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Macroeconomic Effects of Disruptions 
in Global Food Commodity Markets: 
Evidence for the United States
ABSTRACT   We use two approaches to examine the macroeconomic conse­
quences for the United States of disruptions in global food commodity markets. 
First, we embed a novel quarterly composite global production index for the 
four basic staples—corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans—in a standard vector auto­
regression model, and we estimate the dynamic effects of global food commod­
ity supply shocks on the U.S. economy. As an alternative, we also estimate the 
consequences of 13 narratively identified global food commodity price shocks. 
Both approaches lead to similar conclusions. Specifically, an unfavorable food 
commodity market shock raises food commodity prices, and leads to a rise in 
food, energy, and core inflation, and also to a persistent decline in real GDP and 
consumer expenditures. A closer inspection of the pass­through reveals that 
households do not only reduce food consumption. In fact, there is a much greater 
decline in durable consumption and investment. Overall, the macroeconomic 
effects turn out to be a multiple of the maximum impact implied by the share 
of food commodities in the consumer price index and household consumption.
It is almost a truism to say that the characters of the seasons exert a very great 
influence on the amount and quality of our home­produce of wheat from year to 
year; and that upon the amount of food which the crop supplies depends very 
materially, though less than formerly, the general prosperity of the nation.
—John Bennet Lawes and Joseph Henry Gilbert (1868, p. 359)
Until the beginning of the 20th century, agricultural fluctuations were considered very important for the business cycles of advanced econ­
omies (Giffen 1879), but the attention given to these fluctuations vanished 
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as agricultural sectors in developed countries contracted. However, the 
huge swings in food commodity prices since the start of the millennium, 
depicted in figure 1, have reignited interest in the linkages between food 
commodity markets and the macroeconomy. In particular, the surge of 
real global food commodity prices by 67 percent between 2002 and 2011, 
a period that has been described as a “global food crisis,” and their sub­
sequent decline by 40 percent, have attracted a vast interest in under­
standing the economic causes and consequences of developments in food 
commodity markets.1
1. Two examples of newspaper articles addressing this topic are “The World Food Crisis” 
(New York Times, April 10, 2008) and “Global Food Crisis Forecast as Prices Reach Record 
Highs” (The Guardian, October 25, 2010). In 2012, the National Bureau of Economic Research 
directed a panel of academic experts to study the economics of food price volatility (Chavas, 
Hummels, and Wright 2014). See also a number of reports from policy institutions on the 
sources and potential consequences of the surge in food prices (Headey and Fan 2010; Abbott, 
Hurt, and Tyner 2011; Trostle and others 2011) or recent micro economic studies that exam­
ine the welfare implications of food price shocks for households in developing economies 
(Ivanic and Martin 2008; Baquedano and Liefert 2014; Dawe and Maltsoglou 2014).
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Source: International Monetary Fund.  
a. Variables are measured as 100 times the natural log of the index deflated by the U.S. consumer price index.  
b. Real food commodity price is a trade-weighted average of benchmark food prices in U.S. dollars for cereals, 
vegetable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, bananas, and oranges.  
c. Real cereal price is an aggregate of the price of corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans on a trend production-
weighted basis.  
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Real food
commodity priceb
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Figure 1. Evolution of Food Commodity Prices over Time, 1960–2015
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However, surprisingly little is known about the repercussions of dis­
ruptions in global food commodity markets for the business cycles of 
the United States and other advanced countries. This lack of quantitative 
evidence for the macroeconomic effects might be justified by the rela­
tively low and declining share of agriculture in real GDP, and the fact 
that the United States is a modest net exporter of cereals, two features that 
are documented in figure 2; but these explanations appear to be mislead­
ing. The share of agriculture in real GDP has, on average, indeed been 
slightly below 2 percent since the 1960s, but this ignores the fact that food 
commodities are a critical input factor in the production function of the 
food­processing sector, while food and beverages have accounted for 
approximately 17 percent of U.S. household spending between the 1960s 
and today.2 Accordingly, food commodity market fluctuations could also 
have important indirect effects on the U.S. economy; that is, food com­
modity market shocks could affect the economy through their impact on 
consumer spending. Examples include the costs of reallocating labor and 
capital across alternative production activities, precautionary savings, or 
a monetary policy response amplifying output effects. Such effects have 
been put forward in the literature on oil and energy price shocks (Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Watson 1997; Hamilton 2008), but could also apply to food 
commodity price shocks. Moreover, there has been a substantial rise in the 
use of food commodities to produce energy goods in recent periods. For 
example, the share of biofuels in petroleum consumption is currently more 
than 5 percent (see figure 2). Fluctuations in food commodity markets may 
therefore also affect the economy via energy prices.
Quantitative evidence for the macroeconomic consequences is not only 
important for gaining a better understanding of business cycle fluctua­
tions. It is also vital for examining the optimal monetary policy response 
2. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the average share of food and 
beverages in total household expenditures was 17.3 percent between 1960 and 2015. The 
share of food commodities in final food products and beverages expenditures, in turn, 
was 14.1 percent, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research 
Service data, which are only available for the period 1993–2014. This corresponds to $928 
in food commodity expenditures per capita per year (measured in constant 2015 dollar 
values). Overall, only housing and utilities absorb a greater share (17.8 percent) of house­
hold expenditures. The share of oil products (heating oil and motor fuel), for example, 
was on average only 3.8 percent over the same period, while numerous studies have ana­
lyzed the macro economic effects of shocks in the global crude oil market (Hamilton 1983; 
Kilian 2009; Peersman and Van Robays 2009). Notice that about half of gasoline prices 
are determined by the cost of crude oil. Combined with an average share of oil products in 
household expenditures of 3.8 percent, this implies that crude oil expenditures are roughly 
$764 per capita per year.
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Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Energy Information Administration; UN Comtrade Database 
(1-digit SITC).
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Figure 2. Food and the U.S. Economy, 1960–2015
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to changes in food prices or in assessing the usefulness of public food 
security programs, such as the Federal Agricultural Improvement and 
Reform (FAIR) Act and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp Program). Furthermore, it is 
necessary to analyze the repercussions of several policy measures that may 
influence the price of food, such as trade policies (for example, export bans 
or restrictions on food imports) or policies to reduce carbon dioxide emis­
sions (for example, ethanol subsidies or carbon offset programs). Finally, 
empirical evidence for the macroeconomic effects of food market dis­
ruptions should help to assess the consequences of climate change, which 
could increase the likelihood of significant weather shocks in agriculture.
In this paper, we estimate the effects of disturbances in global food com­
modity markets on the U.S. economy during the period 1963:Q1–2013:Q4. 
An empirical analysis of the macroeconomic effects of fluctuations in food 
commodity markets is challenging because food prices likely respond sub­
stantially to both supply and demand conditions, implying that there are also 
reverse causality effects from macroeconomic aggregates on food prices. 
For instance, the unconditional correlation between changes in real global 
food commodity prices and U.S. real GDP is positive. If one is interested 
in a unique causal interpretation, it is thus crucial to isolate movements in 
food prices that are strictly exogenous. We explore two strategies for iden­
tifying such movements.
The first strategy is a joint structural vector autoregression (VAR) model 
for the global food commodity market and the U.S. economy. To identify 
food market disturbances that are unrelated to macroeconomic conditions, 
we construct a novel quarterly composite global production index for the 
four most important staples: corn, wheat, rice and soybeans. Together, 
these commodities make up approximately 75 percent of the caloric con­
tent of food production worldwide. Annual production data for these 
four crops are available from the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) for 192 countries starting in the early 1960s. 
Michael Roberts and Wolfram Schlenker (2013) aggregate the four crops 
on a calorie­weighted basis to construct an annual indicator of world food 
production. We use the same principium to construct a quarterly indicator, 
which is an appropriate frequency for a business cycle analysis. Specifi­
cally, we combine the annual production data for each individual country 
with that country’s planting and harvesting calendars for the four crops. 
Because most countries have only one relatively short harvest season for 
each crop, and there is a delay between planting and harvesting, we can 
assign two­thirds of world food production (or harvests) to a quarterly 
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production index that fulfills the condition that the decision to produce 
(that is, to plant) did occur in an earlier quarter. Accordingly, in a quarterly 
VAR, innovations to the food production index (essentially unanticipated 
harvest shocks) are by construction exogenous to the macroeconomy, and 
the subsequent changes in real GDP, consumer prices, and other macro­
economic variables can be given a causal interpretation.
The estimation results assert that global food market disruptions have 
a considerable influence on the U.S. economy. An unfavorable shock to 
the global food production index of 1 standard deviation raises real food 
commodity prices by approximately 1.7 percent, which in turn leads to a 
0.16 percent rise in consumer prices and a persistent decline in real GDP 
and personal consumption of almost 0.3 percent. According to a simple 
back­of­the­envelope calculation, the effects on consumer prices and per­
sonal consumption are approximately four to six times larger than the max­
imum impact implied by the share of food commodities in the consumer 
price index (CPI) and total consumption expenditures (that is, maximum 
discretionary loss in purchasing power). This denotes that indirect effects 
prevail and magnify the macroeconomic consequences. As a reference 
point, the effects on real GDP are roughly twice as large as the impact of 
a similar rise in global crude oil prices induced by an oil supply shock 
identified within the same VAR model. Additionally, Paul Edelstein and 
Lutz Kilian (2009) find that the response of personal consumption to an 
energy price shock is approximately four times the magnitude of the maxi­
mum discretionary purchasing power loss.
The stylized facts obtained from the VAR turn out to be robust for a 
battery of sensitivity tests and perturbations to the benchmark model. We 
also verify whether the innovations to the global production index are 
picking up other shocks, such as oil price or aggregate demand shocks; 
whether the underlying disturbances have effects on the economy other 
than via fluctuations in food commodity markets (for example, through 
direct effects of weather conditions on economic activity); and whether 
the results are distorted by possible time variation or nonlinearities. Over­
all, we do not find support for these conjectures or that such effects have a 
meaningful influence on the results.
As an alternative strategy to address the identification problem, we use 
a narrative approach in the spirit of James Hamilton (1983), Christina and 
David Romer (1989, 2010), Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998), 
and Ramey (2011). The advantage of narrative methods compared with 
the VAR analysis is that it requires fewer assumptions, and we can use 
a very large information set to identify exogenous food market shocks. 
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More precisely, based on FAO reports, newspaper articles, and several 
other sources, we identify 13 historical episodes in which major changes in 
food commodity prices were mainly driven by exogenous disturbances that 
had little to do with macroeconomic conditions. Examples of unambigu­
ously unfavorable food commodity market shocks are the Russian Wheat 
Deal (combined with a failed monsoon in southeast Asia) in the summer 
of 1972, and the more recent Russian and Ukrainian droughts of 2010 and 
2012. In contrast, a number of unanticipated significant upward revisions 
in the expected harvest volume can be classified as episodes of favorable 
food market shocks (for example, in 1975, 1996, and 2004). As the next 
step, we construct a dummy variable based on these episodes, which is then 
used as an instrument to estimate the consequences of global food com­
modity price shocks for the U.S. economy.
The dynamic effects of the narratively identified shocks are estimated 
using Òscar Jordà’s (2005) local projection method. The results confirm the 
conclusions of the VAR analysis. Whereas the narratively identified shocks 
have a more persistent impact on global food commodity prices and macro­
economic variables, the magnitudes of the effects on economic activity are 
very similar to those of the VAR results. The effects on consumer prices 
are even greater. Overall, the macroeconomic consequences of food market 
disturbances turn out to be substantial.
In our next step, we use the VAR model to examine the pass­through 
to consumer prices and economic activity in more detail. To do this, we 
extend the VAR and estimate the effects of food commodity supply shocks 
on inflation components, household expenditure categories, and other rele­
vant variables, while we also compare the dynamics with oil supply shocks. 
The results reveal that not only do food prices increase after an unfavor­
able food commodity supply shock, but so too does core inflation, as well 
as inflation expectations—and, in recent periods, even energy prices. Oil 
supply shocks, in contrast, only raise energy prices. The significant effects 
on core inflation and inflation expectations are presumably the reason why 
we also observe a monetary policy tightening by the Federal Reserve in 
response to food market disruptions, in contrast to a policy easing follow­
ing unfavorable oil supply shocks. A closer inspection of the impact on the 
components of output further reveal that households do not only reduce 
food consumption expenditures. A key mechanism whereby food market 
shocks affect the economy is through a decline in spending on other goods 
and services, in particular durable consumption and investment.
The monetary policy response can be considered as a first amplifica­
tion mechanism for the strong impact of food commodity supply shocks on 
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economic activity. We argue that this can explain at most one­third of the 
overall output consequences, and that the magnitudes and propagation of 
the remaining (nonmonetary policy) output effects are comparable to those 
of oil supply shocks. More specifically, though food supply shocks have a 
significant impact on food consumption, and oil supply shocks have a sig­
nificant impact on energy consumption (and not the other way around), the 
pass­through of both shocks to all other components of household expen­
ditures and investment appear to be quantitatively and qualitatively very 
much alike. This is even the case for the consumption of motor vehicles 
and parts, a component of expenditures that is typically considered to be 
complementary in use with oil, and thus is perceived as much more sensi­
tive to oil shocks. Our results suggest that other effects are more important 
for the propagation of both shocks. We discuss a number of alternative 
channels that could potentially explain the amplification and composi­
tion of the output effects, but the relevance of these mechanisms is hard 
to identify definitively with the methods used in this paper and is left for 
future research.
In sum, the macroeconomic effects of food market disturbances are 
compelling, and should be taken into account for business cycle analysis, 
countercyclical policies, public risk management schemes for the stabili­
zation of food markets, and the assessment of climate change and policy 
measures that may influence food prices.
In section I, we describe the baseline VAR model, the construction of 
the global food production index, and the other variables that are used 
for the estimations. In section II, we discuss the VAR results and several 
sensitivity checks. The narrative approach is discussed in section III. The 
comparison with oil supply shocks and the pass­through to inflation and 
economic activity are analyzed in section IV. Section V concludes.
I.  A VAR Model for the Global Food Market  
and the U.S. Economy
In this section, we discuss our benchmark VAR model. We propose a strat­
egy to identify exogenous food market disturbances within the VAR model, 
and explain the construction of the quarterly global composite food produc­
tion index. We discuss other variables used in the model in subsection I.D.
I.A. Methodology
To estimate the macroeconomic consequences of disruptions in global 
food commodity markets, it is crucial to identify unanticipated shocks in 
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these markets that are exogenous with respect to the macroeconomy. Our 
first strategy is a structural VAR approach in the spirit of Christopher Sims 
(1980), which has been a popular tool in the literature for estimating the 
effects of shocks related to monetary policy (Bernanke and Mihov 1998), 
fiscal policy (Blanchard and Perotti 2002), the oil market (Kilian 2009), 
technology (Galí 1999), and news (Beaudry and Portier 2006). This method 
allows us to capture the dynamic relationships between macroeconomic 
variables within a linear model, isolate structural innovations in the vari­
ables that are independent of each other, and measure the dynamic effects 
of these innovations on all the variables in the VAR system.
The VAR model that we use has the following reduced form repre­ 
sentation:
1 ,1Z A L Z ut t t( )( ) = α + +-
where Zt is a vector of endogenous variables representing the global food 
commodity market and the U.S. economy, α is a vector of constants and 
seasonal dummies, A(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L, and ut is a 
vector of reduced form residuals. The frequency t of the data is quarterly 
because, as we discuss below, this is essential for the identification of exog­
enous food commodity market shocks.
Because food commodity prices are determined in global markets, Zt 
contains six key variables characterizing these markets: global food com­
modity production, real food commodity prices, global economic activity, 
the real price of crude oil, global crude oil production, and the volume of 
seeds set aside for planting. It is evident that global food production and 
prices portray fluctuations in food markets. Global economic activity mea­
sures changes in global income and the business cycle that could affect the 
demand for food commodities.3 Global oil production and the real price 
of crude oil capture a possible link between oil prices and food commodity 
prices because biofuels can be considered a substitute for crude oil to pro­
duce refined energy products.4 For example, corn is used for producing 
ethanol, and soybeans for producing biodiesel. Alternatively, food com­
modity prices may be affected by oil prices because oil is used in the 
production, processing, and distribution of food commodities. The VAR 
3. This is also typically done in VAR models analyzing the crude oil market (Peersman 
and Van Robays 2009; Kilian 2009; Baumeister and Peersman 2013a).
4. We include both oil market variables because this allows us to also identify oil supply 
shocks in section IV.
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also includes the volume of harvested seeds that are set aside for plant­
ing, which should be an important determinant of future food production. 
Finally, the VAR contains a set of conventional variables representing the 
U.S. macroeconomy: real GDP, real personal consumption, the CPI, and 
the federal funds rate.
I.B. Identifying Exogenous Food Market Disturbances
U.S. and global macroeconomic variables typically have an influence 
on food commodity markets, implying that there is reverse causality from 
macroeconomic aggregates to food market variables.5 For example, a surge 
in global or U.S. economic activity very likely leads to higher food com­
modity prices relatively quickly. This problem is ignored in existing studies 
from policy institutions (for example, the Federal Reserve, the European 
Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) analyzing the pass­
through of changes in food commodity prices to consumer prices.6 These 
studies typically impose a pricing chain assumption; that is, innovations 
in food commodity prices are not contemporaneously affected by shifts in 
consumer prices. The motivation is that commodity prices are determined 
in flexible markets, whereas consumer prices respond to shocks with a 
delay due to the presence of frictions in final goods markets. However, it 
is possible (and likely) that innovations to real GDP will also have an 
immediate impact on food commodity prices, and a delayed effect on con­
sumer prices. Similarly, oil shocks could simultaneously affect food com­
modity prices (on impact) and consumer prices (with a delay). At best, 
such estimates or correlations can be informative about the signaling role 
of food commodity prices for future inflation; but they cannot be given a 
causal interpretation. The same endogeneity problem applies to the analy­
sis of the output effects of fluctuations in food prices.
To investigate the causal macroeconomic effects of disruptions in global 
food markets, it is hence crucial to isolate a series of exogenous shocks that 
are specific to global food commodity markets. In this subsection, we iden­
tify unanticipated supply shocks to global food production. To achieve 
identification, we explore the time lag between the decision to produce 
5. In essence, the reduced form residuals in equation 1 can be thought of as linear com­
binations of, on one hand, the contemporaneous (within the quarter) endogenous response 
of a variable to innovations in the other variables, and on the other hand, exogenous struc­
tural shocks.
6. See, for example, Furlong and Ingenito (1996); Ferrucci, Jiménez­Rodríguez, and 
Onorante (2012); Pedersen (2011); and Furceri and others (2015). For a similar approach, 
see Rigobon (2010).
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(planting) and the actual production (harvest), and the fact that actual 
production is subject to random shocks, which are caused, for example, 
by changes in weather conditions. More specifically, though farmers can 
respond contemporaneously (within the quarter) to macroeconomic devel­
opments by increasing or decreasing the volume of planting, this is not the 
case for actual production because of the time lag between both activities. 
In subsection I.C, we derive a quarterly global food commodity production 
index that explicitly fulfills this criterion. Hence, innovations to this index 
are exogenous food market disruptions (essentially unanticipated harvest 
shocks) that are uncorrelated with other structural shocks. This is identical 
to a Cholesky decomposition of the variance–covariance matrix ut u′t of 
the VAR, in which the food production index is ordered before the other 
variables.7
I.C. Quarterly Composite Global Food Production Index
Measuring world food commodity production is not straightforward. 
Many distinct commodities matter for food consumption and can be con­
sidered as close substitutes for each other. To simplify the analysis, we 
follow Roberts and Schlenker (2013) by transforming the quantities of 
the four most important staples—corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans—into 
calorie equivalents, which are then aggregated into a single composite 
index. Together, these four commodities account for approximately 75 per­
cent of the caloric content of global food production, whereas the prices 
and quantities of other staple food items are also typically linked to these 
four commodities (Roberts and Schlenker 2013).8
Annual production data for each of the four commodities are pub­
lished by the FAO Statistics Division for 192 countries over the period 
1961–2013.9 Roberts and Schlenker (2013) convert the production data, 
which are measured in tons, into edible calories using the conversion fac­
tors developed by Lucille and Paul Williamson (1942). The calories are 
then aggregated across countries and crops. However, annual production 
data are not suitable for our analysis. In particular, the time lag between 
planting and the actual production of a crop typically varies between 3 and 
7. Notice that the ordering of the other variables does not matter for the identification and 
the estimation of the dynamic effects of food commodity market shocks.
8. Corn and soybeans have respectively the greatest and smallest shares of the four major 
staples. Wheat and rice are between the other two, and have approximately equal shares. 
Roberts and Schlenker (2013) use the composite index of the four staples to estimate annual 
global supply and demand elasticities of agricultural commodities.
9. This database is available at http://faostat3.fao.org/.
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10 months, which implies that production could endogenously respond 
to macroeconomic developments when annual data are used. We therefore 
extend the Roberts and Schlenker (2013) approach to a quarterly frequency 
by combining the annual production data with the crop calendars of each 
individual country. This is feasible because the bulk of the countries have 
only one harvesting season for each crop, which lasts for only a few months.
The harvesting and planting dates of the crop calendars are obtained 
from various sources: the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) 
crop calendars for the largest producers and exporters; the Global Infor-
mation and Early Warning System (GIEWS) country briefs; and FAO crop 
calendars.10 These calendars have a monthly frequency. For some very 
small producers, for which no crop calendar was found, the harvesting and 
planting dates of the nearest relevant country are used. The final crop cal-
endar, including country- and crop-specific sources and assumptions, can 
be found in the online appendix to this paper.11 If a single harvesting season is 
spread over two subsequent quarters, we allocate the production volume 
to the first quarter. We only consider harvests for which there is no over-
lap with the planting season at a quarterly frequency. Figure 3 shows some 
examples to illustrate how we have assigned the annual food production 
data to a specific quarter based on the crop calendars (planting and harvest-
ing seasons) of the countries:
—For several crops and countries, the allocation to a specific quarter is 
very obvious. The examples given in figure 3 are for Kazakhstan (wheat), 
Russia (rice), South Africa (corn), and Argentina (soybeans). The harvesting 
seasons clearly occur within a single quarter, whereas the planting seasons 
are one or more quarters beforehand.
—Whenever a single harvesting season is spread over two subsequent 
quarters, we allocate the production volume to the first quarter. The exam-
ples given in figure 3 are Mexico (wheat), China (corn), the United States 
(rice), and Brazil (soybeans).
—Some countries have two planting seasons for some crops, such as 
winter and spring wheat in Russia and Canada. However, because their 
harvesting seasons still occur within a single quarter and the planting seasons 
10. The AMIS crop calendars are available at http://www.amis-outlook.org/amis-about/
calendars/en/; the GIEWS country briefs are available at http://www.fao.org/giews/country 
brief/index.jsp; and the FAO crop calendars are available at http://www.fao.org/agriculture/
seed/cropcalendar/welcome.do.
11. The online appendixes for this and all other papers in this volume may be found at 
the Brookings Papers web page, www.brookings.edu/bpea, under “Past BPEA Editions.”
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are in an earlier quarter, it is possible to allocate the production to a spe-
cific quarter.
—Whenever part of the planting and harvesting seasons overlap at the 
quarterly frequency—for example, for wheat in Brazil—we do not allo-
cate the production. This production is not included in the index.
—For some countries, it is not possible to assign the annual production 
data to a specific quarter because there is more than one harvesting period, or 
because the crops are harvested almost uniformly throughout the year. 
Examples given in figure 3 are Thailand (soybeans) and India (rice). This 
production is not included in the index.
Accordingly, we have managed to assign approximately two-thirds of 
annual world food production to a specific quarter.12 Because of the time 
lag between planting and harvesting of at least one quarter, innovations to 
food production are thus by construction predetermined or exogenous rela-
tive to the other variables included in the VAR. After aggregating the quar-
terly production data across crops and countries, the quarterly global food 
production index is seasonally adjusted using the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
X-13ARIMA-SEATS seasonal adjustment program.13
A couple of points about the index in the context of the VAR analysis are 
worth mentioning. First, although this index does not capture all distur-
bances to global food production, the production volume covered by the 
index should be sufficiently meaningful to influence global food commod-
ity markets, including food commodity prices, which is a prerequisite for 
examining the impact of exogenous food supply shocks on the U.S. macro-
economy. Second, the identified shocks only capture unanticipated changes 
in food production in the harvesting quarter. More specifically, antici-
pated changes in food production before the start of the harvesting season (for 
example, bad weather between planting and harvesting) should already be 
reflected in the other variables and innovations in the VAR, particularly 
food commodity prices.14 Third, our approach assumes that the information 
12. For the individual crops, the index covers 84 percent of global corn production, 
16 percent of rice production, 96 percent of soybean production, and 82 percent of wheat 
production. The coverage of rice production is quite low due to the existence of more than 
one harvesting season in several important producing countries.
13. Information about the program can be found at https://www.census.gov/srd/www/
x13as/.
14. An arbitrage condition ensures that changes in futures prices also shift spot prices of 
storable commodities (Pindyck 1993). If there is a rise in expected food commodity prices—
that is, futures prices increase—traders will buy inventories in the spot market. Hence, spot 
commodity prices also increase.
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sets of local farmers are no greater than the global VAR model. Since 
we do not consider food production forecasts by country, the shocks are 
hence not necessarily identified using the full information sets available to 
the farmers when planting. Finally, our identification strategy also assumes 
that food producers cannot influence the production volume within the 
harvesting quarter. For example, a rise in economic activity or food com-
modity prices could endogenously induce farmers to increase food pro-
duction by increasing fertilization activity. Several studies, however, have 
shown that in-season fertilization is not an efficient way to increase grain 
yields and is not recommended for the food commodities that we consider 
(Mallarino 2010; Schmitt and others 2001; Fanning 2012; Scharf, Wiebold, 
and Lory 2002). Specifically, the best times to apply fertilizer to these 
crops is before or shortly after planting, while fertilization should be com-
pleted before the jointing stage. In fact, fertilizing strategies in the last 
months before the harvest may even be counterproductive and lead to irre-
versible yield loss.15 Whereas some endogenous response might be present, 
this should be meager relative to the variation induced by other factors, for 
example, weather.16
Figure 4 shows the time series of the global food commodity production 
index. There has been an upward trend in food production since the 1960s. 
However, there has also been considerable variation around this trend, 
with spikes of up to 10 percent, suggesting that there have been serious 
food production disruptions. The figure also shows an index of global 
food production excluding U.S. production, and an index of global produc-
tion yields. Both indicators are used below in a sensitivity analysis of the 
benchmark results (subsection II.D). The production yield is defined as the 
ratio of food production to the area harvested, which is also obtained from 
the FAO database (see footnote 9). The upward trend in this variable is flat-
ter than the production volume, implying that part of the food production 
15. The bottom line is that fertilization strategies (for example, nitrogen and phosphate 
applications) enhance plant cell multiplication and stimulate vegetative growth of the 
plant in order to grow as much as possible before the onset of the ripening phase. How-
ever, applying such strategies after the vegetative stage implies that the plant can spend 
less energy on ripening, which could result in lower grain yields. In principle, farmers 
could always reduce food production, for example, by destroying crops or an insufficient 
treatment of diseases during the harvesting season, but that is not likely to happen at a large 
scale.
16. Notice also that the production volume of the four staples that is not covered by our 
index cannot endogenously respond to macroeconomic conditions within the quarter due to 
a standard time lag between planting and harvesting of at least three months.
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expansion is driven by an increase in the amount of land that is used in 
crop production.
I.D. Other Variables
For the baseline estimations, we use the broad food commodity price 
index from the International Monetary Fund. The index is a trade­weighted 
average of different benchmark food prices in U.S. dollars for cereals, veg­
etable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, bananas, and oranges. These bench­
mark prices are representative of the global market and are determined 
by the largest exporter of each commodity. The nominal price index 
has been deflated by the U.S. CPI. The time series is shown in figure 1 
above. Real food commodity prices reached a peak in the 1970s, after 
which there was a steady decline until the early 2000s. The trend is again 
positive until the summer of 2012, and negative afterward. However, 
there have also been many fluctuations around the long­run evolution of 
commodity prices, with noticeable upward spikes in the second half of 
20
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Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
a. The production index aggregates the production of corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans on a calorie-weighted 
basis. 
b. Variables are measured as 100 times the natural log of the global food commodity production index (see the 
text).
c. The production yield is defined as the ratio of food production to the area harvested.
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Production yieldsc
Food production
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Figure 4. Global Food Commodity Production Index, 1961–2014a
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the 1970s, and in 1983, 1987–88, 1995–96, 2002–04, 2007–08, 2010, and 
2012. Overall, the standard deviation of the quarter­on­quarter change in 
real food commodity prices is 5.7 percent.17
Because our production index is limited to the four major staples, we 
have also constructed an alternative composite cereal price index contain­
ing only the prices of corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans. This index, which 
is also shown in figure 1 above, is based on the trend production weights 
of the four commodities and is used below in another sensitivity check of 
the benchmark results. As observed in figure 1, the correlation with the 
International Monetary Fund’s broad index is very high, which is in line 
with the premise that prices for all food commodities tend to vary synchro­
nously. The variation of the cereal price index has, however, been higher 
than the broader food price index, with a quarterly standard deviation of 
7.8 percent.
The volume of seeds from harvests that are set aside for planting is also 
made available by the FAO on an annual basis. We have used the same 
procedure to allocate the annual data to a quarterly series, as described 
in subsection I.C for the production index. Other data are standard. Global 
oil production is obtained from the Oil & Gas Journal for the period before 
1973, and from the U.S. Energy Information Administration afterward, 
following Christiane Baumeister and Peersman (2013b). Similar to Kilian 
(2009), among others, the real oil price series is the refiner acquisition cost 
of imported crude oil, deflated by the U.S. CPI. To proxy global economic 
activity, we follow Baumeister and Peersman (2013a) by using the world 
industrial production index from the Netherlands Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis, which is backcasted for the period before 1991 using 
the growth rate of industrial production from the United Nations. Finally, 
U.S. macroeconomic data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis’s FRED database.
II. VAR Results
In this section we describe the estimation of the VAR model. We show the 
identified shocks and their contribution to real food commodity prices, and 
discuss the dynamic effects on the U.S. economy. In subsection II.D, we 
examine the sensitivity and robustness of the results.
17. As a benchmark, the standard deviation of the change in real crude oil prices is 
11.3 percent over the same period.
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II.A. Inference
The benchmark VAR model for the global food commodity market 
and the U.S. economy has been estimated over the sample period 1963: 
Q1–2013:Q4. All variables are seasonally adjusted natural logarithms 
(multiplied by 100), except for the federal funds rate, which is measured 
in percent. Estimation in log levels gives consistent estimates and allows 
for implicit cointegrating relationships in the data.18 Based on the Akaike 
information criterion, we include five lags of the endogenous variables. 
However, the qualitative results are not sensitive to the lag order choice. In 
subsection II.D, we examine the robustness of the results across subsam­
ples. In the figures, we show the median estimates of the impulse responses, 
together with percentile error bands based on 10,000 draws. These are 
constructed as proposed by Sims and Tao Zha (1999).
II.B.  Identified Shocks and Contribution to Real Food  
Commodity Prices
Figure 5 shows the historical contribution of the identified global food 
commodity supply shocks to the evolution of real food commodity prices 
(solid line), as well as the contribution of all shocks implied by the VAR 
model (dashed line). Overall, the shocks explain approximately 10 percent 
of food commodity price volatility. The contribution of the shocks to real 
food commodity prices corroborates very well with several episodes that 
have been described as (un)favorable developments in food markets. For 
example, the VAR model identifies major favorable food supply shocks 
during the periods or years 1967–72, the mid­1980s, 1992, 1994, 1996–
2000, and 2004–05. In contrast, shocks to the global food production index 
have been unfavorable in the periods or years 1972–77, 1985–88, 1996, 
2000–03, 2005–07, and 2009–12. Almost all these episodes have been 
characterized by significantly falling or rising food commodity prices and 
correlate with many spikes discussed in subsection I.D.
18. See Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) for inference in VAR models when some or 
all the variables have unit roots. In particular, they show that even when variables have 
stochastic trends and are cointegrated, the log levels specification gives consistent esti­
mates. Conversely, pretesting and imposing the unit root and cointegration relationships 
could lead to serious distortions when regressors almost have unit roots (Elliott 1998). 
Notice that the results are robust when we estimate the VAR with a linear (or quadratic) 
time trend.
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The cumulative contribution of the identified food commodity supply 
shocks to the surges in food commodity prices between 2005–07 and 
2009–12 has been more than 10 percentage points each time. Accordingly, 
unfavorable harvests contributed significantly to the so­called global food 
crisis between 2002 and 2011. Nevertheless, as observed in the figure, the 
bulk of the crisis has been caused by other shocks. This is not surprising 
and is in line with common perceptions and several studies that have 
analyzed the sources of the food crisis. A popular source that has been 
postulated by pundits is the considerable rise of food commodity demand 
induced by biofuels. Specifically, policy measures to encourage biofuels 
production—for example, renewable fuel standard mandates—and the 
simultaneous surge in oil prices appear to have triggered a persistent 
demand for corn and upward pressure on corn and food commodity prices 
(Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner 2011). For instance, the share of U.S. corn 
production used to produce ethanol increased from 12 percent in 2004 to 
almost 40 percent in 2010, and ethanol production absorbed 70 percent 
of the increase in global corn production over that period (Headey and 
–20
0
20
40
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
a. Calculated as the actual data minus the baseline of the VAR. 
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All shocksa
Food commodity 
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Figure 5. Historical Contribution of Identified Shocks to Real Food Commodity Prices, 
1963–2013
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Fan 2010).19 Examples of other shocks mentioned in the literature are the 
strong income growth in the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China) during that period—which allowed citizens of these countries to 
incorporate larger quantities of cereals, meat, and other proteins into their 
diets (Zhang and Law 2010)—low interest rates, the depreciation of the 
U.S. dollar, and financial market speculation (Enders and Holt 2014). A 
final interesting feature revealed by the historical contribution of the identi­
fied global food commodity market disturbances is that favorable harvests 
seemed to have lowered food commodity prices by more than 10 percent 
in 2013.
II.C. Impact of Food Market Disruptions on the U.S. Economy
The impulse responses to a shock of 1 standard deviation in the global 
food production index are shown in figure 6. These should be interpreted 
as the dynamic effects of an unanticipated decline in the food production 
index on all the variables in the VAR, controlling for other changes in the 
economy that may also have an impact on the variables. The shock cor­
responds to a decline in the food production index of 4 percent. The drop 
in food production leads to a significant temporary rise in real (nominal) 
food commodity prices, which reaches a peak of approximately 1.7 per­
cent (1.8 percent) after one quarter, and a persistent decline in global eco­
nomic activity. Global oil production starts to decrease after approximately 
two quarters, which is in line with the pattern of the decline in global eco­
nomic activity, while the impact on the real price of oil is insignificant at 
all horizons.
Global food commodity production returns to the baseline after one 
quarter. This pattern, together with the persistent response of food com­
modity prices, is consistent with John Muth’s (1961) rational expectations 
model for commodity markets with speculation, and is at odds with the 
so­called cobweb theorem. Specifically, Muth (1961) shows that the intro­
duction of rational expectations into a linear model with a production lag 
of storable commodities and random shocks to production should gener­
ate first­order serial correlation in prices, while actual production is just a 
19. Notice that biofuels demand did not only strongly account for corn price increases 
during that period but also price increases in other staples. For example, the rapid expansion 
of the U.S. corn area by 23 percent in 2007 resulted in a 16 percent decline in the soybean 
area, which reduced soybean production, contributing to the strong rise in soybean prices 
(Mitchell 2008). Furthermore, European biofuels production has mainly been concentrated 
on biodiesel, which resulted in a crowding­out of the wheat area by oilseeds and hence 
higher wheat prices.
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Benchmark VAR Resultsa
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perturbation around its steady state. Cobweb models, in contrast, pre­
dict negative serial correlation in prices and oscillatory commodity cycles 
(Ezekiel 1938). Our findings clearly support the former, which is in line 
with most empirical studies testing the rational­expectations, competitive­
storage model of agricultural commodities (Gouel 2012). The contempora­
neous decline in the volume of seeds that are set aside for planting, followed 
by a similar rise one year after the shock, also suggests that farmers use 
inventories to smooth sales and production over time.
U.S. real GDP U.S. real personal consumption
U.S. CPI Federal funds rate
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Source: Authors’ calculations.  
a. The sample period is 1963:Q1–2013:Q4. The darker shading indicates the 16th and 84th percentile error 
bands; the lighter shading indicates the 5th and 95th percentile error bands.  
Figure 6. Impulse Responses to Global Food Commodity Supply Shocks: Benchmark 
VAR Resultsa (Continued )
Chapter 1 - 22 
JASMIEN DE WINNE and GERT PEERSMAN 205
The influence of global food market disruptions on the U.S. economy is 
considerable. In particular, real GDP starts to decrease after two quarters, 
reaching a maximum decline of 0.28 percent after five to six quarters, and 
then gradually returns to the baseline. Although the rise in real food com­
modity prices lasts for only four quarters, the decline in real GDP is still 
significant after two years. The macroeconomic consequences are thus 
very persistent. A similar pattern appears for the response of households’ 
real personal consumption expenditures. The shock in global food com­
modity markets also leads to a temporary surge in consumer prices with 
a peak of 0.16 percent, while there is a rise in the federal funds rate of 
8 basis points on impact.
The magnitudes of the effects are striking. According to a simple back­
of­the­envelope calculation, the responses of consumer prices and total 
consumption are about four to six times larger than the maximum direct 
influence that food commodities may have on the CPI and personal con­
sumption. More precisely, the rise of nominal commodity prices is 1.8 per­
cent at its peak. Given an average share of food commodities in final food 
products and beverages of 14.1 percent and a share of food and beverages 
in total household expenditures of 17.3 percent, the maximum direct effect 
of the rise in food commodity prices on consumer prices and total consump­
tion is approximately 0.04 to 0.05 percent.20 This suggests that indirect 
effects are important in magnifying the macroeconomic repercussions; that 
is, not only food prices but also other components of the CPI should increase 
after a surge in food commodity prices, while the decline in consumption 
cannot solely be the consequence of a discretionary income effect. In sec­
tion IV, we analyze this in more detail.
Whereas disturbances in food commodity markets have obviously not 
been the main driver of the U.S. business cycle, the identified global food 
market shocks did contribute to several post–World War II recessions. This 
can be observed in figure 7, which shows the cumulative contribution of 
the identified shocks to real GDP over time (solid line), the contribution of 
all shocks to real GDP implied by the benchmark VAR model (dashed line), 
20. The implicit assumption for the upper bound of the direct effect on total consumption 
is that the rise in food commodity prices is fully induced by higher prices for imported food 
commodities, which leads to a reduction in discretionary income of households to buy con­
sumption goods. In addition, households are assumed not to borrow or dissave in response to 
the shock. For the average share of food and beverages in total household expenditures over 
the sample period, and the share of food commodities in final food products and beverages, 
we refer to figure 2 and footnote 2.
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and the National Bureau of Economic Research’s recession periods (gray 
bars). Although our index only captures a subset of food market disrup­
tions, unfavorable shocks to global food production seem to have contrib­
uted to the recessions in 1974 (0.3 percent contribution to the decline in real 
GDP), 1982 (0.6 percent), the early 1990s (0.2 percent), 2001 (0.7 percent), 
and the Great Recession of 2008–09 (0.5 percent). In nonrecessionary peri­
ods, food commodity market shocks also had a meaningful influence on 
economic activity. For example, favorable food supply shocks increased 
real GDP by roughly 2 percent in the period 1967–72, by 1.7 percent in 
the mid­1980s, by 1.8 percent in 1997–2000, and by 1.7 percent between 
2003 and 2005. In sum, the macroeconomic repercussions of food market 
disturbances have been important for the U.S. economy.
II.D. The Sensitivity and Robustness of Benchmark Results
In section III, we examine the robustness of the results by using a narra­
tive approach that does not rely on the global food commodity production 
index and VAR methodology. But before doing this, we consider a set of 
alternative VAR specifications to assess the sensitivity of the results that 
–6
–4
–2
0
2
4
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
a. Gray areas indicate recessions. 
b. Calculated as the actual data minus the baseline of the VAR. 
Percent
All shocksb
Food commodity 
supply shocks
Figure 7. Historical Contribution of Identified Shocks to U.S. Real GDP, 1963–2013a
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are based on the production index. We also investigate whether the esti­
mations are picking up other effects and the stability of the results across 
subsamples.
DID WE IDENTIFY EXOGENOUS FOOD COMMODITY MARKET SHOCKS? Due to 
the time lag between the planting and the harvesting seasons, shocks to the 
global food commodity production index should in principle be exogenous 
with respect to the macroeconomy. In subsection I.C, we also argued that 
farmers cannot influence grain yields any more in the harvesting quarter, 
for example, by raising fertilization activity. As noted above, fertilizer 
applications must be implemented before or early in the growing season 
and may even lead to yield loss if they are implemented shortly before 
harvesting. Nevertheless, it is worth verifying whether the innovations 
are picking up other shocks, such as oil price or aggregate demand shocks. 
Furthermore, it is important to check whether the identified disturbances 
have effects on the economy other than via fluctuations in food commod­
ity markets. In particular, given that food production shocks are primarily 
the consequence of weather variation, changes in U.S. weather condi­
tions may simultaneously affect food production and economic activity.21 
Michael Boldin and Jonathan Wright (2015) find that unusual tempera­
tures have a statistically significant effect on U.S. real GDP growth in the 
first and second quarters. For example, several panel studies find signi­
ficant negative effects of hotter temperatures on agricultural output, and 
also on labor productivity and labor supply at the spatial level (Dell, 
Jones, and Olken 2014).22 Additionally, storms may distort the estima­
tions and exaggerate the role of food commodity markets in macro­
economic developments.
Overall, we do not find compelling support for the hypothesis that the 
innovations are picking up other shocks or are having meaningful direct 
effects on economic activity, other than through food commodity markets, 
for several reasons. First, a closer inspection of the impulse responses 
21. This evidence is usually only found for poor countries; several papers have found 
that temperature shocks have little effect on per capita income or industrial value­added 
output at the spatial level in rich countries (Dell, Jones, and Olken 2014).
22. Boldin and Wright (2015) do not find a significant impact of unusual snowfall on 
real GDP growth. Based on their estimations, they construct a counterfactual weather­
adjusted series for GDP growth. Unfortunately, we cannot use their series as a robustness 
check because the series only starts in 1990:Q1. The series also has the property that weather 
shocks cannot have a permanent effect on the level of real GDP. Any influence of weather 
conditions on the level of real GDP is therefore “neutralized” in subsequent quarters. This is 
clearly different from the pattern of the impulse responses in figure 6.
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shown in figure 6 conveys the perception that both issues probably do not 
have an important influence on the results. Specifically, global economic 
activity and U.S. real GDP only start to decline with a delay of at least two 
quarters after the identified food market disruptions. Put differently, the 
shocks are not reflected in economic activity on impact, which implies that 
the innovations are not aggregate demand shocks and that the direct effects 
of the underlying global weather conditions on the U.S. economy cannot be 
large.23 Similarly, global oil production only decreases after approximately 
three quarters, whereas the response of crude oil prices is never significant 
and is even slightly negative at longer horizons.
In addition, the return to the baseline of global food production after one 
quarter in the benchmark VAR confirms that the innovations do not cap­
ture endogenous responses to macroeconomic conditions. If food produc­
ers endogenously adjust their production yields to changes in economic 
activity, we should instead observe a persistent response function. Specifi­
cally, if farmers are able to augment (reduce) grain yields within one quar­
ter, this should also (and even more) be the case in the subsequent quarter. 
The absence of autocorrelation in the production response, however, is at 
odds with such endogenous behavior. Notice that it is also unlikely that the 
identified shocks capture an endogenous response of farmers to changes 
in expected (future) economic activity. This is illustrated in the top panel of 
figure 8. The panel shows the dynamic effects of food commodity supply 
shocks on equity prices (as measured by the S&P 500 index) and implied 
stock market volatility (as measured by the VIX volatility index). These 
impulse responses have been estimated by adding both variables one by 
one to the benchmark VAR model. If the innovations pick up shocks in 
expected economic activity or economic uncertainty, there should be a 
significant contemporaneous shift in equity prices or stock market vola­
tility. This is clearly not the case. Equity prices only start to decline with 
a delay, whereas the impact on stock market volatility is insignificant at 
all horizons.
In contrast to the macroeconomic and financial market variables, the 
contemporaneous responses of all the global food commodity market vari­
ables in the benchmark VAR are statistically significant. The patterns of the 
impulse response functions—that is, food production and prices shifting 
23. We also find no correlation between the series of the annualized food commodity 
supply shocks and the annual occurrence (–.09), the total number of deaths (.11), or the total 
dollar damage estimate (.07) of U.S. natural disasters reported in the EM­DAT database 
(http://www.emdat.be/database).
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a. Shows the impulse response function of the S&P 500 index and the VIX stock market volatility index by 
adding these variables to the benchmark VAR. The darker shading indicates the 16th and 84th percentile error 
bands; the lighter shading indicates the 5th and 95th percentile error bands. 
b. Shows the annual USDA forecast revisions for world grains output and annual food commodity supply 
shocks.  
c. Food commodity supply shocks are calorie-weighted aggregates of corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans. Annual 
shocks are the sum of the four quarters. 
d. USDA forecasts are millions of metric tons of wheat, coarse grains (corn, sorghum, barley, oats, rye, millet, 
and mixed grains), and milled rice. Forecast revisions are the sum of forecast revisions for the periods May–
December and December–April.  
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Figure 8. Did We Identify Exogenous Food Commodity Market Shocks?
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in opposite directions—are also consistent with food supply shocks and 
are hard to reconcile with other types of disturbances. Moreover, as can 
be observed in the bottom panel of figure 8, the estimated innovations 
coincide quite well with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) 
forecast revisions. Since the early 1980s, the USDA’s World Agricul­
tural Outlook Board has regularly published projections of world annual 
grains production.24 These projections are always for the period May–April 
(known as the marketing year), and are an aggregate (millions of metric 
tons) of wheat, coarse grains (corn, sorghum, barley, oats, rye, millet, 
and mixed grains), and milled rice. In order to match with the calendar 
year frequency of the supply shocks obtained from the VAR, we take the 
sum of the USDA’s forecast revisions for the periods May–December 
and December–April. Despite the different compositions and weighting 
schemes, and the fact that the annual USDA forecast revisions also cap­
ture anticipated production innovations before the planting and harvest ing 
quarter, the correlation between both series (.53) turns out to be relatively 
high. In sum, both the impulse responses and shock series corroborate that 
we have identified global food commodity market disruptions, and it is 
unlikely that the innovations capture other important effects or endogenous 
responses to the macroeconomy.
This reasoning is also confirmed by the first sensitivity check reported 
in figure 9, which shows the results of several alternative VAR models. The 
first sensitivity check orders the global food production index after global 
oil production, the real price of oil, and global economic activity in the 
Cholesky decomposition. This implies that the identified food commodity 
production shocks are by construction orthogonal to all possible innova­
tions in global economic activity and the crude oil market. All variables 
are the same as in the benchmark VAR; to save space, however, we only 
show the impulse responses of six key variables. As observed in panel A 
of the figure, the impulse responses are nearly identical to the benchmark 
results.
As a second sensitivity test, we exclude U.S. food commodity produc­
tion from the global production index and reestimate the VAR model with 
this alternative index. Accordingly, we only identify external food com­
modity supply shocks, which could in principle not have a direct effect on 
24. An archive of these World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates can be found 
at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1194.
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Figure 9. Effects of Global Food Commodity Supply Shocks on Key Variables:  
Sensitivity Analysisa
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Global food production Real food commodity prices
Panel B. Global food production index, excluding U.S. food production, 
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Figure 9. Effects of Global Food Commodity Supply Shocks on Key Variables:  
Sensitivity Analysisa (Continued )
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Global food production Real food commodity prices
Panel C. Real cereal prices as a measure of the food commodity price
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Figure 9. Effects of Global Food Commodity Supply Shocks on Key Variables:  
Sensitivity Analysisa (Continued )
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Global food production Real food commodity prices
Panel D. Global food production yields as a measure of food production
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Figure 9. Effects of Global Food Commodity Supply Shocks on Key Variables:  
Sensitivity Analysisa (Continued )
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Global food production Real food commodity prices
  Panel E. VAR estimated in first differences 
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Figure 9. Effects of Global Food Commodity Supply Shocks on Key Variables:  
Sensitivity Analysisa (Continued )
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Global food production Real food commodity prices
Panel F. FAVAR with six unobserved macroeconomic factors,
global food production, and real food commodity prices 
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Source: Authors’ calculations.  
a. The range shown around estimates are the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The solid line and shaded 
area are the results of the benchmark VAR (same as in figure 6); the dashed and dotted lines are results of the 
alternative VAR specification.  
Figure 9. Effects of Global Food Commodity Supply Shocks on Key Variables:  
Sensitivity Analysisa (Continued )
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U.S. real GDP.25 The results, which are shown in panel B of figure 9, turn 
out to be very similar to the benchmark results. Notice that this is also 
the case when we additionally exclude food production of the neighboring 
countries from the global production index. These impulse responses are 
not shown in the figure, but are available upon request. In sum, it is unlikely 
that the identified innovations are picking up other shocks, or that there are 
significant direct effects of weather variation on the U.S. economy.
ALTERNATIVE VAR SPECIFICATIONS The results are also robust for several 
other perturbations to the benchmark VAR. More precisely, panel C of fig­
ure 9 exhibits the impulse responses of the benchmark VAR model esti­
mated with the real cereal price index instead of the broad food commodity 
price index. This index—which only contains the price of corn, wheat, rice, 
and soybeans—is less representative of the global food commodity market 
but corresponds more directly to the production index. As observed in the 
figure, cereal prices increase much more than the broad commodity price 
index after a decline in the production index. The maximum impact of a 
shock of 1 standard deviation on real cereal prices is 3.0 percent, while the 
rise in the broad index is 1.7 percent. However, the responses of all other 
variables are analogous to the benchmark effects. The results are thus not 
sensitive to the choice of the food price measure. Panel D of figure 9 shows 
the results with global food production yields as a measure of food produc­
tion, which also takes into account the area harvested (and planted). The 
results are again in line with the benchmark findings. The magnitude of the 
shock is somewhat lower, but the effects on real food commodity prices, 
real GDP, consumer prices, and all other variables are quite similar to the 
benchmark estimations.
Finally, we check the robustness of the results for the modeling choices 
we have made. Specifically, panel E of figure 9 shows the results of 
25. External food commodity supply shocks would not have a direct effect on U.S. real 
GDP unless there is a systematic correlation of non­U.S. food production shocks and U.S. 
food production. If this is the case, the correlation is probably small given the global level of 
our analysis. For example, the correlation between the estimated global food supply innova­
tions and the Multivariate El Niño Southern Oscillation Index, the Oceanic Niño Index, and 
a dummy variable based on the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s 
definition of El Niños varies between -.10 and -.11. The correlation between food produc­
tion shocks excluding U.S. production and the El Niño variables varies between -.14 and 
-.16. None of the correlations are statistically significant. Notice that this exercise does not 
rule out that weather variation has an effect on economic activity beyond food commodity 
markets in other countries, which could in turn affect the U.S. economy via trade. In sec­
tion IV, however, we document that trade effects are relatively small and that export is not an 
important driver of the output consequences.
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the benchmark VAR model estimated in first differences, while panel F 
depicts the impulse responses of the key variables estimated with a factor­
augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) model. Differencing the data 
does not account for cointegrating relationships in the data, but it is less 
likely that the results are distorted, because initial conditions explain an 
unreasonably large share of the low­frequency variation in the variables.26 
The advantage of a FAVAR model is that it uses information from a large 
number of time series, which reduces the possibility of an omitted vari­
able bias. We borrow the 207­variable FAVAR model that James Stock 
and Mark Watson (2016) have used to estimate the effects of oil market 
shocks. The FAVAR is estimated with five lags of two observed factors 
(that is, the global food production index and real food commodity prices) 
and six unobserved factors.27
The impulse responses of the alternative models in panels E and F of 
figure 9 have been accumulated and are shown in levels. Five interesting 
observations, which mostly apply to both models, are worth mentioning. 
First, the contemporaneous decline in global food production is somewhat 
greater than in the benchmark VAR. Second, there is a permanent decline 
in global food production, along with a very persistent rise in real food 
commodity prices. The finding that a bad harvest in one region leads to a 
long­run decline of food production in another region (despite higher food 
prices) is rather surprising. A possible explanation is that both models 
do not account for cointegrating relationships among the variables. Third, 
whereas the magnitudes are in the same neighborhood of the benchmark 
VAR results, the shapes of the output effects turn out to be different. In 
particular, the estimated peak effects of food market shocks on economic 
activity are approximately one year later in the FAVAR and the VAR esti­
mated in first differences, compared with the VARs estimated in log levels. 
26. VARs estimated with ordinary least squares or flat priors tend to attribute an implau­
sibly large share of the variation in the data to a deterministic component. The reason is that 
the criterion of fit does not penalize parameter values that make the initial conditions unrea­
sonable as draws from the model’s implied unconditional distribution. As a result, the model 
attributes the low­frequency behavior of the data to a process of return from the initial condi­
tions to the unconditional mean. This issue has been raised in the context of Mark Watson’s 
discussion of our paper. Also see Sims (2000) for a discussion on the role of initial conditions 
for the low­frequency variation in observed time series.
27. This model has also been used by Mark Watson for the discussion of our paper. We are 
grateful to him for sharing the code and data sets. The 207­variable time series consists of real 
activity, prices, productivity, earnings, interest rates, spreads, money, credit, assets, wealth, 
and oil market variables, as well as variables representing international activity. All variables 
are transformed to a stationary form. See Stock and Watson (2016) for details.
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Fourth, the impact of food commodity market disturbances on consumer 
prices seems to be much larger than the benchmark effects, particularly in 
the FAVAR model. Notice, however, that the uncertainty of the estimates is 
quite high, while the error bands overlap. Fifth and finally, the federal funds 
rate also rises more strongly in the FAVAR. Overall, although the shapes of 
several impulse responses are somewhat different, we can conclude that the 
magnitudes of the macroeconomic consequences of food commodity mar­
ket shocks are not sensitive to the modeling choices we have made.28
SUBSAMPLE ANALYSIS We now assess the robustness of the results across 
subsamples. A constraint on doing this is the relatively large number of 
variables and lags in the benchmark VAR model, which causes over para­
meterization problems for short sample periods. We therefore report the 
results of two exercises. First, we reestimate the benchmark VAR model 
for the sample periods 1963:Q1–1999:Q4 and 1985:Q1–2013:Q4, respec­
tively. The former sample period does not take into account the global food 
crisis of the 2000s and the subsequent collapse of food commodity prices, 
or the recent rising relevance of biofuels in energy consumption depicted 
in figure 2. The latter sample period, in contrast, excludes the major swings 
of food commodity prices in the 1970s and the so­called Great Inflation 
monetary policy regime.
The results for the subsamples are shown in figure 10. Interestingly, 
despite the reduced relevance of food consumption in total household 
expenditures over time, the effects of global food commodity supply shocks 
on real GDP, personal consumption, and consumer prices are quite similar 
for both subsamples and are comparable to the benchmark VAR results. 
A possible explanation is the increased share of biofuels in energy con­
sumption in recent times, which could have offset the declining share of 
food consumption in household expenditures. In particular, the increased 
ethanol production in the second half of the 2000s could have led to a 
28. By estimating food production equations (with all lagged VAR variables as indepen­
dent variables), and implementing the residuals in a simple local projection framework, we 
have also explored whether the existence of nonlinearities could have influenced the estima­
tion results. Specifically, we have examined whether the macroeconomic consequences are 
different (i) when we allow food production to react differently to increases and decreases 
of the lagged independent variables, (ii) depending on the quarter of the shock, and (iii) for 
unfavorable versus favorable shocks. Overall, we do not find evidence that nonlinearities 
have distorted the average effects reported in this paper. We do find support for the hypoth­
esis that unfavorable shocks have stronger macroeconomic effects than favorable shocks 
(respectively greater and smaller than the average effects). The standard errors are, however, 
relatively large. It is worth investigating this more carefully in future research.
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Figure 10. Subsample Analysis Based on Benchmark VAR:  
1963–99 versus 1985–2013a
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a. The range shown around estimates are the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The solid line and shaded 
area are the results for the period 1985:Q1–2013:Q4; the dashed and dotted lines are the results for the period 
1963:Q1–1999:Q4. 
Figure 10. Subsample Analysis Based on Benchmark VAR: 1963–99 versus  
1985–2013a (Continued )
tighter link between agricultural and energy prices, magnifying the con­
sequences of food commodity market disruptions for the U.S. economy 
at the end of the sample.
An enhanced link between food commodity markets and energy prices is 
confirmed by the second exercise to assess time variation. For this exercise, 
we borrow results from Peersman, Sebastian Rüth, and Wouter Van der 
Veken (2016). More specifically, elaborating on the present study, Peersman, 
Rüth, and Van der Veken (2016) estimate a more parsimonious version 
of the benchmark VAR across subsamples—as well as time­varying 
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parameter VARs with stochastic volatility, in the spirit of Giorgio Primiceri 
(2005)—to examine whether crude oil and food commodities have become 
more closely linked in recent periods. The VAR used by Peersman, 
Rüth, and Van der Veken (2016) contains the global food production 
index, real cereal prices, global crude oil production, the real price of 
crude oil, and global economic activity. Within the VAR model, global 
food commodity supply and crude oil supply shocks are identified. The 
results reveal that unfavorable food commodity supply shocks have no 
impact on global crude oil prices until 2003, after which their impact starts 
to gradually rise over time. A similar story emerges for oil supply shocks; 
that is, oil supply shocks have no significant effects on real cereal prices 
until 2003, after which the effects become significant. Hence, crude oil 
and food commodities seem to have become closer substitutes over time, 
in line with the rising share of biofuels in petroleum consumption.
In the first panel of figure 11, we reproduce Peersman, Rüth, and Van der 
Veken’s (2016) results for the sample periods 1985:Q1–2002:Q4 and 
2003:Q1–2014:Q4 for global food commodity supply shocks.29 As can be 
observed in the figure, a food market disturbance that raises real cereal 
prices also triggers an immediate shift of crude oil prices in the post­2003 
period. In the second panel, we show the macroeconomic consequences of 
the shocks in both periods by adding a set of U.S. variables one by one 
to the five­variable VAR model. Some caution when interpreting the mag­
nitudes of the responses is required because the rise in real cereal prices is 
more persistent in the first subsample period. If we take this into account, 
we can again conclude that the consequences for real GDP, personal con­
sumption, and consumer prices have not dramatically changed over time. 
But this is not the case for CPI energy. In particular, food commodity 
supply shocks turn out to have a significant impact on CPI energy in the 
recent period, in contrast to an insignificant effect in the period before 
2003. Put differently, due to the rising share of biofuels in energy consump­
tion, food market disturbances currently also have inflationary effects via 
energy prices.
29. Notice that the VARs given by Peersman, Rüth, and Van der Veken (2016) are esti­
mated with real cereal prices because cereal prices are more directly linked to biofuels. It is 
also easier to compare the magnitudes with real crude oil prices and examine their interplay. 
The impulse responses in both periods have been normalized to the maximum rise of real 
cereal prices obtained in subsection II.D. Furthermore, because the VAR model does not 
contain the volume of seeds that are set aside for planting, there is one extra year of data 
available at the end of the sample period relative to the benchmark VAR in the present paper.
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Figure 11. Subsample Analysis Based on Smaller VAR: 1985–2002 versus 2003–14a
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a. The range shown around estimates are the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The solid line and shaded 
area are the results for the period 2003:Q1–2014:Q4; the dashed and dotted lines are the results for the period 
1985:Q1–2002:Q4. 
b. Variables are added one by one to the global VAR model. 
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III.  A Narrative Approach to Identifying  
Food Market Disturbances
As an alternative approach to examine the consequences of food commod­
ity market disruptions for the U.S. economy, we rely in this section on 
historical documents to identify exogenous food market shocks. Narrative 
methods to address the identification problem have a long­standing tradi­
tion in macroeconomics. For example, they were used by Romer and Romer 
(1989) to estimate the effects of monetary policy changes. By examining 
the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee’s policy deliberations, 
they identify six episodes of large independent restrictive monetary policy 
shocks, which are then included as a dummy variable in an autoregressive 
model to estimate the macroeconomic consequences. Similarly, by read­
ing through Bloomberg Businessweek, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) create 
a dummy variable capturing major military buildups. The dummy is then 
embedded in a standard VAR to examine the impact of government spend­
ing shocks. Ramey (2011) extends this approach by creating a quantitative 
narrative series of exogenous news shocks on government spending. Romer 
and Romer (2010) use the narrative record, including presidential speeches 
and congressional reports, to identify major tax policy shocks. Perhaps most 
closely related to our application, Hamilton (1983, 2003) considers a num­
ber of historical episodes when changes in oil prices were almost solely 
driven by exogenous disturbances to supply that had little to do with macro­ 
economic conditions—for example, political and military conflicts in oil­
producing countries—to estimate the dynamic effects of oil market shocks.
Whereas VARs are constrained by relatively small information sets, 
the advantage of a narrative approach is the possibility of incorporating a 
large amount of information, including expectations. It also requires fewer 
assumptions, and there is no need to identify a structural form. However, 
it implies judgment on the part of the researcher, whereas shocks may still 
contain endogenous components. It can thus be considered a useful comple­
mentary analysis for the VAR results based on the global food production 
index. In subsection III.A, we describe the narrative approach to identify 
exogenous food commodity market shocks. Subsection III.B discusses the 
estimation method, and subsection III.C presents the results.
III.A.  Historical Episodes of Major Exogenous  
Food Commodity Market Shocks
To quantify the macroeconomic consequences of changes in food com­
modity prices, it is crucial to identify changes in food commodity prices 
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that are unrelated to the state of the economy—that is, movements for 
which the proximate causes are disturbances in global food commodity 
markets. We rely on FAO reports, newspaper articles, disaster databases, 
and several other online sources to identify historical episodes of such 
movements. The task is daunting, given the global level of the analysis. 
Continuous, and many times even conflicting, events affect food com­
modity markets somewhere in the world. We therefore only include epi­
sodes that fulfill these criteria:
—There needs to be an event that is important enough to affect food 
commodity markets at the global level, such as weather shocks in a major 
food­producing region, or unanticipated news on the volume of global 
food production (for example, a sizable revision of expected agricultural 
production by the USDA).
—The event should have an unambiguous significant effect on global 
food commodity prices. A shift in commodity prices is considered to be 
significant if either the quarterly change in food commodity prices or 
the accumulated change over two subsequent quarters differs by at least 1 
standard deviation from the sample mean.30
—There should be no developments in the macroeconomy, alternative 
events, or macroeconomic news that could also have a discernible impact 
on food commodity prices. For example, we do not consider admissible 
food market events if there is simultaneously a significant shift in crude oil 
prices (1 standard deviation from its sample mean) or in economic activity 
(for example, a U.S. or global recession). Put differently, we eliminate or 
minimize possible endogenous movements in food commodity prices to 
current or future fluctuations in the business cycle; that is, the event in 
food commodity markets must be the proximate cause of the price shift.31 
No ambiguous cases are selected as episodes.
A narrative approach to identifying exogenous shocks involves judg­
ment calls, which is a concern we acknowledge. However, we believe that 
we have identified 13 episodes that could reasonably be interpreted as 
major exogenous food commodity market disturbances that are unrelated 
to the state of the economy. The estimation results are not driven by a 
30. The standard deviations of the quarterly change in food commodity prices and accu­
mulated change over two subsequent quarters are 5.7 and 9.1 percent, respectively, while the 
means are -0.31 and -0.62 percent, respectively.
31. Crude oil is not only used in the food production process or a close substitute for 
food commodities to produce energy products. A shift in crude oil prices could also signal 
changes in (expected) demand for commodities more generally.
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single episode because they are relatively similar if we exclude individual 
events from the estimations. Six episodes are unfavorable food market dis­
ruptions, whereas we have detected seven favorable shocks to food com­
modity markets. Examples of unambiguously unfavorable shocks include 
the Russian Wheat Deal (combined with a failed monsoon in southeast 
Asia) in the summer of 1972 and the more recent Russian and Ukrainian 
droughts of 2010 and 2012. Conversely, a number of unanticipated signifi­
cant upward revisions in the expected harvest volume (for example, in 
1975, 1996, and 2004) can clearly be classified as episodes of favorable 
food market shocks. The dates, as well as brief descriptions of all global 
food commodity market events, are reported in table 1. A detailed motiva­
tion for the selected quarters can be found in the online appendix to the 
paper. In every case, we attempt to give explanations and quotations so 
other researchers can see our reasoning for classifying the episodes as food 
commodity market disruptions. To give an idea of our approach, the appen­
dix at the end of this paper reproduces the motivation for the most recent 
shock that we identified in 2012:Q3.
III.B. Estimation Method
There is no one­to­one mapping between the true structural shocks and 
the observed changes in food commodity prices in these 13 episodes. We 
therefore first construct a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for the 
unfavorable food market disturbances that we have identified and is equal 
to -1 for favorable food market events. The idea is that this dummy vari­
able series is a noisy measure of the true food market shocks and can be 
used as an external instrument to identify exogenous changes in global 
food commodity prices. In this context, Karel Mertens and Morten Ravn 
(2013) show that a series based on narrative evidence is robust to many 
types of measurement problems and is a valid instrument, as long as the 
series is contemporaneously correlated with the structural shock and is 
contemporaneously uncorrelated with all other structural shocks in the 
economy.
In the next step, we examine the dynamic effects of shocks to global 
food commodity prices on the U.S. economy using Jordà’s (2005) local 
projection method for estimating impulse responses.32 The advantage of the 
local projection method is that it is more robust to misspecification than 
32. A similar approach has been used by Ramey and Zubairy (2014) to estimate the 
effects of narratively identified government spending shocks.
Chapter 1 - 45 
Ta
bl
e 
1.
 O
ve
rv
ie
w
 o
f N
ar
ra
tiv
e 
Fo
od
 C
om
m
od
ity
 M
ar
ke
t S
ho
ck
s,
 1
97
2–
20
12
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 fo
od
 
co
m
m
o
di
ty
 p
ric
es
 (p
erc
en
t)
Pe
ri
od
Ty
pe
O
n 
im
pa
ct
Af
ter
 on
e q
ua
rte
r
Fo
o
d 
co
m
m
od
ity
 m
ar
ke
t e
ve
n
t
19
72
:Q
3
U
nf
av
or
ab
le
 
 
1.
4
 
18
.3
R
us
sia
n 
W
he
at
 D
ea
l a
nd
 fa
ile
d 
m
on
so
on
 in
 so
ut
he
as
t A
sia
W
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
U
SS
R 
de
cl
in
ed
 b
y 
13
 p
er
ce
nt
 d
ue
 to
 d
isa
str
ou
s w
ea
th
er
 
co
n
di
tio
ns
. T
hi
s r
es
ul
te
d 
in
 p
ur
ch
as
es
 o
n 
an
 u
np
re
ce
de
nt
ed
 sc
al
e 
by
 th
e 
So
vi
et
 
U
ni
on
 o
n 
th
e 
w
or
ld
 m
ar
ke
t, 
le
ad
in
g 
to
 la
rg
e 
pr
ic
e 
in
cr
ea
se
s f
ro
m
 Ju
ly
 a
nd
 A
ug
us
t 
19
72
 a
nd
 o
nw
ar
d.
 T
he
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 o
f t
he
 b
ad
 w
ea
th
er
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 in
 
th
e 
U
SS
R 
w
er
e 
on
ly
 k
no
w
n 
ve
ry
 la
te
, a
nd
 w
er
e 
pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
as
 a
 c
on
sid
er
ab
le
 sh
oc
k 
w
o
rld
w
id
e,
 b
ec
au
se
 o
nl
y 
a 
fe
w
 m
on
th
s e
ar
lie
r t
he
re
 h
ad
 b
ee
n 
re
po
rts
 o
f h
ea
vy
 
su
rp
lu
s s
to
ck
s b
ui
ld
in
g.
 T
he
 sa
le
s i
nv
ol
ve
d 
a 
se
rie
s o
f s
ub
sid
iz
ed
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 fo
l­
lo
w
in
g 
an
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t w
he
re
by
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 m
ad
e 
cr
ed
it 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
to
 th
e 
U
SS
R
 
fo
r t
he
 p
ur
ch
as
es
 (k
no
wn
 as
 th
e R
us
sia
n W
he
at
 D
ea
l).
 Th
e 
ris
e 
in
 w
he
at
 p
ric
es
 w
as
 
fu
rth
er
 a
cc
el
er
at
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
’ d
ec
isi
on
 to
 su
sp
en
d 
th
e 
su
bs
id
ie
s n
or
m
al
ly
 
pa
id
 o
n 
ex
po
rts
.
A
t t
he
 sa
m
e 
tim
e,
 th
e 
gl
ob
al
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l s
ec
to
r w
as
 se
ve
re
ly
 a
ffe
ct
ed
 b
y 
m
on
so
on
 fa
il­
u
re
 in
 m
os
t o
f s
ou
th
ea
st 
A
sia
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
su
m
m
er
,
 
w
hi
ch
 w
as
 fo
llo
w
ed
 b
y 
ex
tre
m
el
y 
dr
y 
w
ea
th
er
 th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 a
ut
um
n 
an
d 
ea
rly
 w
in
te
r. 
R
ic
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
in
 
Ca
m
bo
di
a,
 In
di
a,
 M
al
ay
sia
, a
nd
 T
ha
ila
nd
 b
y 
29
 p
er
ce
nt
, 9
 p
er
ce
nt
, 1
3 
pe
rc
en
t, 
 
an
d 
10
 p
er
ce
nt
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
In
 1
97
2:
Q3
 an
d 1
97
2:Q
4, 
rea
l c
ere
al 
pri
ce
s r
os
e b
y 9
.7 
pe
rce
nt 
an
d 1
6.5
 pe
rce
nt,
 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
O
ve
ra
ll,
 a
nn
ua
l g
lo
ba
l c
er
ea
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
de
cl
in
ed
 b
y 
1.
6 
pe
rc
en
t 
in
 1
97
2,
 c
om
pa
re
d 
w
ith
 a
 ri
se
 o
f 9
.2
 p
er
ce
nt
 a
nd
 7
.4
 p
er
ce
nt
 in
 1
97
1 
an
d 
19
73
, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
Chapter 1 - 46 
(co
n
tin
ue
d)
19
75
:Q
2
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
-
10
.9
 
-
9.
9
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 im
pr
o
v
ed
 e
st
im
at
e 
of
 w
o
rl
d 
gr
ai
n 
pr
o
du
ct
io
n
In
 A
pr
il 
19
75
, t
he
 U
SD
A 
pr
ed
ic
te
d 
a 
sig
ni
fic
an
t i
nc
re
as
e 
in
 w
or
ld
 g
ra
in
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
(th
e p
rev
iou
s f
ore
ca
st 
wa
s i
n D
ec
em
be
r 1
97
4),
 in
dic
ati
ng
 an
 ea
sin
g o
f t
he
 tig
ht 
su
p­
pl
y 
an
d 
de
m
an
d 
ba
la
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 tw
o 
ye
ar
s. 
Fu
rth
er
m
or
e,
 in
 M
ay
 1
97
5,
 th
e 
U
SD
A 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
its
 U
.S
. w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
es
tim
at
e 
fo
r 1
97
5 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
M
ay
 fi
el
d 
co
nd
iti
on
s. 
A 
re
co
rd
 w
he
at
 h
ar
ve
st 
w
as
 e
xp
ec
te
d.
 In
 re
tro
sp
ec
t, 
an
nu
al
 
gl
ob
al
 c
er
ea
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 6
.9
 p
er
ce
nt
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r.
19
75
:Q
4
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
 
-
4.
7
-
10
.7
O
pt
im
ist
ic
 ri
ce
 fo
re
ca
st
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f v
er
y 
fa
v
o
ra
bl
e 
m
on
so
on
 se
as
on
In
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 1
97
5,
 th
er
e w
er
e e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
 o
f a
 re
co
rd
 ri
ce
 cr
op
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f a
 fa
vo
r­
ab
le
 m
on
so
on
 se
as
on
. A
s a
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
, r
ic
e 
pr
ic
es
 st
ar
te
d 
to
 d
ec
re
as
e 
fro
m
 
O
ct
ob
er
 1
97
5 
on
w
ar
d 
w
hi
ch
 is
 th
e s
ta
rt 
of
 th
e h
ar
ve
sti
ng
 se
as
on
. R
ea
l c
er
ea
l p
ric
es
 
fe
ll 
by
 1
9 
pe
rc
en
t o
ve
r t
w
o 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 q
ua
rte
rs
. E
x 
po
st,
 1
97
5 
pr
ov
ed
 in
de
ed
 to
 b
e 
a 
v
er
y 
fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
ric
e 
ye
ar
 fo
r I
nd
ia
, J
ap
an
 a
nd
 T
ha
ila
nd
, w
ith
 a
n 
ac
ce
le
ra
tio
n 
of
 p
ro
­
du
ct
io
n 
yi
el
ds
 re
la
tiv
e t
o 
19
74
 b
y 
23
 p
er
ce
nt
, 7
 p
er
ce
nt
, a
nd
 1
4 
pe
rc
en
t, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
19
77
:Q
3
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
-
20
.9
-
12
.9
Pr
ed
ic
tio
ns
 o
f r
ec
o
rd
 U
.
S.
 a
nd
 S
ov
ie
t h
ar
v
es
ts
Se
ve
ra
l f
av
or
ab
le
 fo
od
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
fo
re
ca
sts
 w
er
e 
pu
bl
ish
ed
 th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 Ju
ly
 a
nd
 
A
ug
us
t 1
97
7:
 p
re
di
ct
io
ns
 o
f r
ec
or
d 
U
.S
. c
or
n 
cr
op
s (
Ju
ly 
19
77
); 
inc
rea
sed
 fo
rec
ast
s 
o
f w
or
ld
 w
he
at
 a
nd
 fe
ed
 g
ra
in
s p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
(Ju
ly 
19
77
); 
ne
ws
 on
 re
co
rd 
So
vie
t w
he
at 
ha
rv
es
t (A
ug
us
t 1
97
7);
 an
d p
red
ict
ion
s o
f r
ec
ord
 U
.S.
 so
yb
ea
ns
 cr
op
s (
Au
gu
st 
19
77
).
19
77
:Q
4
U
nf
av
or
ab
le
 
 
8.
0
 
15
.6
R
ec
or
d 
gr
ai
n 
ha
rv
es
ts
 d
id
 n
ot
 m
at
er
ia
liz
e
D
es
pi
te
 e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
 o
f r
ec
or
d 
ha
rv
es
ts 
in
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 q
ua
rte
r, 
gl
ob
al
 g
ra
in
 p
ro
du
c­
tio
n 
tu
rn
ed
 o
ut
 to
 b
e 
be
lo
w
 th
e 
tre
nd
 in
 1
97
7 
as
 a
 re
su
lt 
of
 u
nf
av
or
ab
le
 w
ea
th
er
 
co
n
di
tio
ns
 in
 th
e 
m
ajo
r p
rod
uc
ing
 ar
eas
. In
 N
ov
em
be
r 1
97
7, 
the
 Fi
na
nc
ia
l T
im
es
 
an
n
o
u
n
ce
d 
th
at
 th
e 
So
vi
et
 c
ro
p 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
ro
ug
hl
y 
10
 p
er
ce
nt
 b
el
ow
 th
e 
la
te
st 
es
ti­
m
at
e 
pr
ed
ic
te
d 
by
 th
e 
U
SD
A
. I
n 
ad
di
tio
n,
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l G
ra
in
s C
ou
nc
il 
lo
w
er
ed
 
its
 e
sti
m
at
e 
of
 w
or
ld
 w
he
at
 o
ut
pu
t b
y 
2 
to
 3
 p
er
ce
nt
. I
n 
re
tro
sp
ec
t, 
So
vi
et
 w
he
at
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 5
 p
er
ce
nt
 c
om
pa
re
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r. 
Ch
in
es
e 
w
he
at
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
de
cl
in
ed
 b
y 
18
 p
er
ce
nt
; a
nd
 in
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
, w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
de
cl
in
ed
 b
y 
5 
pe
rc
en
t. 
It 
is 
cl
ea
r t
ha
t t
hi
s c
am
e 
as
 a
n 
un
ex
pe
ct
ed
 sh
oc
k 
in
 1
97
7:
Q4
, 
gi
ve
n 
th
e 
ex
tre
m
el
y 
op
tim
ist
ic
 fo
re
ca
sts
 in
 1
97
7:
Q3
.
Chapter 1 - 47 
19
84
:Q
3
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
-
10
.4
-
14
.1
Fa
v
o
ra
bl
e 
w
ea
th
er
 in
 N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
a 
an
d 
ex
ce
pt
io
na
lly
 g
oo
d 
ce
re
a
l h
ar
v
es
t i
n 
w
es
te
rn
 E
ur
o
pe
In
 Ju
ly
 1
98
4,
 th
e 
U
SD
A 
im
pr
ov
ed
 it
s J
un
e 
es
tim
at
e 
fo
r U
.S
. w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 
an
d 
pr
ed
ic
te
d 
re
co
rd
 g
ra
in
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
w
or
ld
w
id
e.
 M
uc
h 
of
 th
is
 in
cr
ea
se
 w
as
 a
 
co
n
se
qu
en
ce
 o
f t
he
 N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
an
 re
co
ve
ry
 fr
om
 th
e 
sh
ar
p 
de
cl
in
e 
of
 1
98
3 
as
 a
 
co
n
se
qu
en
ce
 o
f i
nc
re
as
ed
 p
la
nt
in
g,
 a
s w
el
l a
s f
av
or
ab
le
 w
ea
th
er
.
 
W
es
te
rn
 E
ur
op
e 
al
so
 h
ad
 e
xc
ep
tio
na
lly
 g
oo
d 
ha
rv
es
ts
 o
f c
er
ea
ls
. I
n 
re
tro
sp
ec
t, 
U
.S
. m
ai
ze
 p
ro
­
du
ct
io
n 
ro
se
 c
on
si
de
ra
bl
y,
 
by
 a
bo
ut
 8
4 
pe
rc
en
t. 
Fu
rth
er
m
or
e,
 w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
in
 C
hi
na
, I
nd
ia
, a
nd
 F
ra
nc
e 
by
 8
 p
er
ce
nt
, 3
3 
pe
rc
en
t, 
an
d 
6 
pe
rc
en
t, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
O
ve
ra
ll,
 g
lo
ba
l c
er
ea
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 1
1.
4 
pe
rc
en
t i
n 
19
84
, 
w
hi
ch
 w
as
 th
e 
la
rg
es
t a
nn
ua
l r
is
e 
si
nc
e 
th
e 
19
60
s.
19
88
:Q
4
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
 
-
4.
5
 
-
9.
4
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f a
 g
lo
ba
l s
ur
ge
 in
 w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n
In
 D
ec
em
be
r 1
98
8,
 it
 w
as
 a
nn
ou
nc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l G
ra
in
s C
ou
nc
il 
th
at
 
w
o
rld
w
id
e 
w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
w
as
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 ri
se
 c
on
sid
er
ab
ly
 in
 1
98
9,
 b
ec
au
se
, 
am
o
n
g 
ot
he
r f
ac
to
rs
, t
he
re
 w
as
 a
 re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t f
or
 th
e 
U
.S
. s
et
­
as
id
e 
of
 a
ra
bl
e 
la
nd
, f
ro
m
 2
7.
5 
pe
rc
en
t t
o 
on
ly
 1
0 
pe
rc
en
t o
f t
he
 w
he
at
 a
cr
ea
ge
 in
 
th
e 
ne
xt
 y
ea
r, 
w
hi
ch
 w
as
 a
 fa
rm
 p
ol
ic
y 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 th
e 
19
88
 d
ro
ug
ht
 in
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 (c
od
ifie
d i
n t
he
 D
isa
ste
r R
eli
ef 
an
d E
me
rge
nc
y 
A
ss
ist
an
ce
 A
ct
 o
f 1
98
8).
 In
 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 d
ro
ug
ht
­
sh
or
te
ne
d 
cr
op
 in
ve
nt
or
ie
s, 
th
e 
19
89
 v
er
sio
n 
of
 th
e 
fa
rm
 b
ill
 
w
as
 e
x
pe
ct
ed
 to
 e
n
co
u
ra
ge
 m
o
re
 c
ro
p 
pl
an
tin
g.
 W
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
 1
98
9 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
in
 a
ll 
la
rg
e 
w
he
at
­
pr
od
uc
in
g 
co
un
tri
es
 (C
hin
a, 
6 p
erc
en
t; F
ran
ce
, 1
0 p
erc
en
t; I
nd
ia,
 
17
 p
er
ce
nt
; t
he
 U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
, 1
2 
pe
rc
en
t; 
th
e 
U
SS
R,
 1
1 
pe
rc
en
t).
 E
x p
os
t, a
nn
ua
l 
gl
ob
al
 c
er
ea
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 m
or
e 
th
an
 1
0 
pe
rc
en
t i
n 
19
89
.
Ta
bl
e 
1.
 O
ve
rv
ie
w
 o
f N
ar
ra
tiv
e 
Fo
od
 C
om
m
od
ity
 M
ar
ke
t S
ho
ck
s,
 1
97
2–
20
12
 (C
on
ti
nu
ed
)
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 fo
od
 
co
m
m
o
di
ty
 p
ric
es
 (p
erc
en
t)
Pe
ri
od
Ty
pe
O
n 
im
pa
ct
Af
ter
 on
e q
ua
rte
r
Fo
o
d 
co
m
m
od
ity
 m
ar
ke
t e
ve
n
t
Chapter 1 - 48 
19
95
:Q
3
U
nf
av
or
ab
le
 
 
6.
6
 
 
7.
8
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 d
ow
n
w
a
rd
 re
v
isi
on
 o
f w
o
rl
d 
ce
re
a
l e
st
im
at
es
In
 1
99
5:
Q3
, th
ere
 w
ere
 la
rge
 d
ow
nw
ar
d 
re
vi
sio
ns
 o
f 1
99
5 
w
or
ld
 ce
re
al
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n.
 
Th
is 
w
as
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 th
e 
ca
se
 fo
r w
he
at
 a
nd
 c
oa
rs
e 
gr
ai
ns
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 (p
oo
r w
ea
the
r c
on
dit
ion
s, 
pre
do
mi
na
ntl
y h
ot 
an
d d
ry 
we
ath
er 
du
rin
g e
arl
y 
Se
pt
em
be
r) 
an
d t
he
 C
om
mo
nw
ea
lth
 of
 In
de
pe
nd
en
t S
tat
es,
 an
d f
or 
wh
ea
t p
rod
uc
tio
n 
in
 A
rg
en
tin
a 
an
d 
Ch
in
a.
 In
 C
en
tra
l A
m
er
ic
a,
 a
 b
el
ow
­
n
o
rm
al
 c
oa
rs
e 
gr
ai
n 
cr
op
 w
as
 
in
 p
ro
sp
ec
t i
n 
M
ex
ic
o 
du
e 
to
 a
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 re
du
ce
d 
pl
an
tin
gs
 a
nd
 d
ry
 w
ea
th
er
 
in
 p
ar
ts 
of
 th
e 
co
un
try
.
 
In
 re
tro
sp
ec
t, 
w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
de
cl
in
ed
 in
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
an
d 
Ru
ss
ia
 b
y 
6 
pe
rc
en
t, 
an
d 
in
 A
rg
en
tin
a 
by
 1
6 
pe
rc
en
t. 
M
ex
ic
an
 co
rn
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
st
ag
na
te
d 
in
 1
99
5,
 b
ut
 U
.S
. c
or
n 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 2
6 
pe
rc
en
t. 
A
nn
ua
l g
lo
ba
l 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
fo
ur
 m
ajo
r s
tap
les
 ul
tim
ate
ly 
de
cli
ne
d b
y 2
.6 
pe
rce
nt 
in 
19
95
.
19
96
:Q
3
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
 
-
4.
5
-
12
.5
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f e
xc
el
le
nt
 g
lo
ba
l c
er
ea
l h
ar
v
es
t
Th
e 
FA
O
 is
su
ed
 a
 fi
rs
t p
ro
vi
sio
na
l f
av
or
ab
le
 fo
re
ca
st 
fo
r w
or
ld
 1
99
6 
ce
re
al
 o
ut
pu
t 
(6.
5 p
erc
en
t u
p f
rom
 th
e p
rev
iou
s y
ea
r) 
in 
Ju
ne
 19
96
. T
he
 la
rg
es
t i
nc
re
as
e 
w
as
 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 in
 c
oa
rs
e 
gr
ai
ns
 o
ut
pu
t, 
m
os
tly
 in
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
co
un
tri
es
. A
dd
iti
on
al
ly
,
 
w
he
at
 o
ut
pu
t w
as
 fo
re
ca
st 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
,
 
an
d 
ric
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
to
 ri
se
 m
ar
­
gi
na
lly
.
 
In
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 1
99
6,
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l G
ra
in
s C
ou
nc
il 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
its
 fo
re
ca
st 
(co
mp
are
d w
ith
 a 
mo
nth
 ea
rli
er)
 fo
r 1
99
6–
97
 gl
ob
al 
wh
ea
t p
rod
uc
tio
n i
n r
esp
on
se 
to
 a
 c
on
fir
m
at
io
n 
of
 fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
ha
rv
es
ts 
in
 th
e 
N
or
th
er
n 
H
em
isp
he
re
 a
nd
 e
xc
el
le
nt
 
pr
os
pe
ct
s i
n 
th
e 
So
ut
he
rn
 H
em
isp
he
re
.
(co
n
tin
ue
d)
Chapter 1 - 49 
20
02
:Q
3
U
nf
av
or
ab
le
 
 
9.
4
 
10
.7
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 d
ow
n
w
a
rd
 re
v
ise
d 
gl
ob
al
 c
er
ea
l e
st
im
at
es
Th
e 
FA
O
’s 
Ju
ly
 2
00
2 
fo
re
ca
st 
po
in
te
d 
to
 a
 g
lo
ba
l c
er
ea
l o
ut
pu
t w
hi
ch
 w
as
 c
on
sid
er
­
ab
ly
 le
ss
 th
an
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 fo
re
ca
st 
in
 M
ay
; i
t w
ou
ld
 b
e 
th
e 
sm
al
le
st 
w
he
at
 c
ro
p 
si
nc
e 
19
95
. T
he
 d
ow
nw
ar
d 
re
vi
sio
n 
w
as
 m
os
tly
 a
 re
su
lt 
of
 a
 d
et
er
io
ra
tio
n 
of
 p
ro
­
du
ct
io
n 
pr
os
pe
ct
s f
or
 se
ve
ra
l o
f t
he
 m
ajo
r w
he
at 
cro
ps
 ar
ou
nd
 th
e g
lob
e b
ec
au
se 
o
f a
dv
er
se
 w
ea
th
er
 in
 th
e 
N
or
th
er
n 
H
em
isp
he
re
 o
r f
or
 p
la
nt
in
g 
in
 th
e 
So
ut
he
rn
 
H
em
is
ph
er
e.
 T
he
 fo
re
ca
st
 fo
r g
lo
ba
l c
oa
rs
e 
gr
ai
n 
ou
tp
ut
 w
as
 a
lso
 re
vi
se
d 
do
w
n­
w
ar
d 
sin
ce
 th
e 
la
st 
re
po
rt 
m
ai
nl
y 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 d
ry
 w
ea
th
er
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 in
 R
us
sia
. I
n 
Se
pt
em
be
r, 
th
e A
us
tra
lia
n 
Bu
re
au
 o
f A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l a
nd
 R
es
ou
rc
e 
Ec
on
om
ic
s a
nd
 
Sc
ie
nc
es
 a
nn
ou
nc
ed
 th
at
 d
ro
ug
ht
 w
ou
ld
 sl
as
h 
th
e 
co
un
try
’s 
w
in
te
r g
ra
in
 p
ro
du
c­
tio
n.
 A
us
tra
lia
 is
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
 to
p 
fiv
e 
w
he
at
 e
xp
or
te
rs
. I
n 
re
tro
sp
ec
t, 
U
.S
. w
he
at
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 1
8 
pe
rc
en
t i
n 
20
02
, a
nd
 A
us
tra
lia
n 
w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 6
0 
pe
rc
en
t.
20
04
:Q
3
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
 
-
6.
9
-
10
.9
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 im
pr
o
v
ed
 fo
re
ca
st
 o
f w
o
rl
d 
ce
re
a
l o
ut
pu
t
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
w
ea
th
er
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 tr
ig
ge
re
d 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f s
ig
ni
fic
an
tly
 h
ig
he
r c
er
ea
l 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
in
 E
ur
op
e,
 C
hi
na
, B
ra
zi
l, 
an
d 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
. I
n 
Ju
ly
 2
00
4,
 th
e 
In
te
r­
n
at
io
na
l G
ra
in
s C
ou
nc
il 
an
no
un
ce
d 
an
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
ris
e 
in
 th
e 
gl
ob
al
 v
ol
um
e 
of
 c
oa
rs
e 
gr
ai
n.
 In
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 2
00
4,
 th
e 
FA
O
 ra
ise
d 
its
 fo
re
ca
st 
fo
r w
or
ld
 c
er
ea
l o
ut
pu
t a
fte
r 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 re
po
rt 
in
 Ju
ne
. A
nn
ua
l g
lo
ba
l c
er
ea
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 m
or
e 
th
an
 9
 p
er
ce
nt
 in
 2
00
4.
Ta
bl
e 
1.
 O
ve
rv
ie
w
 o
f N
ar
ra
tiv
e 
Fo
od
 C
om
m
od
ity
 M
ar
ke
t S
ho
ck
s,
 1
97
2–
20
12
 (C
on
ti
nu
ed
)
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 fo
od
 
co
m
m
o
di
ty
 p
ric
es
 (p
erc
en
t)
Pe
ri
od
Ty
pe
O
n 
im
pa
ct
Af
ter
 on
e q
ua
rte
r
Fo
o
d 
co
m
m
od
ity
 m
ar
ke
t e
ve
n
t
Chapter 1 - 50 
20
10
:Q
3
U
nf
av
or
ab
le
 
 
8.
6
 
22
.1
D
ro
u
gh
ts
 in
 R
us
sia
 a
nd
 E
as
te
rn
 E
ur
o
pe
Th
e 
20
10
 c
er
ea
l o
ut
pu
t i
n 
M
ol
do
va
, R
us
sia
, K
az
ak
hs
ta
n,
 a
nd
 U
kr
ai
ne
 w
as
 se
rio
us
ly
 
af
fe
ct
ed
 b
y 
ad
ve
rs
e 
w
ea
th
er
 c
on
di
tio
ns
. R
us
sia
, K
az
ak
hs
ta
n,
 a
nd
 U
kr
ai
ne
 (a
ll 
th
re
e 
am
on
g 
th
e 
w
or
ld
’s 
to
p 
10
 w
he
at
 e
xp
or
te
rs
) s
uff
er
ed
 th
e 
w
or
st 
he
at
 w
av
e 
an
d 
dr
ou
gh
t i
n 
m
or
e 
th
an
 a
 c
en
tu
ry
,
 
an
d 
M
ol
do
va
 w
as
 st
ru
ck
 b
y 
flo
od
s a
nd
 h
ai
lst
or
m
s. 
In
 R
us
sia
, t
he
 c
ou
nt
ry
 th
at
 w
as
 m
os
t s
ev
er
el
y 
af
fe
ct
ed
 b
y 
ad
ve
rs
e 
co
nd
iti
on
s, 
th
e 
20
10
 c
er
ea
l c
ro
p 
w
as
 3
3 
pe
rc
en
t l
ow
er
 th
an
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r. 
In
 U
kr
ai
ne
, t
he
 
w
he
at
 h
ar
ve
st 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 1
9 
pe
rc
en
t. 
A
cc
or
di
ng
ly
,
 
in
 Ju
ly
 2
01
0,
 w
he
at
 p
ric
es
 sa
w
 
th
e 
bi
gg
es
t o
ne
­
m
o
n
th
 ju
mp
 in
 m
ore
 th
an
 th
ree
 de
cad
es,
 a 
ris
e o
f n
ear
ly 
50
 pe
rce
nt 
sin
ce
 la
te
 Ju
ne
. I
n 
Se
pt
em
be
r, 
w
he
at
 p
ric
es
 w
er
e 
ev
en
 6
0 
to
 8
0 
pe
rc
en
t h
ig
he
r d
ue
 
to
 a
 d
ec
isi
on
 b
y 
Ru
ss
ia
 to
 b
an
 e
xp
or
ts.
20
12
:Q
3
U
nf
av
or
ab
le
 
 
7.
9
 
 
6.
9
D
ro
u
gh
ts
 a
ro
u
n
d 
th
e 
gl
ob
e
D
ue
 to
 d
ro
ug
ht
s i
n 
Ru
ss
ia
, E
as
te
rn
 E
ur
op
e,
 A
sia
, a
nd
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
, t
he
re
 w
as
 a
 
sig
ni
fic
an
t d
ec
lin
e 
in
 g
lo
ba
l c
er
ea
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n.
 In
 re
tro
sp
ec
t, 
an
nu
al
 g
lo
ba
l c
er
ea
l 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
co
nt
ra
ct
ed
 b
y 
2.
4 
pe
rc
en
t. 
In
 Ju
ly
 2
01
2,
 th
e 
U
SD
A 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
its
 Ju
ne
 
es
tim
at
e 
fo
r U
.S
. c
or
n 
by
 1
2 
pe
rc
en
t b
ec
au
se
 o
f t
he
 w
or
st 
m
id
w
es
te
rn
 d
ro
ug
ht
 in
 a
 
qu
ar
te
r c
en
tu
ry
.
 
H
ea
t w
av
es
 in
 so
ut
he
rn
 E
ur
op
e 
ad
de
d 
se
rio
us
 c
on
ce
rn
 a
bo
ut
 g
lo
ba
l 
fo
od
 su
pp
lie
s l
at
er
 th
at
 m
on
th
, a
s w
el
l a
s b
el
ow
­
av
er
ag
e 
ra
in
fa
ll 
in
 A
us
tra
lia
. I
n 
A
ug
us
t, 
th
er
e 
w
as
 n
ew
s a
bo
ut
 a
 la
te
 m
on
so
on
 n
eg
at
iv
el
y 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
th
e 
ric
e 
ha
rv
es
t 
in
 A
sia
. A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l F
oo
d 
Po
lic
y 
Re
se
ar
ch
 In
sti
tu
te
, p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
o
f f
oo
d 
gr
ai
ns
 in
 so
ut
he
rn
 A
sia
 w
as
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 d
ec
lin
e 
by
 1
2 
pe
rc
en
t c
om
pa
re
d 
w
ith
 a
 y
ea
r e
ar
lie
r. 
A
lso
 in
 A
ug
us
t, 
th
e 
Ru
ss
ia
n 
gr
ai
n 
ha
rv
es
t f
or
ec
as
ts 
w
er
e 
re
du
ce
d 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 a
 d
ro
ug
ht
. I
n 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
2,
 w
he
at
 o
ut
pu
t i
n 
Ru
ss
ia
 w
as
 e
sti
m
at
ed
 to
 b
e 
ab
ou
t 3
0 
pe
rc
en
t d
ow
n 
fro
m
 2
01
1;
 in
 U
kr
ai
ne
, a
 d
ec
re
as
e 
of
 a
bo
ut
 3
3 
pe
rc
en
t w
as
 
ex
pe
ct
ed
; a
nd
 in
 K
az
ak
hs
ta
n,
 o
ut
pu
t w
as
 re
po
rte
d 
to
 b
e 
jus
t h
alf
 of
 th
e p
rev
iou
s 
ye
ar
’
s 
go
od
 le
ve
l. 
Th
e 
w
he
at
 h
ar
ve
st 
in
de
ed
 d
ec
lin
ed
 in
 2
01
2,
 b
y 
33
 p
er
ce
nt
,  
29
 p
er
ce
nt
, a
nd
 5
7 
pe
rc
en
t i
n 
Ru
ss
ia
, U
kr
ai
ne
, a
nd
 K
az
ak
hs
ta
n,
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
So
ur
ce
: A
 
de
ta
ile
d 
m
ot
iv
at
io
n 
an
d 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
ep
iso
de
s i
n 
th
is 
ta
bl
e 
ca
n 
be
 fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
on
lin
e 
ap
pe
nd
ix
.
Chapter 1 - 51 
234 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2016
VARs because it does not impose implicit dynamic restrictions on the shape 
of the impulse responses, and not all variables are required to be included 
in all equations. In addition, joint or point­wise analytic inference is sim­
ple, and it is easy to incorporate instrumental variables.33
For each variable and each horizon, we estimate the following single 
regression model:
2 ,1 1z L z L X RFCPt h h h t h t h t t h( ) ( )( ) = α + l + y + q + ε+ - - +
where z is the variable of interest at horizon h. We consider real food com­
modity prices and a set of variables representing the U.S. economy: real 
GDP, real personal consumption, CPI, and the federal funds rate. The term 
αh is a vector of deterministic terms—a constant, linear, and quadratic time 
trend—lh(L) and yh(L) are polynomials in the lag operator (L = 5), and X is 
a set of control variables. Although the control variables do not have to be 
the same for each regression, we include all other z variables. Finally, qh is 
the estimated response of z at horizon h to a shock in real food commodity 
prices (RFCPt) at period t. Because real food commodity prices may be 
partly endogenous to the U.S. economy, we estimate equation 2 with the 
narrative dummy and the first lag of the dummy as external instruments for 
RFCPt. The reason that we also use the first lag of the narrative dummy as 
an instrument is that some of the episodes encompass more than one quar­
ter (see the online appendix). The F statistic of the instruments (dummy 
and lagged dummy) is 12.6. The t statistics of the dummy and the lagged 
dummy are 4.9 and 1.9, respectively.
III.C. Narrative Results
The estimated impulse responses to a 1 percent increase in real food 
commodity prices are shown in figure 12. Because the error terms follow 
33. Because this method imposes fewer restrictions, the estimates are often less pre­
cise and more erratic at longer horizons because of a loss of efficiency (Ramey 2016). 
If the data­generating process is adequately captured, impulse responses of VARs are in 
contrast optimal at all horizons. We have therefore also estimated two VAR models based on 
the narrative food commodity market shocks. On one hand, we have embedded the episodes 
as dummy variables in a standard VAR to estimate the macroeconomic effects, an approach 
similar to that taken by Ramey and Shapiro (1998). On the other hand, we have used the 
dummy variable as an instrument to identify food commodity prices shocks within a VAR 
model, as proposed by Mertens and Ravn (2013). The results of both exercises, which are 
available upon request, confirm the conclusions of the local projections.
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a. The darker shading indicates 1 Newey–West standard error; the lighter shading indicates 2 Newey–West 
standard errors.  
Figure 12. Impulse Responses to Narrative Food Commodity Supply Shocks:  
Local Projectionsa
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some form of a moving­average structure, with an order that is a function 
of horizon h, they are serially correlated. Accordingly, we calculate and 
report Newey–West standard error bands in all figures. The rise in real food 
commodity prices reaches a peak of 1.9 percent after 3 to 4 quarters. This 
corresponds to a rise in nominal food commodity prices of approximately 
2.1 percent, a magnitude that is somewhat higher than the maximum effect 
in the benchmark VAR. The narratively identified shocks also have a much 
more persistent impact on food commodity prices because real food com­
modity prices only return to the baseline after approximately 12 quarters, 
compared with 4 quarters in the benchmark VAR.
The persistent rise in real food commodity prices is also reflected in 
more persistent effects on the U.S. economy relative to the benchmark VAR 
results. Real GDP and real personal consumption decrease by approx­
imately 0.3 percent, reaching their peak after 10 quarters. Taking into 
account the more persistent and slightly greater rise in global food com­
modity prices, the magnitudes of the consequences for the real economy 
are comparable to the VAR results reported in section II. In contrast, the 
impact on consumer prices and the monetary policy response seems to 
be stronger for the narrative shocks. Specifically, consumer prices and 
the federal funds rate increase by 0.4 and 0.2 percent, respectively, which 
is roughly twice the impact obtained with the VAR model and global food 
production index.
Overall, despite being a very different approach, the results of the nar­
ratively identified food commodity market disturbances confirm the main 
messages of the VAR analysis. Hence, we can safely conclude that the 
repercussions of disruptions in global food commodity markets for the 
U.S. economy are compelling. In the next section, we examine the pass­
through in more detail.
IV.  The Pass-Through to Consumer Prices  
and Economic Activity
In subsection II.C, we argued that several indirect effects should be at play, 
amplifying the macroeconomic consequences of food market disruptions. 
In particular, not only food prices but also other components of the CPI 
should increase after a surge in food commodity prices, while the decline 
in consumption cannot solely be driven by the direct loss in purchasing 
power. In other words, there is more than just a discretionary income effect 
of the rise in food commodity prices on household expenditures. In this 
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section, we pursue a tentative attempt at better understanding the mecha­
nisms and interpreting the magnitudes of these effects.34
To do this, we extend the VAR analysis of section I along two dimen­
sions. First, we compare the dynamic effects of food supply shocks with 
the effects of crude oil supply shocks identified within the same VAR 
model. The macroeconomic effects of oil supply shocks can serve as a 
benchmark, because several studies have documented that oil and energy 
shocks also have an influence on the U.S. economy that is disproportion­
ately large compared with its share in GDP and consumer expenditures. For 
example, Edelstein and Kilian (2009) find that the response of total con­
sumption to an energy price shock is approximately four times larger than 
the maximum reduction in discretionary income associated with the shift 
in energy prices. We identify oil supply shocks by imposing theoretically 
plau sible sign restrictions on the impulse responses, as proposed by Peersman 
and Ine Van Robays (2009) and by Baumeister and Peersman (2013a). Spe­
cifically, unfavorable oil supply shocks are identified as innovations that 
are orthogonal to the identified food commodity supply shocks and are 
characterized by a decline in global oil production and a rise in the real 
price of oil, while world economic activity does not expand.35 Second, we 
reestimate the VAR by adding an additional variable of interest each time. 
We consider a set of price variables to investigate the pass­through to con­
sumer prices, and we examine the effects on several components of real 
GDP and household expenditures to learn more about the output effects.
34. To interpret the magnitudes, we conduct a number of back­of­the­envelope calcu­
lations, in particular to assess the role of monetary policy. Given the simplicity of the exer­
cise and uncertainty about the exact values of several parameters, these calculations should 
be taken with a grain of salt and interpreted with more than the usual degree of caution.
35. Since the sign restrictions are based on competitive market forces and the oil price 
was regulated before 1974, the results for oil supply shocks are based on VARs that have 
been estimated over the sample period 1974:Q1–2013:Q4. As an alternative approach, Kilian 
(2009) uses (zero) exclusion restrictions to identify oil supply shocks in a monthly VAR that 
includes global oil production, a measure of economic activity, and the real price of crude oil. 
In particular, he assumes that the short­run oil supply curve is vertical, implying that global oil 
production does not respond to all other (oil demand) shocks in the VAR instantaneously. This 
assumption might be plausible at the monthly frequency but is not appropriate when quarterly 
data are used. Notice also that we rely on a uniform Haar prior distribution to implement the 
sign restrictions. Baumeister and Hamilton (2015) show that this could imply nonuniform dis­
tributions for key objects of interest and that Bayesian inference with informative priors can 
be an improvement. Although this is a promising avenue, this approach is beyond the scope 
of this paper given that the identification of oil supply shocks is not the focus of this study.
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IV.A. Comparison with Oil Shocks
Figure 13 compares the impulse responses of the benchmark variables 
to a commodity supply shock of 1 standard deviation for crude oil and 
food. Some interesting facts are worth mentioning. First, an oil supply 
shock of 1 standard deviation corresponds to a rise in real crude oil prices 
of 4.9 percent on impact, which reaches a peak of 5.6 percent after one 
quarter, and gradually returns to the baseline after four quarters. The pat­
tern of oil prices after an oil supply shock is very similar to the pattern of 
food commodity prices after a food supply shock, although the magnitude 
is approximately three times larger. Second, with a peak effect of -0.39, the 
consequences of an oil supply shock of 1 standard deviation for real GDP 
are approximately 1.5 times stronger. Put differently, the impact of a rise in 
real food commodity prices on economic activity is roughly twice as large 
as the impact of a rise in crude oil prices of equal size. Third, the dynamic 
effects of both shocks on real personal consumption are more or less the 
same, whereas an average food commodity supply shock has a slightly 
stronger and more persistent impact on consumer prices than an average oil 
supply shock. Finally, oil supply shocks reduce global economic activity 
for a period of two years, have no significant effects on global food produc­
tion and food commodity prices, and have a negative impact on the federal 
funds rate.
A noteworthy difference between both shocks is the monetary policy 
response; that is, the federal funds rate increases by 8 basis points after 
a food commodity market shock, whereas the policy rate decreases by 
11 basis points on impact, and by 20 basis points after one quarter in 
response to an oil supply shock. In other words, monetary policy seems to 
amplify the consequences of food market disruptions for economic activity, 
while partly stabilizing the real effects of oil supply shocks. This is rel­
evant for interpreting the magnitudes of the indirect effects of both shocks. 
Specifically, a reasonable rule of thumb for monetary policy effects is that 
a rise in the federal funds rate of 10 basis points leads to a decline in real 
GDP of between 0.05 and 0.1 percent.36 If we take these values seriously, 
this implies that the contemporaneous monetary policy response to food 
36. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) find that an interest rate innovation of 
60 basis points reduces real GDP by 0.5 percent. Bernanke and Mihov (1998) find that a 
monetary policy shock that raises the federal funds rate by 0.4 percent leads to a decline of 
real GDP by 0.3 percent. When we also identify a monetary policy shock within the bench­
mark VAR model (by ordering the federal funds rate last in the Cholesky decomposition), 
as discussed in subsection IV.B, we find that a 60 basis points rise in the federal funds rate 
leads to a fall in real GDP and personal consumption by approximately 0.4 percent.
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Figure 13. Comparing Food Supply and Oil Supply Shocksa
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market disturbances can potentially explain almost one­third of the output 
effects, while the remaining effects on personal consumption are still at 
least four times the discretionary loss in purchasing power. In contrast, 
a similar immediate response to oil supply shocks would have resulted 
in much stronger output effects of such shocks. If Edelstein and Kilian’s 
(2009) results are representative for oil supply shocks—that is, they find 
that the impact of an energy price shock on total consumption is approxi­
mately four times larger than the maximum reduction in discretionary 
income—this also implies that the magnitudes of the indirect (non monetary 
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CPI Federal funds rate
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Source: Authors’ calculations.  
a. The range shown around estimates are the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The solid line and shaded 
area are the results of the food commodity supply shocks (same as in figure 6); the dashed and dotted lines are 
the results of the oil supply shocks. 
Figure 13. Comparing Food Supply and Oil Supply Shocksa (Continued )
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37. In contrast to food commodities, which are only an input factor in the food process­
ing sector (except biofuels in recent periods), it is very difficult to calculate the exact share 
of crude oil in household expenditures because oil is an input factor that is used for several 
product categories (as well as investment goods and government purchases). If we only con­
sider the direct share of heating oil and motor fuel in household expenditures, and take into 
account that about half of gasoline prices is determined by the cost of crude oil, the effects of 
oil supply shocks on real GDP obtained with the VAR model are also roughly four times the 
discretionary loss in purchasing power.
policy) effects of food commodity and oil supply shocks on consumption 
are probably in the same neighborhood.37
IV.B. Consumer Prices
The CPI is calculated as a weighted average of prices of different types 
of goods and services, which can be divided into food (17 percent), energy 
(6 percent), and core (77 percent) CPI. A rise in food commodity prices can 
affect these components via several channels. First, there is a direct effect 
on the CPI’s food component. The exact pass­through of food commodity 
prices to final prices of food products should depend on competition and 
demand conditions in the food sector. Second, a rise in food commodity 
prices may augment energy prices, because food commodities are also used 
for the production of biofuels—from home heating to vehicle fuels, which 
are a source of energy. Third, if energy prices rise, production costs for firms 
could also rise. If firms pass these costs through to their selling prices, the 
consumer prices of nonenergy goods may also rise. Finally, higher inflation 
or inflation expectations could trigger so­called second­round effects that 
could greatly amplify and protract the effects of the shock on core inflation. 
For example, employees could demand higher nominal wages in subsequent 
wage­bargaining rounds in order to maintain their purchasing power, lead­
ing to mutually reinforcing feedback effects between wages and prices. 
Similar channels have been documented for oil shocks.
The impulse responses of food, energy, and core CPI are depicted in 
figure 14. Not surprisingly, a rise in food commodity prices has a strong 
and significant effect on CPI food, with a peak of 0.27 percent after four 
quarters. Given a share of food commodities in final food products and 
beverages of approximately 14 percent and a rise of nominal food com­
modity prices of 1.8 percent, this implies that changes in food commod­
ity prices are more or less fully passed through to food consumer prices. 
Furthermore, the effects of food commodity market disturbances on CPI 
energy are positive, but are not statistically significant at the 10 percent 
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level. Notice, however, that the insignificant impact is misleading because 
it ignores time variation. The use of biofuels as a source of energy is only 
a recent phenomenon. As was shown in subsection II.D (figure 11), the 
impact of food commodity market shocks on CPI energy was insignificant 
before 2003. Conversely, food market shocks seem to have had a signifi­
cant and strong impact on CPI energy since 2003, in line with the rising 
share of biofuels in petroleum consumption. Because the latter period is 
more representative of the current situation, we conclude that fluctuations 
in food commodity prices likely also affect consumer prices via energy 
Nominal wages Real consumer wages
Inflation expectations
4 8 12
Percent
–0.2
–0.1
0
0.1
0.2
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Quarters
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
a. The range shown around estimates are the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The solid line and shaded 
area are the results of the food commodity supply shocks; the dashed and dotted lines are the results of the oil 
supply shocks. 
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prices.38 Finally, there is a significant rise of core CPI after an unfavorable 
food market disturbance, which reaches a peak of 0.14 percent after seven 
quarters. Given the share of core CPI in the overall CPI, this accounts for 
about two­thirds of total inflationary consequences. The rise in core infla­
tion is hence the reason why the ultimate impact on consumer prices is 
considerably larger than the effects implied by the share of food commodi­
ties in the CPI.39
The pass­through of oil supply shocks to consumer prices turns out to 
be very different. As observed in figure 14, unfavorable oil supply shocks 
augment CPI energy but do not raise food consumer prices. There is even 
a decline of CPI food at longer horizons, and core inflation also does not 
increase. An interesting difference between both types of shocks is that oil 
supply shocks seem to trigger inflationary effects via a rise in import prices 
and a depreciation of the U.S. dollar exchange rate, while food commodity 
supply shocks increase the domestic GDP deflator significantly. In addi­
tion, despite the decline in economic activity, nominal wages remain more 
or less constant after a food market disturbance. In contrast, nominal wages 
decrease significantly after an oil supply shock. Additionally, real consumer 
wages decline immediately after oil supply shocks, whereas the response is 
much stickier after food market shocks.
Overall, these different patterns indicate that second­round effects are a 
key explanation for the stronger pass­through of food commodity supply 
shocks to consumer prices compared with oil supply shocks. This hypoth­
esis is confirmed by the impulse responses of inflation expectations shown 
in figure 14. We observe a persistent and significant rise in inflation expec­
tations after a food supply shock, while the impact of oil supply shocks is 
very short­lived and statistically insignificant. Higher inflation expecta­
tions are typically passed through to actual pricing behavior, in particular 
to the prices of nonfood and nonenergy goods and services. Furthermore, 
higher inflation expectations augment the demand for nominal wages in 
the wage­bargaining process, which further increases firms’ costs and 
the prices of nonfood and nonenergy goods and services. The presence 
38. Notice also that the error bands of the effects on CPI energy in figure 14 are relatively 
large, while the magnitudes of the effects are quite strong, that is, CPI energy increases 
by 0.31 percent on impact and 0.37 percent at its peak. In contrast, when we reestimate 
the VAR over a sample period that ends in 2002:Q4, the effects on CPI energy are essen­
tially zero. The difference between the point estimates also suggests that the pass­through to 
energy prices has become an important channel in recent periods.
39. Notice that core CPI also increases when we estimate VAR models over more recent 
sample periods, for example, excluding the Great Inflation. Second­round effects of food 
market shocks are thus still important and have not vanished over time.
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of second­round effects and the greater impact of food market disrup­
tions on inflation expectations and core inflation probably also explain 
the Federal Reserve’s tightening of monetary policy after such shocks, 
in contrast to a policy easing following oil supply shocks.40
IV.C. Household Expenditures and Economic Activity
Because food is a basic necessity, food demand is considered to be quite 
inelastic. Unless households increase borrowing, higher food prices conse­
quently erode the disposable income to purchase other goods and services, 
leading to a decline in expenditures. In subsection II.C, we argued that the 
upper bound of such a discretionary income effect is 0.04 to 0.05 percent, 
while personal consumption declines by almost 0.3 percent after a food 
commodity supply shock of 1 standard deviation. Hence, other propagation 
mechanisms should also be at play. A first plausible channel is the mon­
etary policy response to control inflation, which curtails aggregate demand. 
However, as discussed in subsection IV.A, the monetary policy response 
can at most explain one­third of the overall effects.
Besides the monetary policy effects, how are food commodity market 
disruptions transmitted to the real economy? There are several reasons to 
believe that the underlying mechanisms are similar to the pass­through of 
oil supply shocks to economic activity. First, as argued in subsection IV.A, 
the magnitudes of the indirect (nonmonetary policy) effects of both shocks 
are within the same neighborhood. Most important, the dynamic effects of 
both shocks on the components of household expenditures are also very 
much alike. This can be observed in figure 15, which shows the effects of 
food commodity and crude oil supply shocks on several components of 
household expenditures and investment. Not surprisingly, unfavorable 
food supply shocks have a significant negative impact on nondurable food 
consumption—that is, food and beverages for off­premises consumption— 
while oil supply shocks reduce the consumption of energy goods and ser­
vices, not the other way around.41 However, all other impulse responses 
40. The finding that inflation expectations (and core inflation) respond more to food 
prices than energy prices has also been documented by Clark and Davig (2008), among 
others. Several studies also find that economic agents weigh food prices considerably higher 
than its share in expenditures when forming inflation expectations, in contrast to energy 
prices (Murphy and Rohde 2015). A possible explanation why food prices have larger effects 
on inflation expectations and core inflation is that energy prices are substantially more vola­
tile than food prices.
41. The demand for food and energy products is hence not completely inelastic to shifts 
in their own prices. In contrast, the impact of food commodity shocks on the consumption 
of food services and accommodations turns out to be insignificant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 15. The Pass-Through to Household Expendituresa
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behave qualitatively and quantitatively similarly. Strikingly, this is even the 
case for the consumption of motor vehicles and parts, a subcomponent 
of durable consumption that is typically considered to be complementary 
in use with oil, and thus is perceived as being much more sensitive to oil 
shocks relative to other shocks. Overall, these findings suggest that the 
dominant mechanisms that lead to a decline in a household’s purchases of 
nonfood and nonenergy nondurables and services, and also purchases of 
durable consumption goods, are quite similar.
The impulse responses further reveal that a crucial channel whereby 
food commodity market shocks (and oil supply shocks) affect the economy 
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Source: Authors’ calculations.  
a. The range shown around estimates are the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The solid line and shaded 
area are the results of the food commodity supply shocks; the dashed and dotted lines are the results of the oil 
supply shocks. 
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is a shift in the consumption of durables and investment. Specifically, dura­
ble consumption decreases by 0.93 percent after a food market disruption, 
which is three times more than the overall decline in personal consumption. 
Likewise, there is a reduction in investment of 0.93 percent. The relevance 
of both output components for explaining the consequences of food market 
disruptions is illustrated in table 2. The table’s first two columns show the 
maximum effects of both shocks on all the components of figure 15, while 
the third and fourth columns list the relative responses of the components 
to the response of total personal consumption. The fifth and sixth columns 
show the weighted effects of the components, with the weights calcu­
lated as the ratio of each component to GDP. As observed, durables and 
investment are considerably more sensitive to food supply shocks than 
other components of household expenditures, followed by nondurable 
food consumption. In addition, despite their limited weights, both com­
ponents account for the bulk of the output effects.42
One argument that could be made against our reasoning is that the stron­
ger effects of food market shocks on the consumption of durables and 
investment are driven by the monetary policy response rather than other 
mechanisms, because both aggregates are typically much more sensitive to 
interest rate changes. Though this is true, we believe that it does not change 
our conclusion. To illustrate this, we identify a monetary policy shock 
within the VAR model.43 The maximum effects of a shift in the federal 
funds rate of 8 basis points—that is, the estimated contemporaneous mon­
etary policy response to a food commodity supply shock—on all compo­
nents are reported in the last column of table 2. Durable consumption and 
investment indeed react much more to a monetary policy shock than the 
other components. However, the magnitudes are too small to account for 
the stronger responses to food commodity supply shocks depicted in the 
table’s first two columns. Even in the absence of monetary policy tighten­
ing, the effects on durables and investment are still a multiple of the effects 
on the other expenditures’ components. Hence, the greater impact on dura­
ble consumption and investment compared with other categories of goods 
42. There is also a decline in the volume of exports of 0.37 percent after a food commod­
ity supply shock. The contribution to the overall output effects, however, is relatively low. 
The export effects are also statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level. For oil supply 
shocks, in contrast, there is a strong and significant decline in exports that matters for the 
overall output effects.
43. For simplicity, we use Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans’s (1999) identification 
strategy by ordering the federal funds rate last in the Cholesky decomposition. Other 
approaches typically find similar output effects. One caveat is that we obtain a so­called 
price puzzle.
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and services can only partly be explained by the monetary policy tighten­
ing, and thus other effects on both aggregates are crucial in explaining the 
consequences of food market shocks.
IV.D.  Potential Explanations for Magnitude  
and Composition of Output Effects
The remaining question is which nonmonetary policy mechanisms could 
magnify the consequences of both shocks for personal consumption. In 
spite of the voluminous literature on the effects of oil price shocks, there is 
little consensus on the dominant mechanism. Popular channels that have 
been put forward in the oil and energy literature are the postponement of 
irreversible purchases of investment and durable consumption goods 
because of increased uncertainty about future energy prices and a shift in 
the consumption of durables that are complementary in use with energy 
(Edelstein and Kilian 2009; Hamilton 2008). However, it is not likely that 
the postponement of irreversible purchases applies to food prices. Further­
more, because the purchases of motor vehicles react in a similar way to 
food and oil shocks, complementary effects also cannot be dominant.44
There are, however, various other channels that have been documented 
for oil and energy price shocks, which could also apply to food commod­
ity price shocks. For example, Julio Rotemberg and Michael Woodford 
(1996) demonstrate that imperfect competition considerably amplifies the 
effects of shocks on factor prices. With a calibrated, one­sector stochastic 
growth model with energy input, they show that allowing for a modest 
degree of imperfect competition increases the predicted effects of a rise 
in energy prices on economic activity by a factor of five, and that such 
market imperfections can account for their estimates of the consequences 
for U.S. output. Mary Finn (2000) shows that variable capital utilization 
also greatly intensifies the repercussions of shifts in factor prices for the 
real economy, even in perfectly competitive markets, and can explain the 
magnitudes found in the empirical literature. Given the critical role of food 
commodities as an input factor in the food­processing sector, these theories 
could also apply to food commodity price shocks.
Another class of models in the oil literature focuses on frictions in real­
locating capital and labor across sectors that may be differently influenced 
by oil price shifts (Davis and Haltiwanger 2001; Hamilton 1988). Such 
frictions lead to higher unemployment and lower capacity utilization in 
44. The only possible exception for both arguments is the role of food commodities to 
produce energy goods in recent periods, but this cannot be the case for the average effects 
since the 1960s.
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affected sectors that can magnify the effects on economic activity.45 A pop­
ular example in the oil literature is a reallocation of capital and labor away 
from the automobile sector when consumers purchase fewer cars, or a real­
location of resources within the automobile sector when consumers switch 
toward more energy­efficient cars in response to oil price hikes. However, 
food market shocks could also lead to a changed composition of aggregate 
demand, which could result in a costly reallocation of capital and labor 
across sectors that would reduce economic activity. For example, there 
could be substitution between the use of food services and accommoda­
tions to purchases of food and beverages for off­premises consumption. 
Most important, the results given in figure 15 show that food price shocks 
lead to a considerably greater decline in expenditures on durable goods 
compared with nondurables and services, which could trigger sectoral 
shifts throughout the economy that further amplify the macro economic 
consequences.46
In fact, a stronger response of durable consumption to shocks in house­
holds’ purchasing power, and possible reallocation effects that protract the 
macroeconomic consequences, may be a plausible mechanism to explain 
our empirical results—both the amplification and composition of the out­
put effects—as well as the similarity to the dynamics of oil shocks. Specifi­
cally, consumer theory shows that expenditures on luxuries and durables 
should be more sensitive to transitory income shocks than expenditures on 
necessities and nondurables. For example, Martin Browning and Thomas 
Crossley (2009) demonstrate that households can significantly reduce their 
total expenditures without a significant decline in welfare if they con­
centrate their budget reductions on durables. The reason is that a sub­
stantial reduction in expenditures on durables can be realized with only a 
modest decline in the consumption of durables because existing stocks of 
durables could continue to provide a flow of services.47 Such a mechanism 
45. These additional effects can be very large. For example, Acemoglu, Akcigit, and 
Kerr (2016) show that small shocks can cause sizable aggregate fluctuations due to their 
propagation through the production network.
46. Notice that the presence of significant reallocation effects implies that the conse­
quences of food price increases for household expenditures should be stronger than food 
price decreases because such effects amplify the former, while dampening the latter. As 
mentioned in footnote 28, we find support for this prediction in the data.
47. Hamermesh (1982), Parker (1999), and Browning and Crossley (2000) also discuss 
mechanisms for how transitory changes in income could have a disproportionately greater 
effect on expenditures of luxuries and durables. Bils and Klenow (1998) confirm this pre­
diction in U.S. data for 57 types of consumer goods. Dynarski and Gruber (1997) find that 
the elasticity of durables to changes in income in the United States is eight times larger than 
for nondurables.
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can explain why purchases of motor vehicles respond considerably more 
strongly than several other goods and services to both food price and 
oil price shocks, without the requirement of being complementary in 
use. In essence, when food and energy bills increase, households can 
continue to drive their existing car for a while, rather than buying a new 
car. Although the welfare losses from this behavior might be small at 
the individual household level, the macroeconomic accelerator effects 
may be substantial.
Notice that this accelerator mechanism may be particularly important 
for food and energy price shocks, because the share of food and energy 
consumption in household expenditures is substantially higher for low­
income households. For example, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey, the share of food and bever­
ages consumption in total expenditures of the lowest income quintile was 
16.2 percent in 2014, compared with only 12.1 percent for the highest 
quintile. For energy expenditures (natural gas, electricity, fuel oil, other 
fuels, gasoline, and motor fuels), the shares are 10.7 and 6.4 percent, 
respectively, for the lowest and highest quintiles. Measured as a percent­
age of total income after taxes, the differences are even more dramatic: 
35.8 and 9.1 percent for food consumption, and 23.6 and 4.8 percent for 
energy consumption. Because food and energy are basic necessities, and 
low­income households typically also have borrowing constraints and no 
liquid assets to smooth consumption over time, they thus have few other 
options than reducing expenditures on durables.
Finally, when food prices increase, households may decide to con­
sume less and to increase their precautionary savings because of a rise 
in uncertainty or a greater perceived likelihood of future unemployment 
and income loss. According to John Cochrane (2016), precautionary sav­
ings and risk aversion are prominent ingredients of business cycle fluc­
tuations. In particular, he argues that higher risk premiums and increases 
in risk aversion triggered by relatively small shocks affecting consumers, 
rather than risk­free rates and intertemporal substitution, are the central fea­
tures of recessions. Edelstein and Kilian (2009) provide empirical evidence 
that shifts in precautionary savings and deteriorating consumer confidence 
are likely an important determinant of the excess response of household 
consumption to energy price shocks.
To assess the possibility of precautionary savings effects, the final panel 
of figure 15 shows the impulse responses of the University of Michigan’s 
Index of Consumer Sentiment to food commodity and crude oil supply 
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shocks. As can be observed, there is a significant decline in consumer sen­
timent after both shocks, which is consistent with increased uncertainty by 
households. Precautionary savings effects may thus also be an important 
propagation mechanism of food market disruptions to the real economy. 
Whether this is indeed the case, and the relevance of the different mecha­
nisms to explain the overall effects, are questions that cannot be answered 
with the methods used in this paper. This requires other methods, such as 
general equilibrium models that incorporate food markets, and is left for 
future research.
V. Conclusions
Food commodity markets have historically been subject to considerable 
volatility. In particular, since the start of the millennium, there have 
been large swings in global food commodity prices. Although the linkages 
between food commodity market fluctuations and the macroeconomy are 
important for designing policies that can ameliorate the consequences of 
these swings, these linkages are poorly understood. With global tempera­
tures expected to rise substantially during the next decades, understanding 
these relationships will become even more important. In this paper, we have 
estimated the consequences of disruptions in global food commodity mar­
kets for the U.S. economy during the past 50 years. Because food markets 
also respond to developments in the macroeconomy, the main challenge 
in doing this is to identify exogenous shifts in food commodity prices. We 
have used two different approaches for identifying such movements. The 
first strategy is a joint structural VAR model for global food commodity 
markets and the U.S. economy, in which food market disruptions are iden­
tified as unanticipated changes in a quarterly global food production index 
that we have constructed based on the planting and harvesting calendars 
of the four major staples—corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans. As our sec­
ond, alternative identification strategy, we relied on narratives—from FAO 
reports, newspaper articles, disaster databases, and several other sources—
to identify 13 historical episodes when significant changes in food com­
modity prices were mainly caused by exogenous food market events.
The structural VAR analysis and the narrative approach lead to similar 
conclusions. We find a considerable impact of fluctuations in food com­
modity markets on the U.S. economy. On one hand, a rise in food com­
modity prices augments food and core consumer prices, as well as energy 
prices more recently. On the other hand, there is a persistent decline in real 
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GDP and household expenditures. The effects are approximately four to 
six times larger than the maximum impact implied by the share of food 
commodities in the CPI and household consumption. An intriguing find­
ing is that households reduce durable consumption much more than food 
consumption. Additionally, investment declines considerably. Both effects 
can only partly be explained by a moderate tightening of monetary policy 
in order to stabilize the shocks’ inflationary consequences. A better under­
standing of these indirect effects’ exact mechanisms remains complex and 
is an interesting topic for future research. The construction of dynamic 
general equilibrium models for food markets may be useful to answer this 
question. Other avenues for future research are analyses of cross­country 
differences and consideration of the question of whether policies, such as 
public food security programs or monetary policy, could dampen the macro­ 
economic consequences of food market disruptions.
A P P E N D I X
Example of a Narratively Identified Global Food Commodity 
Market Shock: Droughts around the Globe in 2012:Q3
Type of shock: Unfavorable.
Food commodity market event:
Due to droughts in Russia, Eastern Europe, Asia, and the United States, there 
was a significant decline in global cereal production. In retrospect, annual 
global cereal production contracted by 2.4 percent. In July 2012, the USDA 
decreased its June estimate for U.S. corn by 12 percent because of the worst 
midwestern drought in a quarter century. Heat waves in southern Europe 
added serious concern about global food supplies later that month, as well as 
below­average rainfall in Australia. In August, there was news about a late 
monsoon negatively affecting the rice harvest in Asia. According to the Inter­
national Food Policy Research Institute, production of food grains in south­
ern Asia was expected to decline by 12 percent compared with a year earlier. 
Also in August, the Russian grain harvest forecasts were reduced because 
of a drought. In October 2012, wheat output in Russia was estimated to be 
about 30 percent down from 2011; in Ukraine, a decrease of about 33 per­
cent was expected; and in Kazakhstan, output was reported to be just half 
of the previous year’s good level. The wheat harvest indeed declined in 
2012, by 33 percent, 29 percent, and 57 percent in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan, respectively. The EM­DAT database of international disas­
ters lists droughts in Ukraine (April 15, 2012 to July 31, 2012), Russia 
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(June 2012 to September 2012), and the United States (June 2012 to 
December 2012).
We allocate the shock to 2012:Q3 because this is the period when the 
severe scaling back of the expected harvests started, resulting in consider­
able price increases. Real food commodity prices increased by 7.9 percent 
in that quarter, whereas oil prices decreased by 1.6 percent. The same com­
ment about the Greek debt crisis reported for the 2010:Q3 shock applies for 
2012:Q3 (the Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was 
approved in March 2012). There were no other events that could explain 
the rise in food commodity prices.
Relevant articles:
Charles Abbott, “Midwest Drought Slashes Corn Estimate, Jolts Market,” 
Reuters (July 12, 2012).
The worst Midwest drought in a quarter century is doing more damage to U.S. 
crops than previously expected with the government on Wednesday slashing its 
estimate for what was supposed to be a record harvest. The U.S. Department 
of Agriculture said the corn crop will average just 146 bushels an acre, down 
20 bushels from its June estimate and a much more dramatic drop than analysts 
had projected. The report initially reignited a near-record rally in grain prices 
that could eventually hit consumer grocery bills in North America, although the 
impact could be more immediate for the world’s poor if the drought persists. The 
severe scaling back of the harvest has sent corn and soybean prices up by more 
than a third over the past month, as extreme heat and dry conditions stunt growth 
in the world’s largest grower and exporter.
Rudy Ruitenberg, “Europe Heat Wave Wilting Corn Adds to U.S. Drought,” 
Bloomberg (July 24, 2012).
Heat waves in southern Europe are withering the corn crop and reducing yields 
in a region that accounts for 16 percent of global exports at a time when U.S. 
drought already drove prices to a record.
Temperatures in a band running from eastern Italy across the Black Sea 
region into Ukraine reached 35 degrees Celsius (95 degrees Fahrenheit) or more 
this month, about 5 degrees above normal, U.S. government data show. Corn, 
now in the pollination phase that creates kernels, risks damage above 32 degrees, 
said Cedric Weber, the head of market analysis at Bourges, France­based Offre 
et Demande Agricole, which advises farmers on sales.
The heat wave in Europe is adding to concern about global food supplies as 
U.S. farmers face the worst drought since 1956, India delays sowing because of a 
late monsoon and Australian crops endure below-average rainfall. Soybeans and 
corn rose to all­time highs yesterday and wheat surged 42 percent since June 1. 
The United Nations says food prices will probably rebound after falling the most 
in three years in the second quarter.
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Prabhudatta Mishra, “Rice Harvest in India Set to Drop as Drought Curbs 
Sowing,” Bloomberg (August 16, 2012).
Rice production in India, the world’s second­biggest grower, is poised to slump 
from a record as the worst monsoon since 2009 reduces planting, potentially 
lowering exports and boosting global prices.
The monsoon­sown harvest may be between 5 million metric tons and 
7 million tons below a record 91.5 million tons a year earlier, said P. K. Joshi, 
director for the South Asia region at the Washington­based International Food 
Policy Research Institute. Production of food grains, including corn and len-
tils, may slide as much as 12 percent from 129.9 million tons a year earlier, 
he said.
Rice has rallied 6.3 percent in Chicago since the end of May on prospects for 
a lower Indian crop and export curbs, adding to global food costs that the United 
Nations estimates jumped 6.2 percent in July. Corn and soybeans have soared 
to records as the worst U.S. drought in half a century killed crops. Global rice 
production this year will be smaller than previously forecast, according to the 
UN’s Food & Agriculture Organization.
Polina Devitt, “Russia Harvest Forecasts Cut as Drought Hits Crop in 
East,” Reuters (August 20, 2012).
Two leading Russian agricultural analysts cut their forecasts for Russia’s grain 
harvest on Monday after harvest data from two drought­stricken eastern growing 
regions reduced the outlook for the overall crop. SovEcon narrowed their grain 
forecast to 71–72.5 million metric tons (78.3–79.9 million tons) from a previous 
70–74 million tonnes after the start of harvesting campaign in Urals and Siberia 
regions showed weak crop prospects. It has also cut wheat harvest forecast to 
39–41 million tonnes from earlier 40.5–42.5 million tonnes.
The Institute for Agricultural Market Studies (IKAR) has cut its 2012 grain 
crop forecast to 73 million tonnes from a previously expected 75.4 million 
tonnes, its chief executive, Dmitry Rylko, said. It has not yet estimated wheat 
harvest.
“I see the possibility of further downgrading,” Rylko said.
Global Information and Early Warning System, “Crop Prospects and Food 
Situation,” no. 3 (October 2012), Rome: United Nations, Food and Agri­
cultural Organization.
FAO’s latest forecast for world cereal production in 2012 has been revised down-
ward slightly (0.4 percent) since the previous update in September, to 2,286 mil­
lion tonnes. The latest adjustment mostly reflects a smaller maize crop in central 
and southeastern parts of Europe, where yields are turning out lower than earlier 
expectations following prolonged dry conditions. At the current forecast level, 
world cereal production in 2012 would be 2.6 percent down from the previous 
year’s record crop but close to the second largest in 2008. The overall decrease 
comprises a 5.2 percent reduction in wheat production, and a 2.3 percent reduction  
for coarse grains, while the global rice crop is seen to remain virtually unchanged. 
Chapter 1 - 74 
JASMIEN DE WINNE and GERT PEERSMAN 257
Severe droughts this year in the United States and across a large part of Europe 
and into central Asia have been the main cause of the reduced wheat and coarse 
grains crops. . . .
FAO’s latest forecast for global wheat production in 2012 stands at 663 mil­
lion tonnes, 5.2 percent below last year’s level, but close to the average of the 
past five years. This level is considerably below expectations earlier in the 
year, largely reflecting the impact of the severe drought that set­in across east­
ern Europe and central Asia, but also on account of downward revisions for 
the key Southern Hemisphere producing countries where weather and policy 
factors in some cases have reduced prospects for the 2012 crop yet to be 
harvested.
Most of the decline in global wheat production, compared to last year, reflects 
the negative effects of drought in the major producing CIS countries in Europe 
and Asia. Wheat output in the Russian Federation is estimated some 30 percent 
down from 2011, in Ukraine, latest information points to a decrease of about 
33 percent, while in Kazakhstan, output is reported to be just half of last year’s 
good level. In other parts of Europe, wheat output also declined, particularly 
in some central and southeastern countries on the edge of the drought­affected 
zone. The aggregate output of the EU countries is estimated to be down by 
2.6 percent. In the other Asian subregions, record crops have been gathered in 
the key producers in the Far East, namely, China and India, while in the Near 
East, results have been mixed: good crops were gathered in Afghanistan and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran but outputs were down elsewhere, reflecting dry 
conditions and/or the negative impact of civil disturbances. The 2012 harvest 
results were also mixed in North Africa, where production recovered in Algeria 
but was sharply reduced in Morocco due to dry conditions. In the United States, 
this year’s wheat production is estimated to have increased by 13.4 percent to an 
above­average level of 61.7 million tonnes. In Canada, output is expected to be 
above average and almost 7 percent higher than in 2011.
In South America, the subregion’s aggregate wheat production is forecast at 
about 21 million tonnes, 12 percent down from the previous year and below 
average. The expected reduction reflects a general decline in the area planted in 
response to changes in marketing policy and due to dry weather at sowing time 
in June and July. In Oceania, prospects for the wheat crop in Australia are mixed, 
reflecting varied winter rainfall and moisture conditions: overall output is fore­
cast down by about 24 percent from last year’s record crop due to lower yields 
expected in some major producing areas affected by dry conditions.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
WOLFRAM SCHLENKER   This paper by Jasmien De Winne and Gert 
Peersman presents an innovative analysis of whether food commodity price 
shocks have ramifications throughout the larger economy. There is a large 
body of literature discussing how oil price fluctuations might have an impact 
on the economy, yet very little work has been done examining the effects of 
food commodity price fluctuations.
The authors address this question in two ways: empirically, by estimat-
ing a vector autoregression (VAR) model; and narratively, by examining 
the economic response to 13 episodes of significant commodity market 
surprises. The VAR cleverly extends a previous analysis that used annual 
commodity yield shocks of the four staple commodities—corn, wheat, rice, 
and soybeans—as instruments for commodity prices. The authors utilize 
calendars for the various crops to define the quarters for which produc-
tion shocks should show up as news. The analysis concentrates on crops 
and countries where the harvest time falls in a different quarter than the 
planting time. Farmers endogenously choose how much to plant; but, con-
ditional on the planted area, production shocks at harvest time are pre-
dominantly exogenously determined by the effect of weather on yields. The 
authors find a large effect of commodity price shocks on U.S. GDP. There 
is even a surprisingly large positive effect on durables like cars.
The VAR is discussed in more detail in Mark Watson’s comment. Here, 
I focus on a puzzle in the mechanism behind the discovered relationship 
and a reduced-form sensitivity check.
COMMODITY PRICES VERSUS FOOD PRICES When talking about prices, it is 
important to separate the raw commodity prices that farmers receive for their 
products from the food prices that consumers pay at the store. Though the 
latter accounted for, on average, 17 percent of households’ expenditures in 
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the 1960–2015 period, the fraction that falls on the pure commodity cost is 
rather minor. Michael Roberts and I (2013) estimate that for a 2,000-calorie 
daily diet of raw, unprocessed rice, the annual commodity cost fell in real 
terms during the 20th century, and is currently less than $100. Because 
nobody eats raw, unprocessed rice and nothing else, this is of course a 
hypothetical example. A meat-based diet would have higher commodity 
costs; 1 calorie of meat requires more than 1 calorie of feedstock, as a large 
fraction of the feedstock is used to sustain the animal. But the largest com-
ponent of the final food price consumers end up paying at the store is the 
processing and distribution cost. There is a big difference between changes 
in the price of raw commodities—which can easily double in response to 
production shocks due to the inelastic demand for commodities—and the 
change in food prices at the supermarket.
This point has been made by Christiane Baumeister and Lutz Kilian 
(2014), who show that fluctuations in oil prices do not translate into changes 
in the food prices consumers pay at the store. They emphasize,
The distinction between retail food prices and the prices received by farmers 
for grain crops and livestock is important. . . . The discrepancy between the 
slow growth in real consumer food prices and the more rapid growth in the crop 
prices received by farmers is explained by the small cost share of agricultural 
products in the food prices paid by U.S. consumers. For example, the farm value 
of wheat in the price of bread is only about 5 percent, so even substantial wheat 
price increases are associated with only small increases in the price of bread. 
(Baumeister and Kilian 2014, p. 736)
This raises a question about the possible mechanism between commodity 
prices that farmers receive and overall economic fluctuations in the United 
States: Are the observed commodity price swings large enough to change 
how much consumers pay at the store? If not, how would higher com-
modity prices affect consumer spending, and possibly make an impact on 
the larger economy?
My figure 1 plots the quarterly commodity price index for both the large 
basket of commodities and the narrower cereal price index from De Winne 
and Peersman for the years 1996–2015. The dashed lines show the large 
rise between 2005 and 2008, especially for the cereal index, where prices 
roughly tripled. The figure also shows food expenditures taken from the 
diary files of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure 
Survey. Weekly expenditures are aggregated to the quarterly level to match 
De Winne and Peersman’s time scale, and are then multiplied by four to 
get the corresponding annual cost in nominal dollars, as shown on the right 
vertical axis. The solid black line shows total expenditures, which increase 
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smoothly over time, from roughly $4,500 in 1996 to $6,500 in 2015. The 
solid gray lines separate total expenditures into ones for food consumed at 
home and in restaurants. These lines rise smoothly over time as well.
The disconnect between commodity prices and food expenditures 
is apparent. The former roughly tripled, yet the latter hardly budged at 
all. There might be differences between farmers’ commodity prices and 
consumers’ food expenditures. Stores might choose not to pass on all fluc-
tuations. Alternatively, an increase in prices might be offset by a decrease 
in the quantity consumed, though the complete unresponsiveness in expen-
ditures when commodity prices triple seems odd, given the highly inelastic 
demand. For comparison, my figure 2 plots prices for eggs and milk as well 
as food expenditures from the diary files from the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey. Both eggs and milk are much harder to store than raw commodi-
ties, so farmer prices fluctuate more wildly because shocks cannot be 
smoothed across time; yet, the two series of farmer prices and store prices 
appear to be very much linked.
The most likely reason why consumers’ food expenditures do not respond 
to farmers’ commodity prices for the four basic staples—corn, wheat, rice, 
50
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Sources: De Winne and Peersman; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey.
a. The values are indexed so that the average nominal food price equals 100. 
b. Weekly nominal food expenditures are aggregated to the quarterly level, and are multiplied by 4 to give the 
annual cost. 
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Figure 1. Commodity Prices versus Food Price Expenditures, 1996–2015
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Sources: U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service; U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey. 
a. For food prices, monthly data are averaged over the three months of each quarter; for consumer expendi-
tures, weekly data are aggregated to the quarterly level. 
b. The values are indexed so that the average nominal food price equals 100. 
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Figure 2. Food Prices versus Food Expenditures for Eggs and Milk, 1996–2015a
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and soybeans—is that the latter are a small fraction of the former. If food 
expenditures do not respond to commodity prices, is the observed signifi-
cant relationship between commodity prices and the economy at large real? 
The next section presents an alternative reduced-form sensitivity check.
REDUCED-FORM ANALYSIS USING CALORIC SHOCKS De Winne and Peersman’s 
VAR uses production in the harvest quarter as a variable. Not all changes in 
total production are news, given that some are anticipated and endogenous, 
such as changes in the growing area. This is accounted for in the VAR by 
incorporating commodity prices, which should reflect all information the 
market knew at the time of the harvest. However, the linearity in the VAR 
model might be inadequate to model all nonlinear responses to changes in 
expectations and prices.
An alternative to including total production as a variable is to construct 
shocks that are unexpected news. My figure 3 shows such unexpected quar-
terly caloric shocks, which are constructed as residuals from a regression 
of log yields to country- and crop-specific time trends. They are then 
summed over all countries and crops using predicted production weights 
and the caloric content of each crop. For a detailed description of how 
these shocks are derived, see Roberts and Schlenker (2013, p. 2271). The 
only difference between my figure 3 and Roberts and Schlenker’s (2013) 
methodology is that my shocks are aggregated to the quarterly level, 
whereas Roberts and Schlenker aggregate to the annual level. The harvest 
starts as defined by De Winne and Peersman’s crop calendar. My figure 3 
shows the results when the time trend is modeled as a restricted cubic spline 
with either four or six knots. The number of knots has a negligible effect on 
the shocks, because yields have been trending upward very smoothly over 
time. The shocks (deviations from a country- and crop-specific trend) are 
exogenous and random in time, making them ideal as an instrument.
My table 1 presents the results of a simple reduced-form regression 
when various quarterly dependent variables, yt, are regressed on the caloric 
production shocks that are due to yield anomalies wt (both a contempo-
raneous term and five lags to match the lag structure of De Winne and 
Peersman), quarterly fixed effects aq(t), and a time trend f (t), which is again 
flexibly modeled as a restricted cubic spline with either four or six knots:
∑ ( )= α + β + + ε( ) −
=
y w f tt q t k t k t
k
.
0
5
Various variables used by De Winne and Peersman are used as the 
dependent variable: Columns 1 and 2 use their real commodity price index; 
columns 3 and 4 use the real cereal price index; columns 5 and 6 use real 
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U.S. GDP; and columns 7 and 8 use real global production. The odd-
numbered columns use a restricted cubic spline time trend with four knots, 
while the even-numbered columns use six knots. The top panel estimates 
the model in first differences of the log variables, while the bottom panel 
estimates the model in log levels.
Focus on the differenced results in the top panel: The results for com-
modity price in columns 1 and 2 are highly significant; an unexpected 
caloric shock in production leads to a large, significant change in prices 
of the opposite sign. The large magnitude is due to the extremely inelastic 
demand for the good, and supply usually requires a full year (four quarters) 
to respond during the next annual cropping cycle. The timing also seems 
intuitive; prices move in the two quarters after new production shocks are 
revealed. The second quarter might be an artifact of the classification 
scheme, where harvesting periods that span two quarters are assigned to the 
first. Shocks might not be fully revealed until quarter t + 1. The coefficients 
a year later in quarters t + 4 and t + 5 are significant and of the opposite 
sign, as production shortfalls can be counterbalanced in the next growing 
season by increasing the growing area. The combined effect—the sum of 
Sources: Author’s calculations; Roberts and Schlenker (2013). 
a. This figure shows caloric shocks in the harvesting quarter, following the crop calendar used by De Winne and 
Peersman. The model regresses log yields on time trends for each crop and country, and derives the residuals. 
The log deviations are aggregated over all crops and countries for the harvesting quarter using the predicted 
production (yield trend × actual area), multiplied by a caloric conversion factor as weight. Time trends are 
modeled as restricted cubic splines with four or six knots. 
Year
Yield deviation from trend
–0.05
–0.1
–0.15
–0.2
0
0.05
1968 1976 1984 1992 2000 2008
Four spline knots
Six spline knots
Figure 3. Caloric Shocks, 1960–2015a
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the six individual coefficients—is given at the bottom of each panel. They 
are insignificant because temporary price spikes disappear in the next 
growing season, when production responses can take place. My figure 4 
shows that commodity prices move very closely together; the figure 
compares De Winne and Peersman’s price indexes with data for the four 
commodities, corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans. Correlations of the price 
deviations from a time trend are given in my table 2; they are generally 
very high, on average about .80.
Conversely, the results for GDP and global production in the last four 
columns of my table 1 suggest no significant effects of production shocks 
on GDP or global production in any of the following five quarters. The 
combined effect is very small in magnitude and not significantly different 
from 0.
The bottom panel of my table 1 uses levels as a sensitivity check, which 
might be questionable for variables that are not stationary but is shown for 
comparison purposes. Price effects are again significant and of a large mag-
nitude, while the effects on GDP and global production are sometimes sig-
nificant, but can have the opposite sign found by De Winne and Peersman. 
The results are highly sensitive to whether one includes four or six spline 
Sources: De Winne and Peersman; U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service. 
a. Monthly data are averaged over the three months of each quarter. The values are indexed so that the average 
nominal food price equals 100. 
Nominal food prices indexa
250
200
150
100
50
1968 1976 1984 1992 2000 2008
Year
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Soybeans
Commodities
Cereals
Figure 4. Comparison of Various Commodity Prices, 1960–2015
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knots. The more flexible specification using six knots gives insignificant 
results or significant results that have a counterintuitive sign.
In summary, the reduced-form regression linking U.S. GDP and global 
production to unexpected food price shocks does not corroborate the find-
ing that food price shocks have an impact on the economy at large. So why 
do the authors find them? One explanation might be that the effects are real 
but small enough that the reduced-form analysis does not pick them up. A 
lack of evidence does not necessarily show the lack of an effect, although 
the standard errors are fairly small.
An alternative explanation might be that instead of food prices affect-
ing GDP, there are omitted confounders. An emerging literature shows 
that weather has strong influences on GDP growth (Dell, Jones, and Olken 
2012; Boldin and Wright 2015; Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015) and con-
flict (Hsiang, Meng, and Cane 2011; Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013). 
If detrimental weather shocks cause both agricultural and other sectors to 
decline while commodity prices spike, there might be an induced correla-
tion that is not causal. The authors address this by only using agricultural 
shocks outside the United States, but the spurious correlation might even 
be at work if countries’ GDPs are linked through international trade. On top 
of this, the VAR structure might be too restrictive to force the identification 
to rest on unexpected shocks. This empirical puzzle—that the VAR detects 
a relationship that the reduced-form analysis fails to pick up—needs to be 
addressed by future research.
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COMMENT BY
MARK W. WATSON  This paper by Jasmien De Winne and Gert 
Peersman is an ambitious and careful analysis of the effects of global 
food supply shocks on the U.S. macroeconomy. The authors use a familiar 
framework—structural vector autoregression (SVAR)—and related distrib-
uted lag models. Their key challenge is to identify exogenous variation in 
global food production that can be used to estimate the dynamic causal 
effects of global food shocks on the U.S. macroeconomy. They do this 
in two complementary ways, both involving the construction of new data 
series.
For their first approach, they construct a quarterly index of crop harvests 
for four staple food commodities using data covering nearly 200 coun-
tries. They argue that much of the unforecastable variation in harvests is 
exogenous because planting decisions are made in the quarters before the 
harvest. Using this logic, 1-quarter-ahead forecast errors in their produc-
tion index are exogenous food supply shocks. The dynamic causal effects 
of food shocks can be identified by ordering their global food production 
index as the first variable in an SVAR identified by a Wold causal ordering.
For their second approach, they construct a time series of narrative 
shocks that isolate quarters in which major changes in food production 
were caused by judgmentally determined exogenous factors. The authors 
find 13 such quarters during their 1963–2013 sample period. They use 
the resulting set of indicator variables as instruments to estimate dynamic 
causal effects in a series of distributed lag models.
Both approaches yield similar conclusions; an unexpected increase in 
global food supply leads to (i) a reduction in global food prices, (ii) an 
increase in U.S. GDP, (iii) a decrease in both overall and core prices, (iv) a 
decrease in interest rates, and (v) a relatively large increase in expenditures 
on durable consumption goods. The authors argue that part of the channel 
from food production shocks to expenditures on consumer durables runs 
through interest rates—that is, Federal Reserve easing as inflation falls fol-
lowing a favorable food supply shock.1 But their estimates suggest that this 
interest rate channel is responsible for only one-third of the total effect. The 
channel (or channels) explaining the remaining two-thirds remains a mys-
tery, although the authors provide several interesting conjectures.
Here, I use an alternative econometric framework—a structural dynamic 
factor model (SDFM)—to estimate the causal effect of global food shocks 
1. See Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) for a related analysis of the monetary policy 
channel for oil shocks.
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on the U.S. macroeconomy. I have two goals: first, to gauge the robustness 
of the authors’ conclusions; and second, to see if the alternative framework 
provides additional clues as to why global food supply shocks have such a 
large effect of expenditures for consumer durables. To preview the results, 
I find the authors’ main empirical conclusions are robust to this alternative 
framework, but the SDFM suggests that the interest rate channel may be 
more important than is suggested by the authors’ SVAR.
I begin by briefly reviewing the SDFM and how it (usefully, in my mind) 
extends the authors’ SVAR analysis.2 A key feature of the SDFM is that it 
easily scales up to incorporate more variables. In a standard n-variable 
SVAR, the number of parameters to be estimated is of the order n2; in an 
SDFM, the number of parameters is of the order n. This makes it possible 
to include many more variables in an SDFM than would be feasible in an 
SVAR. For example, I use more than 200 macroeconomic variables in the 
SDFM to estimate the effect of global food supply shocks. The large num-
ber of variables in the SDFM gives it two distinct advantages over an 
SVAR: First, it attenuates omitted variable and measurement error biases 
in estimates of the unobserved structural shocks; and second, it provides a 
coherent framework for estimating the effect of shocks on a large number 
of macroeconomic variables. The general SDFM has the form
= Λ +X F et t t(1) ,
F F Gt t t(2) L ,1( )= Φ + η−
where Xt is an n × 1 vector of observed variables (n > 200 in this applica-
tion), Ft is a k × 1 vector of unobserved factors where k is relatively small 
(k = 8 here), et is a vector of idiosyncratic errors, and ht is a vector of the 
model’s structural shocks. My interest is in global food shocks, so they are 
an element of ht.
When interest focuses on a structural shock that has only a small effect 
on most of the variables in the model, its factor needs to be tightly con-
nected to an observed series (Stock and Watson 2016). As De Winne and 
Peersman show, this is the case for food supply shocks, as they explain 
2. Stock and Watson (2016) provide a comprehensive survey of dynamic factor models 
and how the structural versions of these models, SDFMs, are related to SVARs. The empiri-
cal results presented here use this framework, and are closely related to the analysis of oil 
supply shocks appearing in Stock and Watson’s (2016) survey.
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only a small amount of the variability in U.S. macroeconomic variables. 
This leads me to specify equation 1 of the SDFM as
X
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where QtFood is the logarithm of the global food supply index constructed by 
De Winne and Peersman, PtFood is the logarithm of the food commodity 
price index constructed by De Winne and Peersman, and Yt is a vector 
of more than 200 macroeconomic variables, as described by Stock and 
Watson (2016). From equation 3, the first factor, FtQ-Food, is the global food 
index and the second factor, FtP-Food, is the food commodity price index. 
The other factors, FtOther, are not directly observed, and they correspond 
to macroeconomic factors beyond food supply and food prices that cause 
common variation in the macroeconomic variables included in Yt. Finally, 
using the same timing assumption as the authors’ SVAR, I set the first row 
of G in equation 2 as (1 0 . . . 0), so that the first element of ht is the global 
food supply shock. I estimate the model using six factors in FtOther and four 
lags of F in the VAR in equation 2.
My table 1 shows the estimated impulse effects, ∂Xi,t+h/∂h tQ-Food, com-
puted using the SDFM model along with the fraction of forecast error vari-
ance associated with the food supply shock, hQ-Food. The first row shows that 
the food shock has a unit impact effect on the logarithm of global food pro-
duction and an R2 of 1, which follow from the identifying assumptions that 
the shock yields a 1 log point increase in food production, and this shock 
explains all of the 1-quarter-ahead forecast error. The next row shows the 
estimated effect of this shock on the logarithm of the food commodity price 
index after h = 1 quarter. Food prices fall by 0.39 log points, and food 
supply shocks explain just 7 percent of the variance in food prices at this 
horizon. The SDFM includes more than 200 variables, and the remaining 
rows of the table show impulse responses for a subset of these variables 
after h = 5 quarters.
The SDFM’s estimates suggest many of the same conclusions as the 
SVAR used by the authors. An exogenous 1 log point increase in global 
food supply leads to (i) a nearly identical fall in global food prices (0.39 
in the SDFM versus 0.41 in the SVAR); (ii) an increase in U.S. GDP; 
(iii) decreases in both overall and core prices, both measured by personal 
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Table 1. Estimated Effect of Global Food Supply Shocks on Selected Variables  
from a Structural Dynamic Factor Modela
Variable Impulse response at horizon h R2(h)
Global food production (h = 0) 1.000 (0.000) 1.00
Food commodity price index (h = 1) -0.390 (0.110) 0.07
Other variables (h = 5)
GDP 0.037 (0.021) 0.01
Consumption 0.050 (0.020) 0.04
Consumption: durables 0.153 (0.070) 0.03
Consumption: nondurables 0.044 (0.019) 0.03
Consumption: services 0.027 (0.010) 0.03
Investment 0.046 (0.082) 0.00
Investment: fixed nonresidential -0.002 (0.062) 0.01
Investment: fixed residential 0.340 (0.120) 0.04
Industrial production 0.023 (0.040) 0.01
Industrial production: consumer durables 0.128 (0.075) 0.01
Industrial production: automobiles 0.190 (0.107) 0.01
Employment 0.009 (0.016) 0.00
Unemployment rate -0.810 (0.951) 0.01
Labor productivity 0.034 (0.017) 0.02
Housing permits 0.656 (0.226) 0.04
Retail sales 0.097 (0.039) 0.04
PCE prices -0.063 (0.028) 0.04
PCE prices: core -0.029 (0.014) 0.02
PCE prices: food and beverages -0.137 (0.058) 0.05
PCE prices: durable goods -0.038 (0.027) 0.01
PCE prices: services -0.028 (0.015) 0.03
Federal funds rate -4.310 (2.140) 0.04
10-year Treasury bond rate -2.440 (0.880) 0.03
30-year mortgage rate -3.000 (1.130) 0.04
Senior Loan Officer Opinion Surveyb 3.730 (1.300) 0.06
Excess bond premiumc -0.660 (0.305) 0.01
S&P 500 Index 0.293 (0.183) 0.01
Housing prices 0.068 (0.034) 0.02
Exchange rates -0.114 (0.059) 0.02
Consumer expectations 2.460 (0.850) 0.04
Oil production 0.062 (0.026) 0.01
Oil prices -0.483 (0.260) 0.03
CPI gasoline -0.259 (0.141) 0.03
Sources: Author’s calculations; Stock and Watson (2016).
a. R2(h) is the fraction of the (h + 1)-quarter-ahead forecast error associated with the global supply 
shock. Standard errors (computed using parametric bootstrap simulations) are in parentheses.
b. The Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices is a 
quarterly survey of large banks that seeks qualitative information with respect to changes in bank lending 
practices in the previous quarter.
c. The excess bond premium measure comes from Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012).
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consumption expenditures (PCE) in the SDFM; (iv) a decrease in inter-
est rates; and (v) a relatively large increase in expenditures on consumer 
durables.
That said, there are interesting quantitative differences in the estimated 
effects of the SDFM and SVAR that, when coupled with the information 
from other variables, suggest a more important role for interest rates in the 
transmission of food shocks to the macroeconomy. For example, in addi-
tion to large effects on consumer durable expenditures and automobile pro-
duction, food shocks have large effects on residential investment and new 
housing permits. Evidently, sectors that are sensitive to the interest rate 
are particularly affected by food shocks. The SDFM suggests a somewhat 
smaller effect of the shocks on GDP (roughly 60 percent of the size of the 
SVAR effect), and a larger and more persistent effect on the federal funds 
rates (consistent with the results for the authors’ FAVAR model in their 
figure 11). Longer-term interest rates (10-year Treasury bonds and 30-year 
mortgage rates) fall significantly following a favorable food supply shock. 
Other financial variables also move in ways consistent with an easing of 
monetary policy: Stock prices rise, the dollar falls relative to other curren-
cies, the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey indicates 
an easing of credit, and the excess bond premium described by Simon 
Gilchrist and Egon Zakrajšek (2012) falls.
The SDFM results suggest that interest rates are an important, perhaps 
dominant, channel for the effect of food shocks on the macroeconomy. The 
size of the effect of food shocks on sectors that are sensitive to the interest 
rate (residential investment, expenditures on consumer durables) appears to 
be roughly what would be predicted by the effect of these shocks on inter-
est rates (Bernanke and Gertler 1995; McCarthy and Peach 2002).
Of course, this SDFM exercise is merely a single robustness check that 
should be viewed in the context of the large number of careful exercises 
reported by De Winne and Peersman. Their paper raises a novel and interest-
ing question, and I have no doubt that it will be investigated in future papers 
using other methods and data. I look forward to following this research.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION   Lutz Kilian observed that the paper’s pri-
mary story that food supply shocks raise the price of food and lower the 
discretionary income of consumers, given that households spend a rela-
tively large proportion of their budget on food, is a sensible starting point 
for the analysis, but that this view is not supported by the evidence. The 
first problem is how to define “food prices.” On one hand, there are food 
commodity prices in the global economy; on the other hand, there are U.S. 
retail food prices. In a recent paper, Kilian and Christiane Baumeister show 
that, despite large fluctuations in global food commodity prices, there was 
virtually no change in U.S. retail food prices.1 One explanation is that 
most of the prices of final goods are determined by factors other than com-
modity prices; for example, data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
suggest that only about 5 percent of the cost of producing bread comes 
from the cost of wheat. According to this logic, it is easy to see why a 
fluctuation in the global price of wheat would have very little effect on the 
retail price of bread. Hence, if there is a channel of transmission from food 
commodity prices to the macroeconomy, as the authors conjectured, that 
channel must be about something entirely different, something that links 
food commodity prices to real GDP.
The interesting part of the paper, Kilian contended, is not the impulse 
responses and variance compositions; it is the historical decompositions 
that quantify the cumulative effect of food supply shocks. Kilian stressed 
that these historical decompositions reveal a puzzle. This puzzle is how 
food supply shocks that explain little of the evolution of global food com-
modity prices can explain much of the variation in U.S. real GDP growth 
and its components at the same time. A good example is the apparently 
large effect of food supply shocks on automobile purchases by consumers. 
One potential explanation for this finding might seem to be the discretion-
1. Christiane Baumeister and Lutz Kilian, “Do Oil Price Increases Cause Higher Food 
Prices?” Economic Policy 29, no. 80 (2014): 691–747.
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ary incomes as food prices change; but as Kilian had just observed, there 
is little variation in discretionary incomes because retail food prices do not 
move much. A second possible explanation is that there might be a direct 
link between crude oil prices, biofuel prices, and food commodity prices; 
but as Kilian had mentioned, he and Baumeister had found no support for 
such a link. Yet another possible explanation is that monetary policymakers 
might have responded to changes in inflation driven by changes in retail 
food prices, Kilian explained; but there have been no large changes in retail 
food price inflation, so this explanation does not seem plausible. Finally, 
Kilian expressed skepticism about the paper’s attempt to explain its find-
ings based on other channels of the transmission of food supply shocks 
(such as reallocation effects or food price uncertainty effects). The latter 
channels, Kilian pointed out, all require the use of nonlinear models, and 
hence cannot be used to rationalize the authors’ estimates obtained from 
linear models.
Kilian concluded that, rather than there being some mystery explanation 
yet to be discovered, the paper likely has a problem identifying food sup-
ply shocks. A properly identified model, he contended, would include data 
on global food prices and quantities, but would also include changes in 
income that ultimately drive the demand for food. It would also include 
things like inventories of food commodities, which are difficult to mea-
sure. Kilian argued that the paper’s model might also have omitted vari-
ables as well as measurement problems, pointing to a mismatch between 
the prices and quantity data for food commodities. For example, the 
Soviet Union is included in constructing the quality measure, but the 
Soviet Union only very intermittently participated in global food com-
modity markets, meaning that the price data do not match the quantity 
data, invalidating the identification.
Kilian had one final comment related to the paper’s results on the effects 
of the oil supply shocks. He noted that the way the paper identified these 
shocks was not state of the art; rather, it was done in a way that, according 
to recent research, is known to be misleading because it does not impose 
all relevant identifying restrictions.2 He suggested discarding that particular 
2. See, for example, Lutz Kilian and Daniel P. Murphy, “Why Agnostic Sign Restrictions 
Are Not Enough: Understanding the Dynamics of Oil Market VAR Models,” Journal of the 
European Economic Association 10, no. 5 (2012): 1166–88; Christiane Baumeister and Gert 
Peersman, “The Role of Time-Varying Price Elasticities in Accounting for Volatility Changes 
in the Crude Oil Market,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 28, no. 7 (2013): 1087–1109; 
and Juan Antolin-Diaz and Juan Francisco Rubio Ramírez, “Narrative Sign Restrictions for 
SVARs,” Discussion Paper no. 11517, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
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evidence; but more important, he failed to see why that evidence was 
included in the paper in the first place, given that it is not related to the 
paper’s central question of what the effects of food supply shocks are.
As Mark Watson’s discussion had emphasized, Christopher Sims noted 
that it is hard to reliably estimate the effects of food prices because the 
contribution to the shocks’ variance is small. Sims took issue with Watson’s 
approach in his presentation of taking the first difference of the data, not-
ing that the cointegration literature finds that this is a bad idea because 
it throws away too much information. It is always possible to get differ-
ent results with a worse model, he noted. If the authors could show that 
altering their model to produce a better fit would give different results, 
this would be a legitimate criticism; but Watson’s presentation simply pre-
sented a handful of other models, some of which may fit much worse. Sims 
hoped that the authors would do more to analyze their model’s fit.
Sims was surprised that the authors were able to show big impulse 
responses with good estimates of the error bands. It is hard to know what 
kind of model would explain the error bands, he noted; but the effects 
are certainly there, and are statistically significant. To undermine this, 
one would need to produce a better model showing that the error bands 
are wrong or that the impulse responses come out in a different way.
Sims mentioned a few possible econometric issues. Specifically, when 
it comes to food prices, seasonality is extremely important. Seasonality 
is pervasive in price and output data for commodities, particularly food 
commodities. The authors’ model, as he understands it, includes seasonal 
dummies and uses seasonally adjusted data. He noted a bit of danger in 
doing this, because seasonally adjusted data always use future data as part 
of the adjustment. Unraveling this adjustment using a multivariable vector 
autoregression could be cause for worry, and so Sims suggested that the 
authors check for robustness there, by testing whether the seasonal dum-
mies matter or by replacing some series with series that are not seasonally 
adjusted and by leaving in the dummies. He noted that commodity prices 
notoriously produce nonnormal residuals due to large outliers. According 
to the authors’ current framework, it would not be too difficult to construct 
a model that allowed for t-distributed errors, which would indicate whether 
the results were being driven by a few large outliers.
Justin Wolfers noted that what the authors do with the global food index 
seems to make sense; once a crop is planted, conditional on what is planted, 
what ends up getting harvested seems exogenous. In the regression context, 
if one were to include harvests and control for planting, then other exog-
enous effects would be identified. But the authors did not seem to include 
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planting in their model, so he was not sure how harvests turned out to be 
exogenous.
Looking at the authors’ results at face value, Robert Hall thought they 
seemed totally implausible, which is always interesting, he noted. A big 
wave in macroeconomic theory, pioneered by Robert Shiller, deals with 
a concept variously termed confidence, sentiment, ambiguity aversion, or 
animal spirits. Models that have these features tend to generate the pattern 
observed by the authors, which is changes in a wide variety of macro-
economic variables that are similar in magnitude and are highly correlated. 
Within this framework, the price of basic cereals should be profoundly and 
primordially important for the present paper. It seems sensible, he noted, 
that they could perhaps trigger changes in confidence; if so, this is interest-
ing because most research in this area has taken it to be totally unobserv-
able and not triggered by some natural phenomenon. He suggested that the 
present paper could constitute a new branch of this line of thinking.
Martin Eichenbaum bet that a typical consumer has no clue about what 
is happening in commodity markets, and that the real question consumers 
face is about the price they are actually paying at the grocery store, not the 
price of cereals on the commodity market. Hall contended that, in fact, peo-
ple are well informed through the media about commodity prices, which 
Eichenbaum stated was possible.
Eichenbaum also commented on variance being small and yet things 
being estimated precisely. There is an analogue in the literature on mon-
etary policy shocks: When models are estimated in log levels, they explain 
very little of the variance in output identified with fund shocks, and yet 
standard errors are generally estimated quite precisely. He suggested that 
this might be something for the authors to consider.
Building on Hall’s comments, James Stock added that there is a lot 
of evidence that consumer sentiment tends to move with prices that are 
highly salient, such as those for gasoline and meat. An empirical question 
is whether this salience—even though it turns out not to be a big deal in 
bottom-line expenditures—might be a feature.
Narayana Kocherlakota suggested that since commodities have a durable 
aspect, movements in discount factors could actually have an effect on their 
prices. He proposed that perhaps the authors’ food prices were picking up 
a spurious correlation, and that discount factors are moving in relation to 
many other important things in the economy. He suggested that adding 
stock prices to their model might avoid some of this spurious correlation.
Gerald Cohen noted that there is a nontrivial lag between the effect of 
input costs for types of feed—like corn and wheat—and the cost of meat. 
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He recalled a glut of meat production in the middle to late 2000s, following 
the increase in corn prices, and suggested that the authors might look into 
this phenomenon. A related phenomenon is observed in the pig industry, 
called the corn–hog cycle. This cycle consists of massive fluctuations in 
pig production caused by overreactions to changes in the market prices 
of pigs and their feed. In pig rearing, feedstuffs are a large proportion of 
the economic market cost of a pig, so a change in feedstuff price has an 
immediate effect on farmers’ profits; conversely, cattle primarily eat grass, 
and specialty feed is normally only a small proportion of total feed costs.
Echoing Sims, Peersman was critical of Watson’s stability argument 
because estimating the model in first differences does not take into account 
potential cointegration relationships between the data. This approach was 
also the only one of which he was aware that produced somewhat weaker 
effects and different dynamics. He noted that estimating several variants of 
the level specifications for the full sample produces results that are quanti-
tatively and qualitatively very similar.
Regarding variance decompositions, though it is true that the shocks 
explain only about 10 percent of U.S. GDP variation, Peersman asked, 
“Did you expect more?” Food prices are obviously not the main driver 
of the U.S. business cycle, so it is good that the authors did not find big 
effects, he contended. Notwithstanding, the contribution of food commod-
ity market shocks to GDP variation turns out to be approximately the same 
as monetary policy or oil supply shocks, which are two shocks that receive 
a lot of attention in the literature. Peersman agreed with Eichenbaum that 
the macroeconomic consequences could be estimated quite precisely, even 
when they explain a relatively small proportion of the variance.
In response to questions of omitted variable bias, he noted that the 
authors’ VAR model does not include global income measures, and that 
they had tested their model for robustness by including both more and 
fewer variables. The authors believed that the final model, which includes 
10 variables, was sufficient to counter omitted variable bias. This is also 
confirmed by the FAVAR analysis reported in the paper. Furthermore, 
the narrative analysis revealed that food commodity market events in the 
Soviet Union did have an important influence on global commodity prices, 
even in the 1970s. However, as Kilian had suggested, Peersman noted that 
data on inventories do not exist at the required quarterly frequency.
Looking at subsamples, Peersman noted that, taking into account 
the error bands, the results are stable if two decades of observations are 
excluded at the beginning or the end of the sample period. The results 
become less stable for shorter sample periods but this should not be a sur-
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prise, because the authors are working with 10 variables and thus many 
observations are needed to make proper estimates. For more parsimonious 
versions of the VAR—for example, by including fewer variables or lags—
the results are also stable for shorter sample periods. In general, much vari-
ation in the variables is needed to capture the shocks of global food prices 
and food production, which is why Peersman is not a fan of these types of 
subsample analysis.
Schlenker was surprised to find that people spend about the same 
amount on food each year. He stated that a natural question to ask, then, is 
why there are any effects of food shocks at all. Peersman asserted that this 
is exactly the point, and might be the mechanism: When people keep on 
consuming equally as much food because they need to eat every day, they 
must cut expenditures on some other components of their budgets. The data 
suggest that households in the lowest quintile of the income distribution 
spend about 36 percent of their income on food; furthermore, low-income 
households are typically liquidity constrained, so food price fluctuations 
might have big effects on these households’ other types of spending. There 
also seems to be a significant decline in consumer confidence, which is a 
natural amplifier of the macroeconomic consequences.
Peersman disagreed with Kilian’s assertion that there is no pass-through 
from global food prices to domestic retail prices. Peersman argued that 
there is, in fact, a one-to-one pass-through of global food commodity 
prices to U.S. food commodity prices, and a pass-through to the food com-
ponent of the consumer price index proportional to the share of food com-
modities in final food products. He also stressed that this share has been 
about 14 percent on average, which is much larger than the share Kilian 
was insinuating. Regarding the authors’ identification strategy for oil sup-
ply shocks, Peersman noted that this strategy followed that used in a recent 
paper he and Baumeister published in the American Economic Journal.3 
Furthermore, he asserted that imposing the kind of restrictions on the elas-
ticities that Kilian had suggested produces the same results, noting that 
these restrictions only matter to identify demand shocks in the oil market, 
not supply shocks.
Peersman conceded that Sims’s point about seasonality was a good one. 
There is indeed much seasonality in the food production index. He noted 
that they had run specifications without seasonal dummies, and this had no 
3. Christiane Baumeister and Gert Peersman, “Time-Varying Effects of Oil Supply 
Shocks on the U.S. Economy,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5, no. 4 
(2013): 1–28.
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influence on the results. The authors also found similar macroeconomic 
consequences using data that were not seasonally adjusted, as Sims had 
also suggested. All in all, the authors found that the effects are similar 
across the various specifications.
Regarding Wolfers’s comment about why the authors do not include 
data on crop planting, Peersman noted that planting data are actually not 
needed because what is being identified are quarterly shocks, that is, shocks 
within the harvesting quarter. Everything that happens before this quarter 
should already be included in the information of the model’s other vari-
ables. Food commodity prices, for instance, should contain all the relevant 
information about planting that is in principle reflected in the price just 
before the harvesting quarter.
Regarding Kocherlakota’s suggestions that there could be a common 
shock to commodities that is basically driven by rates of returns and dis-
count factors, Peersman noted that this was indeed one of the authors’ 
concerns, and they did a lot of work to figure out whether this was the case. 
For example, in the paper they show that only food commodity market 
variables react on impact. Similarly, GDP and other variables only start 
to decline after a couple of quarters, meaning that on impact, there is no 
shock directly affecting GDP. More importantly, equity prices also do not 
shift on impact.
Finally, Peersman noted that estimating the impact of food prices on 
exports shows that the effects are not strong. Even though there is a decline 
in global economic activity, exports do not appear to be the culprit; they 
decline a bit, but the effect is not statistically significant. He concluded that 
domestic consumption is what really seems to drive the output effect.
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1 Introduction
There is growing evidence that climatic changes have increased the mean and variance of
weather conditions around the globe (e.g. Munasinghe et al. 2012). The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change projects for the coming century a further rise in the variability and
frequency of extreme weather events such as droughts, tropical cyclones and heavy rainfall
(IPCC 2014). Since temperature and precipitation are direct inputs in agricultural production,
the economic consequences are considered to be most important for agriculture (Auffhammer
and Schlenker 2014; Carleton and Hsiang 2016). Especially developing countries are projected
to suffer a lot because poorer countries already have hotter climates, as well as higher shares
of agricultural sectors in economic activity (Nordhaus 2006; Mendelsohn 2008). For example,
Jones and Olken (2010) and Dell et al. (2012) show that higher temperatures in a given year
reduce the growth rate of exports and real GDP significantly, but only in poor countries.
An element that has not been considered so far is the possible impact of climate change on
economic performance of countries through a rise in the volatility of global agricultural (food)
commodity prices. More specifically, disruptions in agricultural markets around the globe
that are the result of extreme weather conditions could lead to substantial changes in the
prices of agricultural commodities. For example, the extreme droughts in Russia and Eastern
Europe were the primary reason for the rise in global real food commodity prices by more
than 20% in the summer of 2010 (De Winne and Peersman 2016, henceforth DWP 2016).
Real cereal prices increased even by almost 30% (see Figure 1). These changes in agricultural
prices could, in turn, curtail economic activity of countries that are not directly exposed to the
extreme weather conditions, for example, through an impact on consumer spending. Given
the high proportion of food consumption in household expenditures, this could augment the
costs of global climate change for poor countries. Moreover, these indirect effects may as
well affect rich economies, which also have non-negligible shares of food expenditures. DWP
(2016) demonstrate that this is the case for the United States, where the macroeconomic
effects of increases in global food commodity prices turn out to be a multiple of the share of
food commodities in household consumption.1
In this paper we provide empirical evidence on the impact of (non-domestic) fluctuations in
global agricultural markets on economic activity of 75 advanced and developing countries. In
1Between 1960 and 2015, food commodity expenditures per capita per year measured in constant 2015
dollar values amounted to approximately $900 in the United States (DWP 2016). As a reference, crude oil
expenditures over this period were on average roughly $750 per capita per year. DWP (2016) document that
the effects of a rise in global food commodity prices on real GDP are approximately twice as large as a rise
in global crude oil prices. We are not aware of other studies that have estimated the effects of changes in
agricultural prices on economic activity of advanced economies.
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particular, we (i) estimate the effects of exogenous changes in global cereal prices on real GDP
per capita, (ii) examine whether there are differences between high and low-income countries,
and (iii) explore the correlation with other relevant country characteristics. Such evidence is
not only useful for evaluating possible indirect consequences of climate change. As can be
observed in Figure 1, variation in global agricultural commodity prices can be substantial.
Given the relevance of food in household expenditures, swings in global agricultural prices
may also be an important driver of business cycles in many countries. This matters for the
construction of business cycle models and it is relevant for fiscal and monetary policymakers
who want to stabilize economic fluctuations. In addition, quantitative evidence should help to
assess the consequences of policies that may influence agricultural prices, such as agricultural
trade policies, ethanol subsidies or food security programs.
Since reverse causality between economic activity and agricultural prices is likely present,
the key challenge of our analysis is the identification of shifts in global agricultural prices that
are exogenous rather than endogenous responses to global economic conditions. For example,
popular explanations that have been postulated for the considerable rise of agricultural com-
modity prices at the beginning of the century are strong income growth in the BRIC countries
and an increase in the demand for biofuels as a consequence of soaring crude oil prices and
the global economic expansion (e.g. Zhang and Law 2010; Abbott et al. 2011). Even for small
economies that do not affect global demand this distinction is presumably important.2 To
address this problem, we construct two instrumental variables for each country that reflect
non-domestic exogenous shocks to global agricultural markets.
The first instrument is a quarterly series of unanticipated foreign harvest shocks. The
shocks are estimated as prediction errors of composite production indices that aggregate the
harvests of the world’s four most important staple food commodities: corn, wheat, rice and
soybeans. Overall, these commodities make up approximately 75% of the caloric content of
food production worldwide (Roberts and Schlenker 2013). We use harvest data of 192 coun-
tries, and systematically exclude the harvests of the country itself, the entire sub-region in
which the country is located and the harvests in the neighboring sub-regions. We also orthog-
onalize the shocks to domestic weather conditions. As a second instrument, we use the 13
episodes of major global agricultural commodity market disruptions that have been identified
with narrative methods in DWP (2016). The episodes that did not directly affect the harvests
of a country are converted to an instrumental variable series for that country. In the next step,
2If shifts in global agricultural prices are caused by a rise in global economic activity, individual countries
could, for example, be part of the expansion or benefit from trade with other countries. This is not the same
as shocks at the supply side of global agricultural markets, which could depress output of trade partners.
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we use both instruments to estimate the dynamic effects of a rise in global cereal prices on
real GDP per capita. We apply two methods that are popular in empirical macroeconomics.
As the baseline, we estimate panel (and individual-country) structural vector autoregression
models with external instruments (SVAR-IV). As an alternative, we conduct direct panel IV
regressions of the effects with local projection methods (LP-IV).
According to the SVAR-IV estimations, an exogenous rise in global cereal prices by 1%
on impact (which further increases to 1.5% after one quarter) ultimately reduces average real
GDP per capita across countries by 0.10%. The effects are statistically significant, but also
economically important if one considers that the quarterly standard deviation of changes in
real cereal prices has been 7.3% over the past five decades, and 8.7% since the start of the
millennium (see Figure 1). The results of the LP-IV estimations turn out to be very similar.
Furthermore, we show that the use of external instruments matters. In particular, when we
estimate the effects of “average” global cereal price shocks (that is, a recursively identified
SVAR with cereal prices ordered first), we find much milder effects on economic activity.
Notably, the latter also applies to small economies.
The estimation of panel SVAR-IVs for country groups reveal that the effects are signifi-
cantly larger in high-income countries; that is, the decline of real GDP is 0.11% for the top
income-tertile of the countries, compared to only 0.03% for the lowest income-tertile. This
difference is surprising given the fact that high-income economies have much lower shares of
food in household expenditures. Moreover, high-income countries usually have more advanced
government institutions and better developed financial markets to absorb food price volatility.
We then explore the effects according to alternative country groupings. We find that
the macroeconomic consequences are on average significantly smaller in countries that are
net exporters of agricultural products or that have higher shares of agriculture in GDP. In
contrast, the effects are larger in countries that have higher overall shares of trade in GDP
(non-agricultural trade integration). Finally, we find no robust relationship between the extent
of agricultural tariffs and the impact of global agricultural price shocks on local activity. Since
high-income countries have on average lower shares of agriculture in GDP, higher shares of
trade in GDP and are typically net importers of agricultural products, this could be an
explanation for the counterintuitive stronger effects on high-income countries. Indeed, when
we control for these country features by considering all characteristics simultaneously in the
LP-IV model, the effects on real GDP become smaller when income per capita increases.
A caveat that comes with our analysis is that we document correlations between a selection
of country characteristics and the effects of global agricultural price shocks on economic
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activity. This does not imply causation nor does it reflect transmission channels. There may
be several channels that vary across countries that are not captured in the analysis, such
as the pass-through of global prices to local prices, the composition of food consumption
and production, the monetary policy response or the presence of government food security
programs. A detailed investigation of the transmission mechanisms is left for future research.
Furthermore, since the methods that we use require sufficiently long quarterly time series, our
analysis does not include extreme poor countries, which could behave differently.
Notwithstanding these caveats, there are several conclusions that are relevant for poli-
cymakers. First, swings in global agricultural prices appear to be important for economic
activity in many countries, including advanced economies. This should be taken into account
for the analysis of business cycles and policies that may affect agricultural prices. Second,
it is often argued that poor countries have to bear the bulk of the climate change burden,
which acts as a disincentive for rich countries to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions (e.g.
Althor et al. 2016). However, our results suggest that the repercussions of climate change on
rich countries are probably larger than previously thought. Consider the extreme droughts in
Russia and Eastern Europe in the summer of 2010. According to our estimates, this lowered
real GDP growth in high-income countries by roughly 1% during two years. Such events may
happen more frequently and become more profound as a result of climatic changes. Finally,
our results suggest that soaring food prices are not necessarily detrimental for low-income
countries. In this context, our macro evidence complements several microeconomic studies,
which conclude that we need a nuanced debate on the welfare effects of changes in food prices
in low-income countries (e.g. Headey and Fan 2008; Swinnen and Squicciarini 2012).
In section 2, we discuss the baseline methodology and construction of external instruments
to identify agricultural commodity price shocks. The panel results are reported in section 3.
In section 4 we examine cross-country heterogeneity, while section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology
To examine the dynamic effects of disruptions in global agricultural markets on economic per-
formance of countries, we estimate the consequences of exogenous shifts in global agricultural
commodity prices on real GDP per capita for a panel of 75 industrialized and developing
countries. The selection of the countries is determined by the availability of sufficiently long
time series of quarterly macroeconomic data. An overview of the countries can be found in
the appendix of the paper (Table A1). The baseline methodology that we use are SVAR
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models in the spirit of Sims (1980). The advantage of an SVAR approach is that it requires
us to impose only a limited structure on the data. It captures the dynamic relationships
between a set of macroeconomic variables within a linear system and allows to measure the
dynamic causal effects of structural shocks on all the variables in the model controlling for
other developments in the economy that may also influence the variables.
The key challenge when estimating SVAR models is the identification of the structural
shocks. To do this, an increasing number of studies use information from variables that are
not included in the VAR system, for example high frequency data or series based on narrative
evidence. The idea is that these external series are noisy measures of the true shocks and
can be used as instruments in conjunction with the VAR model to identify impulse response
functions. These are not the full shock series, but rather reflect an exogenous component of
the shock. This method has also been described as “external instrument SVAR” (Stock and
Watson 2012) or “proxy SVAR” (Mertens and Ravn 2013). In this study, we adopt such an
approach in a panel setting. Specifically, we estimate VAR models identified with external
instruments for each individual country, as well as Mean Group panel VARs for all (or a subset
of) countries simultaneously. In section 2.1, we first discuss the baseline individual-country
and panel SVAR model with external instruments and the data that we use to estimate
the dynamic effects of disruptions in global agricultural markets. In section 2.2 and 2.3, we
then describe two sets of external instruments that are used to achieve identification. The
estimation results will be discussed and compared with LP-IV methods in section 3.
2.1 Baseline SVAR Model with External Instruments
For each country i, we assume that macroeconomic dynamics can be described by the following
reduced form VAR-system of linear simultaneous equations:
Yi,t = αi +Ai(L)Yi,t−1 + ui,t (1)
Yi,t is a vector of endogenous variables representing the global and individual country’s econ-
omy in quarter t, αi is a vector of constants and Ai(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L.
ui,t is a vector of reduced form residuals, which are related to the structural shocks by
ui,t = Biεi,t (2)
where Bi is a nonsingular (invertible) matrix. For the baseline estimations, the vector of
endogenous variables Yi,t contains three variables: global real cereal prices, global economic
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activity and the country’s real GDP per capita. All variables are measured in natural loga-
rithms and seasonally adjusted. The first two variables are common for all countries.3
Global cereal prices is an index that is calculated as the weighted average of the benchmark
prices in U.S. dollars of the four most important staples: corn, wheat, rice and soybeans.
The benchmark prices, which are collected from IMF Statistics Data, are determined by the
largest exporter of each commodity and should be representative of global markets. The
weights are based on the trend production volumes of the four commodities. The nominal
price index has been deflated by the U.S. CPI to retrieve real prices. We choose cereal prices
to portray fluctuations in global agricultural markets because these food commodities most
closely resemble with the instruments that will be used to identify exogenous agricultural
market shocks. Moreover, cereals are storable commodities that are traded in integrated
global markets, which is important in the context of our analysis. Together, the four staples
account for approximately 75 percent of the caloric content of food production worldwide,
while the prices of other food commodities are also typically linked to these staple food items
(Roberts and Schlenker 2013). In section 3.1, we will also use a broader price index to assess
the robustness of the results. To proxy global economic activity, we follow Baumeister and
Peersman (2013) and use the world industrial production index from the Netherlands Bureau
for Economic Policy Analysis. We include this variable in the VAR-model to capture changes
in global income that may affect the demand for food commodities. In addition, it could
capture transmission and spillover channels of agricultural shocks to individual countries via
the global business cycle. Finally, to measure economic activity of the individual countries,
the vector of endogenous variables includes real GDP per capita. For details of all these series,
we refer to the data appendix.
The coefficients of αi and Ai(L) in equation (1) can simply be estimated by OLS. Also the
variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form VAR can be estimated; that is, E
[
ui,tu
′
i,t
]
=
BiB
′
i, which provides six independent identifying restrictions to obtain the coefficients of Bi.
Because we are only interested in one of the structural shocks; that is, exogenous shifts in real
cereal prices, we do not have to identify all the coefficients of Bi. Only the elements of the
first column of Bi have to be identified, which nevertheless requires additional restrictions. To
do this, we follow Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens and Ravn (2013) by using external
instruments. Specifically, let Zi,t be a vector of external instrumental variables for country
i. These variables can be used for identification of the first column of Bi if the following
3Because the third variable of Yi,t varies across countries, the reduced form VAR for the two common
variables also varies across countries. Notice, however, that the results are very similar when we do not allow
for feedback of the individual country’s real GDP per capita on the common variables; that is, when we estimate
so-called near-VAR models. These results are available upon request.
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conditions are satisfied:
E
[
Zi,tε
1′
i,t
]
6= 0 (3)
E
[
Zi,tε
2′
i,t
]
= 0 (4)
where ε1i,t is an exogenous shock to real cereal prices and ε2i,t a vector of all other structural
shocks. Equation (3) postulates that the instruments are correlated with shocks to real cereal
prices (instrument relevance condition), while equation (4) requires that the instruments are
uncorrelated with all other shocks (exogeneity condition). These are the key identifying
assumptions to obtain the first column of Bi up to scale and sign. The scale and sign are set
by normalizing the shock to have a one percent impact on real cereal prices. For more technical
details and implementation in practice, we refer to Stock and Watson (2012), Mertens and
Ravn (2013) or Ramey (2016). In the next subsections, we propose two instruments that
fulfill these conditions, i.e. unanticipated harvest shocks and a series of narratively identified
major food commodity market disruptions.
2.2 Unanticipated Foreign Harvest Shocks
As a first possible external instrument that could shift global cereal prices in a way that
is plausibly unrelated to economic conditions, we consider unanticipated “foreign” harvest
shocks. The underlying idea is that unexpected variations in harvests that are sufficiently
large to affect global supply of cereals likely trigger significant shifts in global cereal prices,
which should fulfill the instrument relevance condition in equation (3). On the other hand,
harvest volumes can in principle not (endogenously) respond to changes in the state of the
economy within one quarter, which accomplishes the exogeneity condition in equation (4).
More specifically, for the staple food commodities that we consider, there is a time lag of at
least one quarter between the planting and harvesting seasons. Farmers could thus adjust
their planting volumes in response to changing economic conditions within one quarter, but
this cannot (yet) have an impact on the harvest volumes of that quarter. Furthermore, one
could realistically argue that a possible influence of food producers on the volumes during
the quarter of the harvest itself is meager relative to variation induced by other factors such
as weather conditions, pests or diseases affecting crops. For example, it is not realistic to
postulate that farmers increase food production by raising fertilization activity during the
harvesting quarter in response to an improvement of economic conditions. In particular,
several studies have shown that in-season fertilization strategies are inefficient and often even
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counterproductive for the staples that we consider.4
To derive the instruments, in a first step, we construct a quarterly index of foreign harvest
volumes for all countries in our panel. To do so, we elaborate on DWP (2016). More precisely,
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations publishes annual harvest
data for each of the four major staples for 192 countries over the period 1961-2014.5 DWP
(2016) combine the annual harvest data of each individual country with that country’s planting
and harvesting calendars for each of the four crops, in order to allocate the harvest volumes to
a specific quarter. Harvests are only allocated if the planting season was at least one quarter
earlier. Since most countries have only one relatively short harvest season for each crop; that
is, a few months, and the delay between planting and harvesting varies between 3 and 10
months, DWP (2016) can assign two-thirds of world harvests to a specific quarter. The four
crops of all countries are then aggregated on a caloric-weighted basis to construct a quarterly
composite global food commodity production index.
In the present study, we use the same principium to construct foreign harvest volumes for
each individual country. More precisely, for each country, we aggregate the harvest volumes of
all other countries in the world, except the harvests of the country itself, the entire sub-region
in which the country is located and the harvests in the neighboring sub-regions.6 For example,
for Italy, we exclude the harvests of all countries in South-Europe, West-Europe, East-Europe
and North-Africa. The reason why we exclude domestic harvests is that we do not want to
capture possible direct effects of the shocks on the domestic economy, in particular on the
domestic agricultural sector, which could distort the analysis.7 For an individual country,
such shocks to agricultural commodity prices are not truly exogenous. The harvests of the
other countries in the region are also excluded because weather variation might be correlated
across neighboring countries. After aggregating, the series are seasonally adjusted using the
4See, for example, Mallarino (2010), Schmitt et al. (2001), Fanning (2012) and Scharf et al. (2002). The
reason is that fertilization enhances vegetative growth of the plant before the ripening phase. The best timing
is hence before or shortly after planting, while fertilization programs should be completed before the jointing
phase. Applying such strategies after the vegetative phase implies that the plant can spend less energy on
ripening, resulting in lower grain yields. Notice, however, that food producers could always destroy crops or
treat diseases insufficiently in response to a decline in economic activity, but that is not likely to happen at
a global scale. Overall, DWP (2016) show that global food production does not convey relevant endogenous
responses to macroeconomic conditions within (at least) one quarter.
5This database is available at http://faostat3.fao.org/.
6We use the United Nations definitions of sub-regions, which can be found at
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm.
7Given that harvest shocks are typically the consequence of weather variation, changes in weather conditions
could potentially also directly affect economic activity; that is, beyond the agricultural sector. For example,
storms may affect harvests and economic activity simultaneously. There are also studies that find negative
effects of hotter temperatures on labor productivity and labor supply at the spatial level for poor countries
(Dell et al. 2014).
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Census X-13 ARIMA-SEATS Seasonal Adjustment Program (method X-11). The result of
this exercise are 75 indicators of foreign harvest volumes.
In a next step, we use the aggregated harvest volumes to obtain unanticipated foreign
harvest shocks. In essence, the shocks are prediction errors of the harvest volumes conditional
on past harvests and a set of relevant information variables that may influence harvests.
Specifically, we estimate the following agricultural commodity production (harvest) equations:
qi,t = ci,t +Θi,t + Ci(L)Xt−1 +Di(L)qi,t−1 + νi,t (5)
where qi,t is the natural logarithm of the foreign harvest volume of country i. Xt is a vector
of control variables that may affect global food commodity markets and hence also harvest
volumes with a lag of one or more quarters; that is, the natural logarithms of respectively real
cereal prices, global economic activity and real crude oil prices. The former two variables are
evident. We also include the real price of crude oil because food commodities can be consid-
ered as a substitute for crude oil to produce refined energy products, while oil is used in the
production, processing and distribution of food commodities. Θi,t is a vector of weather vari-
ables to minimize possible correlation of the estimated foreign shocks with domestic weather
conditions and harvests of the countries.8 Specifically, this vector includes the Multivariate
El Niño Southern Oscillation Index and the Oceanic Niño Index to control for global weather
phenomena that may also affect the countries. In addition, for each country i we include the
European Drought Observatory index of domestic precipitation (rain anomaly) and an index
of temperature anomaly, as well as the corresponding squared values. ci,t is a constant, while
Ci(L) and Di(L) are polynomials in the lag operator (L = 5). Notice that the results are
robust when we also include a deterministic trend in the production equation or choose an
alternative number of lags.
For all 75 countries, we estimate equation (5) over the sample period 1975Q1-2014Q4. The
start of the sample period is determined by the availability of the precipitation series, while
harvest data are made available by the FAO until 2014. If we assume that the information
sets of local farmers are no greater than equation (5), the residuals νi,t of this equation can
be considered as unanticipated harvest shocks. Notice that anticipated harvest innovations
before the harvesting quarter should be reflected in the control variables, in particular cereal
prices, because an arbitrage condition ensures that changes in futures prices also shift sport
8Ideally, we directly control for domestic harvest volumes. Unfortunately, the harvest volumes are not
available for all countries at a quarterly frequency.
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prices of storable commodities (Pindyck 1993).9
In sum, due to the time lag between the planting and harvesting season, the foreign
harvest shocks are uncorrelated with other macroeconomic shocks. Hence, if the shocks have
a relevant impact on cereal prices, the series fulfill the conditions specified in equations (3)
and (4). The instrument relevance condition will be evaluated based on the F-statistics.
Notice also that the standard errors of the VAR estimations are not distorted by generated
regressor issues, because the generated regressors are used as instrumental variables and are
not directly included in the VAR model. In particular, as shown by Pagan (1984), any
instrumental variable estimation with generated regressors yields a consistent estimator of
the true standard errors.
2.3 Narrative Global Agricultural Market Shocks
As a second external instrument, we use the series of major exogenous global food commodity
market disruptions that have been identified with narrative methods in DWP (2016). More
precisely, DWP (2016) rely on newspaper articles, FAO reports, disaster databases and other
online sources to identify 13 historical episodes of substantial movements in food commodity
prices that are unambiguously caused by disturbances in global food commodity markets and
unrelated to the state of the economy. An overview and brief description of these episodes
is reported in Table 1. For more details, we refer to the online appendix of DWP (2016).
Six episodes are unfavorable shocks that have augmented food prices, while seven episodes
have been characterized by a meaningful decline in food commodity prices. These episodes are
converted to a dummy variable series, which is equal to 1 and -1 for unfavorable and favorable
shocks respectively, and can be used as an external instrument to identify the VAR. However,
to minimize correlation of the shocks with domestic agricultural conditions, for each individual
country, we exclude the episodes when domestic annual cereal production growth deviated
more than one standard deviation from its mean over the period 1965-2014. Accordingly,
about 30 percent of the episodes are excluded.
3 Effects of Global Agricultural Market Shocks
The VAR models in this study are estimated in log levels, which gives consistent estimates
while allowing for possible cointegration relationships between the variables (Sims et al. 1990).
9Futures prices of food commodities are not available over the whole sample period.
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The VARs are estimated for all 75 individual countries. To obtain Mean Group panel VAR
estimates, we average the impulse response functions of the individual countries. In contrast
to Fixed Effects panel estimations, a Mean Group estimator allows for cross-country hetero-
geneity and does not require that the dynamics of the economies in the VAR are the same.10
In the estimations, we include five lags of the endogenous variables, which is the maximum
number of lags suggested by the Akaike information criterion across all individual country
VARs. The results are, however, not sensitive to the lag order choice. The first column of
Table A1 in the appendix reports the sample periods of each country. Notice that the start of
the sample, which is 1965Q1 the earliest, varies a lot across countries. This can be explained
by data availability and obvious historical reasons. For example, the samples of the Russian
Federation and several Eastern European countries only start in the 1990s. The sample period
of the VAR and of the estimation of the external instruments are therefore often different.11
To check the validity and strength of the instruments for the baseline estimations, Table
A1 shows the first-stage F-statistics and robust F-statistics allowing for heteroskedasticity.
With very few exceptions, the values for each country turn out to be much higher than the
threshold suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) for having possible weak instrument problems.
The F-statistic of the instruments at the panel level (based on a Mean Group estimation of
the first stage) that is robust for clustering by time is 28.1, while the corresponding clustered
t-statistics of the harvest and narrative shocks are 4.8 and 5.4, respectively. Put differently,
our instruments can be considered as strong, which fulfills the relevance condition posited in
equation (3).
In the figures, we always show the estimated impulse responses for a global agricultural
market shock that raises real cereal prices by 1% on impact. We construct one- and two-
standard error confidence intervals using a recursive-design wild bootstrap procedure. Specif-
ically, following Mertens and Ravn (2013), we generate bootstrap draws of Y bi,t recursively by
using the estimated coefficients of the VAR denoted in equation (1), where the residuals of all
countries are (simultaneously) multiplied by a random variable ebt taking on values of -1 or 1
with probability 0.5. We also generate a draw for the instruments Zbi,t = Zi,tebt . The reduced
10Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the Fixed Effects panel estimator is biased in dynamic panels when
the coefficients of the lagged endogenous variables differ across cross-sectional units, which is usually the case
in panel VARs. As an alternative, they propose a Mean Group panel estimator, where separate regressions are
estimated for each cross-sectional unit, and the panel estimates are obtained by taking cross-sectional averages
of the estimated coefficients. For panel VARs, this is typically done by calculating the averages of the estimated
impulse responses (e.g. Gambacorta et al., 2014).
11This is not a problem because the instruments are only used to estimate the elements (of the first column)
of Bi. See also Gertler and Karadi (2015) for a similar discrepancy between the VAR sample and the sample
period that is used to estimate the instruments. Overall, we explore the maximum data available for the
estimations, which should improve efficiency.
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form VAR is then re-estimated for Y bi,t, and the shocks are identified using the instruments
Zbi,t. We use 5,000 replications to calculate the confidence intervals. To obtain the confidence
intervals of the panel VARs, we also calculate the average impulse responses of the individual
countries for each replication. Notice that this procedure requires symmetric distributions for
the residuals and instruments, but it is robust to conditional heteroscedasticity of unknown
form and takes into account uncertainty about identification and measurement (Mertens and
Ravn 2013). Furthermore, because ebt is the same for all countries, the procedure takes into
account the correlation of the VAR residuals across countries to construct the confidence
bands of the panel VARs.12 In section 3.1, we report the baseline panel VAR results. Section
3.2 discusses a battery of sensitivity checks. In section 3.3, we compare the results with an
LP-IV approach that directly estimates the dynamic effects at different horizons, whereas the
effects on individual countries are presented in section 3.4.
3.1 Baseline Panel VAR Results
The estimated impulse responses of the panel VAR are shown in Figure 2. An exogenous
shock to global agricultural markets that raises real cereal prices by 1% on impact reaches a
peak of approximately 1.5% after one quarter, in order to gradually decline to roughly 0.4% at
longer horizons. The rise in cereal prices leads to a fall in the global economic activity index,
as well as average real GDP per capita of the 75 countries in our panel. The decline in output
is sluggish and very persistent. In particular, the effects on real GDP are only statistically
significant after 3-4 quarters and reach a maximal decline of approximately 0.10% after about
8 quarters.13 Beyond this horizon, output remains permanently lower at this level.
The macroeconomic effects of changes in agricultural prices are not only statistically sig-
nificant, but also economically important. Notice, for example, that the standard deviation of
quarterly changes in real cereal prices has been 7.3% since the 1960s, and even 8.7% since the
start of the millennium. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 1, swings in agricultural prices can
be very persistent. For example, global real cereal prices increased by 112% between 2002 and
2011, followed by a collapse of 77% afterwards. These fluctuations are obviously only partly
12Notice that the standard bootstrap based on a random reshuﬄe of the residuals with replacement would be
problematic because the reshuﬄe has to be same across countries to account for cross-country correlation of the
residuals, while the panel is unbalanced. In addition, given that the narrative instrument series contains many
zero observations, a drawing procedure with replacement would produce zero vectors with positive probability.
It is therefore more convenient to apply the Rademacher bootstrapping procedure.
13In the VAR literature, the significance of the results is typically based on one standard error bands. Two
standard error bands are mostly not even reported. In this context, the impulse responses of agricultural
commodity price shocks are quite precisely estimated. When we compare the panel results with the individual
country results, also the use of a panel dataset appears to increase the precision of the estimates.
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driven by agricultural supply disruptions; that is, the consequences of endogenous shifts in
cereal prices may be different, but the magnitudes suggest that developments in agricultural
markets matter for business cycle fluctuations.
An alternative way to assess the economic relevance of our estimates are the extreme events
that have been documented in Table 1. In the summer of 2010, real cereal prices increased
for example by 29%, which was predominantly the consequence of the worst heatwave and
drought in more than a century in Russia and Eastern Europe (DWP 2016). According
to our estimates (that is, a peak rise of 1.5% after one quarter leads to a decline of real
GDP per capita by 0.1% after two years), this global agricultural shock has lowered average
real GDP per capita growth across countries by roughly 1% during two years. Similarly,
the unfavorable shocks that occurred in 2002Q3 and 2012Q3 have likely reduced real GDP
growth in two subsequent years by 0.6% and 0.4%, respectively. On the other hand, the two
most recent favorable agricultural market shocks (1996Q3 and 2004Q3) should have boosted
economic activity in the following two years by respectively 0.8% and 0.6%. In sum, global
agricultural shocks matter for countries’ business cycle fluctuations.
3.2 Sensitivity of Panel VAR Results
Figure 3 and 4 show a number of sensitivity checks of the panel VAR results. For brevity
reasons, we only report the impulse responses of real GDP per capita. We first assess the
influence of using instrumental variables to identify the shocks. More specifically, Figure
3 compares the baseline SVAR-IV results with an estimation of the panel SVAR that does
not use external instruments to identify the shocks. Instead, we use a standard recursive
(Cholesky) decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form VAR, where
the real cereal price index is ordered first. In essence, this identification strategy assumes that
all reduced form innovations to real cereal prices are exogenous price shocks for the individual
countries. This assumption is often made to identify commodity price shocks more generally,
in particular to estimate the effects on small economies.14
As can be observed in Figure 3, the effects on real GDP are much smaller for the recursive
identification. The impact is even significantly positive in the short run, while the long-run
decline is approximately 0.06%, compared to 0.10% in the benchmark estimations. As shown
14For example, Dreschel and Tenreyro (2017) assume that Argentina is a relatively small country, which does
not drive global commodity prices. Addison et al. (2016) use this premise to estimate the effects of agricultural
commodity price shocks on growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similar assumptions have, for example, been made
in the literature examining the impact of food prices on conflict (e.g. Brückner and Ciccone 2010; Dube and
Vargas 2013; Bazzi and Blattman 2014).
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in the right panel of the figure, the difference between both impulse response functions is also
statistically significant. Since both identification methods rely on the same reduced form VAR
system, this can formally be tested by calculating the difference between the impulse responses
for each replication of the bootstrapping procedure. This finding suggests that the reduced
form innovations to cereal prices are a mixture of exogenous agricultural market shocks and
endogenous responses to other macroeconomic shocks (e.g. global demand shocks), which
could bias the estimated effects considerably. A rise in cereal prices caused by a disruption in
global agricultural markets is clearly different from a surge that is consequence of increased
worldwide economic activity. In fact, we find that this also applies to most small countries
that could not influence global agricultural prices. It is hence important to isolate shifts in
commodity prices that are truly exogenous to estimate the macroeconomic effects properly.
The results do not seem to depend on one of the instruments that we have used. This is
shown in panels (A) and (B) of Figure 4. Specifically, panel (A) shows the impulse responses
when we only use the unanticipated foreign harvest shocks as an external instrument, while
panel (B) shows the results for an estimation solely based on the narrative shocks. The
panels also show the baseline point impulse responses (dotted red lines) to compare with the
benchmark results. The effects on real GDP turn out to be very similar.15
In panels (C) and (D), we show the results of two extended VAR models. The panels
show the results of a VAR-IV that also includes respectively the inflation rate and the real
(bilateral) USD exchange rate of the individual countries in the vector of endogenous variables
Yi,t, which could enrich the dynamics of the VAR model. A caveat of these extensions is that
exchange rate regimes have varied over time, while inflation has been very unstable in some
countries during the sample period, which may imply possible structural breaks in the VAR
dynamics. We find a positive impact of the shocks on inflation and a temporary depreciation
of the USD real bilateral exchange rates.16 The results of both extensions for real GDP per
capita turn out to be quite similar to the baseline results.
15The clustered panel VAR F-statistic of both instruments independently are 25.2 and 37.3 for the foreign
harvest and narrative shocks, respectively. Notice, however, that the robust F-statistics are below 10 for 17
countries if only the foreign harvest shocks are used for the identification of the shocks. For the narrative
shocks, this is only the case for two countries. For this reason, we excluded Mexico, Jamaica, Belize, Costa
Rica, Egypt, Guatemala and Tanzania from the estimations that are solely based on the foreign harvest shocks.
The first-stage robust F-statistics for these countries are less than 1, resulting in explosive error bands of the
panel VARs. The exclusion of these countries, however, has a negligible influence on the point estimates of the
impulse responses. Overall, it appears that there is value added by using both instruments jointly to identify
the shocks. As documented in Table A1, the (joint) robust F-statistics are lower than 10 for only four countries
and always higher than 6.5.
16The impulse responses of inflation and the exchange rate are not shown, but available upon request. The
temporary depreciation of the real USD exchange rate may be the consequence of the relative strong decline
of US real GDP compared to the majority of the other countries, which is shown in Figure A1.
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Panel (E) shows the results when we estimate the panel VAR only from 1990 onward. A
shorter sample period can be motivated by the reduced share of food in household expenditures
over time, and the fact that the series of several countries only start in the 1990s. However,
as can be observed in the figure, the results are again very similar. In fact, we find that this
is also the case for alternative (shorter and longer) sample periods.
Finally, panel (F) shows the estimated impulse responses when we use the broad food
commodity price index of the IMF instead of cereal prices, which was also shown in Figure 1.
Panel (F) reveals that the effects of a rise in food commodity prices by 1% are stronger than
an equal rise in cereal prices. In particular, real GDP decreases by 0.14% in the long run.
This finding is not very surprising since this index covers a larger share of food commodi-
ties.17 Overall, we can conclude that the panel VAR results are generally robust to several
perturbations of the VAR model.
3.3 Comparison with a Panel LP-IV Approach
If the SVAR model adequately captures the data generating process, this method is most
efficient to estimate the dynamic effects of agricultural shocks at all horizons. However, if
the SVAR is not a correct representation of the dynamics of the variables in the system,
the specification errors will be compounded at each horizon resulting in impulse responses
that are potentially biased (Ramey 2016). To further check the robustness of the results,
we therefore also estimate the impulse responses directly with panel LP-IV methods. The
advantage compared to VARs is that LP methods are more robust to misspecification (Jordà
2005; Stock and Watson 2017).18 Another advantage is that it will be able to estimate the
relationship between the dynamic effects and several country characteristics simultaneously
in section 4, which is not possible with panel VARs. A disadvantage of this method, however,
is a loss of efficiency and hence less precisely estimated effects that are often quite erratic at
longer horizons.
17The panel F-statistic of the instruments is 19.7 for the broad food commodity price index. However, the
robust F-statistics for 17 individual countries are lower than 10, which suggests that it is better to use real
cereal prices as the price variable in the estimations.
18The baseline SVAR-IV assumes invertibility of Bi, i.e. the space of the VAR innovations spans the space
of the structural shocks, which can be interpreted that there are no omitted variables in the VAR. Under
invertibility, SVAR-IV and LP-IV are both consistent, but SVAR-IV is more efficient. However, if invertibility
fails, the SVAR-IV estimates are not consistent, while LP-IV estimates are. LP-IV methods can hence be a
solution to omitted variables bias. See Stock and Watson (2017) for more details.
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For each horizon h we estimate the following panel LP-IV model:
yi,t+h = αi,h + δi,h (L) yi,t−1 + ρi,h (L)Xi,t−1 + γhRCPt + εi,t+h (6)
where yi,t+h is real GDP per capita of country i at horizon h. αi,h are country fixed effects,
while δi,h(L) and ρi,h(L) are polynomials in the lag operator (L = 5) that could vary across
countries. Xi,t−1 is a set of control variables determined before date t. In line with the VAR
estimations, this vector includes the lags of global real cereal prices, global economic activity,
as well as lags of the instruments. Accordingly, γh represents the dynamic response of real
GDP per capita at horizon h to a change in real cereal prices (RCPt) at time t, which we
estimate with the two instrumental variables that we have described in section 2.2 and 2.3.
Figure 5 shows the estimation results for γh when we estimate equation (6) with respec-
tively the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) and Mean Group (MG) estimator as described in
Pesaran et al. (1999). Specifically, the PMG estimator allows all coefficients and error vari-
ances to differ across countries, but constrains the effects of agricultural shocks on real GDP
per capita (γh) to be the same across countries. This specification is most closely related to
the extended LP-IV model that we will estimate in section 4, i.e. when we allow γh to vary
according to a set of country characteristics. The MG estimator, in contrast, is most closely
related to the panel SVAR estimations, by also allowing the effects of agricultural shocks to
be different across countries, i.e. γi,h. The standard errors of the estimates are adjusted for
correlations between the residuals across countries, as well as serial correlation between the
residuals over time. These are calculated as discussed in Thompson (2011).
As expected, the precision of the LP-IV estimates is less accurate than the SVAR-IV results
due to the loss of efficiency. The effects on real GDP around the peak are still significant at
5% level for the PMG estimator, but the MG estimations are only significant at 10% level.
The point estimates are, however, very similar to the SVAR-IV estimates. The peak declines
of real GDP based on the PMG and MG estimator are respectively 0.14% and 0.12%, which
is only moderately larger than the SVAR-IV estimates. We can thus conclude that the panel
results are robust to the estimation method.
3.4 Individual Country Results
The individual-country SVAR-IV results are shown in Figure A1 of the appendix. For each
country, we show the effects of a 1% increase in cereal prices on real GDP per capita. The figure
reveals that there is considerable cross-country heterogeneity. Several countries experience
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substantial declines in real GDP following a rise in cereal prices, e.g. Belarus, Bulgaria,
Chile, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the Russian
Federation. On the other hand, a large number of countries, e.g. Argentina, India, Indonesia,
Jamaica, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines and South Africa,
experience a temporary increase in real GDP. Also the shapes are different across countries.
In the next section, we explore in more detail whether there is cross-country heterogeneity
depending on a set of country characteristics.
4 Exploring Cross-Country Heterogeneity
So far, we have documented that unfavorable global agricultural markets shocks significantly
reduce average real GDP per capita, while the effects are very different across individual
countries. The aim of this section is to examine whether (i) rich and poor countries are
on average differently affected by fluctuations in agricultural markets, and (ii) there is a
relationship between the magnitude of the effects and some key country characteristics. Notice
that the results in this section reflect correlations, which does not imply causation nor does
it reflect transmission mechanisms. Nevertheless, it could improve our understanding of the
pass-through of global agricultural shocks to economic activity. At the same time, it provides
stylized facts that could serve as a benchmark for the construction of theoretical business
cycle models that incorporate agricultural markets.
The analysis in this section is mainly based on the effects of agricultural shocks across
country groups. The composition of the groups is based on the averages of a selection of
country characteristics over the period 2000-2015 (annual data). More precisely, we use the
baseline panel SVAR-IV model and calculate the Mean Group impulse responses of respec-
tively the top and bottom tertile of the countries according to a specific country characteristic,
as well as the differences between both tertiles.19 The groups hence always contain respec-
tively the 25 highest and lowest ranked countries for a characteristic. The period to compose
the groups overlaps but does not correspond one-to-one with the SVAR-IV sample periods
of all countries due to the unbalanced nature and availability of the data. However, since
we use the underlying data only to compose the groups and the middle tertile is excluded
to conduct the estimations, this should have little or no impact on the results. Notice also
that the results are qualitatively robust to alternative sizes of the groups, e.g. top/bottom
19Since the bootstrapping procedure is done for all countries simultaneously and takes into account the
correlation of the residuals, it is also possible to calculate confidence bands for the differences between country
groups.
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half or quintiles of the countries. As a special case, in section 4.3 we will also estimate an
LP-IV specification that is based on the country averages directly. Details about the data
sources can be found in the appendix. Table A1 reports for each country the averages of the
characteristics between 2000 and 2015, as well as the country’s rankings that have been used
to construct the groups between parentheses.
4.1 Are the Effects Different between Rich and Poor Countries?
There is large agreement in the literature that poor countries suffer more from climate change
because the economic repercussions are considered to be most severe for agricultural pro-
duction, while the share of agricultural production in total GDP is usually larger in these
countries. Moreover, poor countries typically already have hotter climates, which increases
the likelihood of extreme weather events. Dell et al. (2012), for example, find that a 1°C rise
in temperature in a given year reduces economic growth by about 1.3% in poor countries. On
the other hand, changes in temperature appear not to have a meaningful impact on growth
in rich countries. To assess whether this is also the case for the indirect effects of climatic
changes as a result of a rise in the volatility of global harvest volumes and more frequent surges
in global agricultural commodity prices, we first estimate the Mean Group impulse responses
of the top versus the bottom tertile of the countries according to income (PPP-adjusted real
GDP) per capita. All countries in the top tertile are advanced economies according to the
IMF’s 2015 World Economic Outlook country classification, while the low-income countries
are all classified as emerging market or developing economies.
The results are shown in Figure 6. A remarkable observation is that high-income countries
appear to be much more affected by exogenous global agricultural price shocks. For the group
of high-income countries, a rise in global cereal prices induces a gradual and persistent decline
in economic activity; that is, real GDP per capita declines by 0.11% in the long run. In
contrast, low-income countries experience a temporary increase of real GDP during the first
year after the shock, which reaches a statistically significant peak of 0.05% after two quarters.
Subsequently, the effects on real GDP start to decrease and become negative after one year.
The peak decline, however, is only 0.03% and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, as
shown in the right panel of the figure, the differences between the impulse responses of both
country groups are clearly significant at all horizons.
The stronger output effects in rich countries turn out to be very robust. Figure 7 sum-
marizes a battery of robustness checks. We only show the estimated differences between both
groups. First, the results do not depend on the way the groups are constructed. As shown
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in panels (A) and (B), we also find significant differences between the top and bottom half or
quintiles of the countries. We also find it when we estimate the SVAR-IV model solely for the
post 1990 sample period, which implies that this result is e.g. not driven by the longer sample
periods that most high-income countries have (panel (C)). Furthermore, the results are simi-
lar when we estimate the effects of changes in global real cereal prices measured in domestic
currency. The results are thus also not the consequence of exchange rate movements that are
different between high and low-income countries (panel (D)).20 Finally, as can be observed
in panels (E) and (F), we find stronger effects when we estimate the difference between both
groups with panel LP-IV techniques or when we identify average agricultural price shocks
using a simple recursive (Cholesky) decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the
VAR residuals.21
The finding of significantly larger effects on economic activity of high-income countries is
surprising. In fact, there are several reasons why real GDP of high-income countries is ex-
pected to be less affected by changes in global agricultural commodity prices. First, the share
of food (commodities) consumption in total household expenditures is much lower compared
to low-income countries. For example, the share of food and non-alcoholic beverages consumed
at home in total household expenditures over the period 2000-2015 has been respectively 12%
and 33% for the top and bottom income-tertile, while the elementary correlation with average
income per capita across all countries has been -0.76. Although such data does not exist,
this is likely also the case for the share of (raw) food commodities in household expenditures.
Second, high-income countries typically have more effective government institutions. It is
hence less likely that increases in food prices trigger conflicts such as food riots which, in
turn, could have an impact on real GDP. Finally, high-income countries are financially more
developed than low-income countries, which should allow households to smooth consump-
tion and firms to smooth production when they experience income shocks.22 In sum, there
must be other important mechanisms that explain why rich countries are more vulnerable to
exogenous changes in global agricultural prices.
20This estimation has been done by simply converting global USD cereal prices in domestic currency using
bilateral USD exchange rates. Ideally, we should use direct measures of domestic cereal prices for this check,
but unfortunately such data is not available for a sufficiently long era and number of countries.
21The panel LP-IV model that we have used to do this, will be discussed in section 4.3.
22The correlation between real GDP per capita and the World Bank indicator of government effectiveness is
0.88, while the correlation with the percentage of persons that have a credit card is 0.85. When we split the
country-groups according to these two characteristics, we also find counter-intuitive stronger effects in “rich”
countries.
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4.2 Alternative Country Characteristics
We now discuss a number of alternative characteristics that might explain why real GDP of
advanced economies declines more in response to increases in global agricultural prices. We
discuss four possible country characteristics. The correlations of these characteristics with
income per capita are reported in Table 2, as well as the overlap between the top and bottom
tertiles of the groups. In section 4.3, we will show the relationships between the characteristics
and the dynamic effects of global agricultural shocks on real GDP.
Net exports of primary food and beverages A first possible explanation for the coun-
terintuitive stronger effects on high-income countries is that rich countries are typically net
importers of agricultural products. If a country is net importer of food commodities, a rise in
global food commodity prices deteriorates its terms of trade. In contrast, net food commod-
ity exporters should benefit from higher agricultural prices. We therefore split the countries
according to their net export position of primary food and beverages as a percentage of GDP.
As shown in Table 2, the cross-country correlation of income per capita and net exports of
primary food and beverages is negative (-0.32). Twelve of the high-income countries belong
to the bottom tertile of net food exports and fourteen low-income countries to the top tertile
of food exporters.
Value added agricultural sector As can be observed in Table 2, there is a strong negative
correlation between income per capita and the share of agriculture in GDP. There are several
reasons why a larger share of the agricultural sector in GDP may be a reason for more
subdued macroeconomic repercussions of changes in global agricultural prices in low-income
countries, in addition to net export benefits. Specifically, in countries that have relatively
large agricultural sectors, more households are likely self-sufficiency farmers, while a lot of
agricultural commodities are typically only traded on local markets, which isolates them from
changes in global food prices. In addition, when food prices increase, countries with large
agricultural sectors may also have more scope to increase food production at longer horizons
after the shock.
Furthermore, food commodity price increases do not only affect the terms of trade, it
also involves redistribution of income within countries, which could magnify or dampen the
consequences on economic activity if food producers have different propensities to consume
(or invest) out of changes in disposable income than food consumers.23 Since low-income
23Browning and Crossley (2009) show that households that experience transitory income shocks can signif-
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households usually have higher marginal propensities to consume, such effects may be different
between rich and poor countries. In particular, the revenues of higher food prices in rich
countries are typically concentrated to a relatively small group of people, while the bulk of
poor people are urban with limited access to land that spend large portions of their income
on food. For example, households belonging to the lowest income quintile in the United
States spend 35.8% of their income after taxes on food consumption. For the highest quintile,
this is only 9.1%.24 Since low-income households have no access to capital markets to smooth
consumption and food is a basic necessity, they have no other options than reducing their non-
food expenditures. For example, DWP (2016) find that changes in food prices in the United
States trigger a significant decline in durable consumption of households, which magnifies the
repercussions on economic activity considerably.
On the other hand, food consumers typically have higher average incomes than food sellers
in low developed countries (Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik 2008), while many impoverished people
in low-income countries depend upon food production for their livelihood (Headey and Fan
2008). Although poor households in these countries spend higher shares of their budgets
on food, their incomes are likely more responsive to agricultural prices. Poor countries may
thus also benefit from higher agricultural prices as a result of redistribution of income that,
in turn, stimulates aggregate spending.25 Overall, favorable redistribution effects are likely
greater when the share of agriculture in the economy is larger; that is, more households benefit
from higher food prices. For example, Jacoby (2016) constructs a simple general equilibrium
model and finds that countries with large shares of agricultural employment could ultimately
benefit from higher food prices because this has a positive impact on rural wages.26
Trade openness Varies studies have shown that enhanced trade integration increases the
correlation of business cycles among countries (e.g. Frankel and Rose 1998; Clark and Van
Wincoop 2001; Calderón et al. 2007). There also exist a number of studies that find a
icantly reduce their expenditures with little loss in welfare if they concentrate their budget cuts on durables
purchases and continue to consume their existing stock of durables. Although the losses of this behavior might
be modest for individual households, the macroeconomic effects could be substantial. The consequences on
economic activity of this change in the composition of spending can be further magnified if this involves costly
reallocation of capital and labor across sectors within a country, see e.g. Hamilton (1988).
24Authors’ calculations based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey for
2014. These percentages include both food at home, food away from home and alcoholic beverages.
25In this context, Headey (2014) finds that in the long run higher food prices typically reduce poverty in
low-income countries. However, other studies have found that higher food prices increase poverty. See Headey
and Fan (2010) for a review.
26We find very similar results when we use the share of agricultural employment in total employment to
construct the groups. The correlation between the share of agriculture value added in GDP and agricultural
employments in total employment across the countries in our sample is 0.85.
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positive link between trade and volatility of economic activity (e.g. Rodrik 1998; di Giovanni
and Levchenko 2009; Newbery and Stiglitz 1984). Since global agricultural shocks have a
significant impact on worldwide economic activity, countries that are more integrated with
the rest of the world via trade are probably also more affected by the shocks. We consider the
ratio of total exports plus imports to GDP as a measure of trade integration. As can be seen
in Table 2, there is a positive correlation between income per capita and the trade-to-GDP
ratio (0.35).
Trade tariffs for agricultural goods Finally, agricultural import barriers may mitigate
the consequences of global agricultural shocks on the domestic economy because retail prices
might be more decoupled from international prices. Anderson and Nelgen (2012) find that the
pass-through of changes in global cereal prices to domestic prices is on average only about 0.5.
Gouel (2014) argues that the incomplete transmission is likely the result of trade policies.27
To evaluate whether countries that have tighter import barriers are differently affected by
global agricultural shocks, we group the countries according to the effectively applied rate for
agricultural goods calculated with the UNCTAD method based on Trade Analysis Information
System (TRAINS) data. There seems to be a moderate positive correlation between import
barriers and the wealth of nations (see Table 2).
4.3 Estimation Results
Panel SVAR-IV for country groups Figure 8 shows the impulse responses estimated
with the panel SVAR-IV approach for the top and bottom tertiles of the countries according
to each characteristic. The results confirm several hypotheses that have been postulated in
section 4.2. More specifically, we find weaker average effects of unfavorable global agricultural
price shocks on the economies of countries that are large net exporters of primary food and
beverages, as well as countries that have a higher share of agriculture in GDP. Both features
may thus be a possible explanation for the stronger effects on high-income countries. This
also applies to the degree of trade integration. Figure 8 reveals that the decline in real GDP
is on average greater in countries with higher shares of trade in GDP. Specifically, real GDP
decreases by 0.16% in the top-tertile of the countries, compared to only 0.06% in the lowest
27The price transmission elasticity is higher for soybeans (0.72) than for wheat (0.47) and rice (0.52), because
the former is traded more heavily (30% of total soybeans production, versus 8% of rice and 20% of wheat
production) and the rate of protection for soybeans is not significantly negatively correlated with the world
price, unlike for other commodities.
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tertile. Finally, we do not find a relationship between the extent of trade tariffs for agricultural
goods and the consequences of swings in global cereal prices.
Simultaneous analysis of country characteristics Panel SVARs do not allow to ex-
amine the country features simultaneously. To do this, we estimate an extended version
of the LP-IV model introduced in section 3.3, which allows for an influence of the country
characteristics on the effects of changes in real cereal prices on real GDP per capita:
yi,t+h = αi,h +
∑
k φk,hchar(k)i + δi,h (L) yi,t−1 + ρi,h (L)Xi,t−1
+ [γ0,h +
∑
k γk,hchar(k)i]RCPt + εi,t+h
(7)
where char(k)i is a vector of five (k = 5) country characteristics; that is, income per capita
and the four country features that have been discussed in section 4.2. All other variables are
the same as in section 3.3. We estimate two versions of equation (7) using the PMG estimator.
In the first, char(k)i is a vector of five dummy variables that are equal to 1 if the country
belongs to the top-tertile of characteristic k. As an alternative, we estimate a specification
where char(k)i contains the underlying data series that we have used to compose the country
groups; that is, the average values of the country characteristics over the period 2000-2015.
Since the latter period does not fully overlap with the LP-IV sample period, these results
should be interpreted with more than the usual degree of caution. In contrast to the simple
grouping of countries (excluding the mid-tertile), endogeneity issues might also be at play.
We will therefore only provide a qualitative interpretation of the estimates with the sole aim
to improve our understanding of cross-country differences.
The results of both specifications are shown in panels (A) and (B) of Figure 9, respectively.
Although the standard errors are quite large, there are some clear patterns. First, there is a
negative relationship between the net agricultural export position of a country and the effects
of global agricultural shocks on domestic economic activity. Hence, net exporters suffer less
from the shocks. Conversely, countries that have a higher overall share of trade in GDP are
more vulnerable to the shocks. Notice, however, that both characteristics are statistically
only significant for the dummy variables specification.
For both specifications, we find that countries are significantly less affected by the shocks
when they have a higher share of agriculture in GDP. It seems that countries that have rela-
tively large agricultural sectors are better insulated to global agricultural shocks. Furthermore,
the extent of trade tariffs for agricultural goods turns out to be positively correlated with the
effects on real GDP, but the uncertainty of the estimates is relatively high to make robust
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conclusions. A possible explanation of the positive correlation is endogeneity. In particular,
countries that are more vulnerable to agricultural shocks may, for example, impose more trade
barriers.
Interestingly, once we control for these four alternative country characteristics, we find
that the effects on real GDP per capita are more subdued when countries are richer; that
is, when income per capita is higher. For both specifications, the relationship turns out to
be statistically significant. This suggests that the stronger average effects on high-income
countries that we have documented in this paper are likely related to the other country
characteristics. More specifically, high-income countries are typically net importers of primary
food and beverages, and have a relatively small share of agriculture in GDP, a large share of
trade in GDP and higher trade tariffs for agricultural goods, which seems to make them more
vulnerable to global agricultural shocks.
5 Conclusions
In this study, we have estimated the consequences of exogenous shifts in global agricultural
commodity prices on real GDP per capita for a panel of 75 advanced and developing coun-
tries. Isolating exogenous shifts in agricultural prices is challenging because the prices of
food commodities typically respond quickly to changes in the state of the economy, implying
that reverse causality effects from macroeconomic aggregates to agricultural prices are also
present. To address this problem, for each country we construct two instrumental variables
that reflect disturbances to global agricultural markets, which shift prices in a way that is
plausibly unrelated to economic conditions: unanticipated foreign harvest shocks and a series
of exogenous global agricultural shocks identified with narrative methods. These instruments
are then used to estimate the dynamic effects on economic activity with panel SVAR-IV and
LP-IV methods.
The results reveal that swings in global agricultural prices appear to be important for
economic activity; that is, a rise in agricultural prices significantly reduces average real GDP
per capita. Scholars that study business cycle fluctuations should hence consider to accom-
modate agricultural markets in their models. This also applies to the analysis of policies that
may affect agricultural prices, such as public food security programs, agricultural export bans,
import tariffs, ethanol subsidies or carbon offset programs.
The macroeconomic consequences turn out to be very different across countries. A striking
result is that we find much larger effects in high-income countries. Additionally, we document
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stronger effects on countries that have a high share of trade in GDP. On the other hand,
countries that are net food commodity exporters and/or have a high share of agriculture in
GDP appear to be less affected by disruptions in global agricultural markets. These findings
are interesting in the context of the literature on climate change. Specifically, several studies
find that poor countries with higher shares of agriculture suffer more from climatic changes
than rich countries or countries with less agricultural activities because they have relatively
large agricultural sectors (e.g. Nordhaus 2006; Jones and Olken 2010; Dell et al. 2014; Althor
et al. 2016). While this might be the case for the direct effects of a rise in the mean and
variance of global weather conditions on the economies of poor and rich countries, it appears
to be the opposite for the indirect effects of changes in weather conditions in other countries
around the globe. The consequences of climate change on advanced economies may hence be
much larger than previously thought.
The weaker effects on countries that are net exporters of food commodities and/or have
large agricultural sectors is also in line with the skepticism of several scholars about the idea
that higher food prices are unambiguously harmful for the poor (e.g. Headey and Fan 2008;
Swinnen and Squicciarini 2012). In particular, the world’s poor are highly dependent on
farming or are employed in sectors that are related to agricultural production. Soaring food
prices could thus result in redistribution of income in favor of the poor. Accordingly, our
macro evidence complements microeconomic welfare studies of changes in food prices in low-
income countries (e.g. Deaton 1989; de Hoyos and Medvedev 2011; Ivanic and Martin 2008;
Verpoorten et al. 2013).
As a final remark, it should be mentioned that we have only provided a first set of stylized
facts on the relationship between the effects of global agricultural price shocks and some
country characteristics. There are, however, a range of other factors that could influence
the vulnerability of economies to rising food prices. Examples are the degree of the pass-
through of global price shifts to local price changes or the composition of food production and
consumption. Furthermore, the monetary policy response to the inflationary consequences
or the presence of government policies aimed at mitigating price increases are likely also
important for the effects on economic activity. The exact transmission mechanisms need to
be further addressed in future research.
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Appendix: Data
Baseline SVAR-model
• Global real cereal prices: The global cereal price index is a production-weighted
aggregate of the price series of corn (U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico), wheat
(No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico), rice (5 percent broken
milled white rice, Thailand) and soybeans (U.S. soybeans, Chicago Soybean futures
contract No. 2 yellow and par) made available by the IMF. These benchmark prices
are representative for the global market and determined by the largest exporter of each
commodity. The price series (in U.S. dollar per metric ton) are weighted with trend
production volumes (in metric ton) of the four commodities. The trend production
volumes are obtained by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter to annual global production
data (with smoothing parameter = 100). Note that for rice, the paddy production
volumes are converted to a milled rice equivalent using a conversion ratio of 0.7, since
the price series is expressed in U.S. dollar per metric ton of milled rice. The cereal price
index has been seasonally adjusted using Census X-13 (X-11 option). The nominal price
index has been deflated by U.S. CPI.
• Global economic activity: Seasonally adjusted world industrial production index
from the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, backcasted for the period
before 1991 using the growth rate of industrial production from the United Nations
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.
• Real GDP per capita (country-specific): As the preferred source we use the season-
ally adjusted real GDP index from the OECD Main Economic Indicators database. This
series is available for 37 countries for varying sample periods. For Greece this series still
contains seasonality, so we perform additional seasonal adjustment. For the remaining
countries we download real GDP from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database. In order to obtain longer time series we backcast the OECD and IMF series
using various other sources: 1) We use GDP series from the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) for Argentina, Brazil, China, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Es-
tonia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Latvia, Poland, South Korea and Hong Kong. 2) We
use GDP series from Oxford Economics (downloaded via Datastream) for Argentina,
Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Malaysia, Romania, Russia and Thailand. 3) We use GDP
series provided by the respective national statistical office for Belize, Iran, Morocco and
Uruguay. 4) For Costa Rica and Iceland we backcast using a GDP series from the OECD
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Quarterly National Accounts database. 5) For Kyrgyzstan we use the GDP series from
the World Development Indicators Database (quarterly series, downloaded via Datas-
tream ). 6) For Colombia, Cyprus, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Macedonia, Malaysia,
Poland, Slovakia we backcast using annual GDP, Chow-Lin interpolated with quarterly
industrial production from the IMF IFS database. Additional details are available on
request.
Unanticipated foreign harvest shocks
• Foreign harvest volume (country-specific): These indices are based on annual food
production data downloaded from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). For
a more detailed description of the construction of the index, see main text.
• Real crude oil prices: The refiner acquisition cost of imported crude oil, deflated by
the U.S. CPI.
• Multivariate El Niño Southern Oscillation Index: Index provided by the Earth
System Research Laboratory (https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/enso/mei/, accessed Au-
gust 2016). The index is based on six different variables in order to measure El
Niño/Southern Oscillation (ENSO).
• Oceanic Niño Index: Index made available by the Earth System Research Laboratory
(https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/gcos_wgsp/Timeseries/Data/nino34.long.anom.data, ac-
cessed August 2016). This index is calculated by averaging sea surface temperature
anomalies in an area of the east-central equatorial Pacific Ocean (the Nino-3.4 region).
• European Drought Observatory (EDO) index of domestic precipitation (country-
specific): The Standardized Precipitation Index 3 (SPI 3) measures the observed rain-
fall in mm. over 3 months minus the average over 3 months divided by the standard
deviation of 3 months. The country average of half minute cells is made available by
the European Drought Observatory (EDO).
Data downloaded from http://edo.jrc.ec.europa.eu/edov2/php/index.php?id=1140 in
March 2017.
• Temperature anomaly index: This index measures quarterly averages of monthly
deviations from long-term (1901-2015) average national temperatures. Data was down-
loaded from the World Bank Climate Change Data Portal
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(http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportal, accessed September 2017). The underly-
ing dataset was produced by the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) of University of East
Anglia (UEA).) Missing values for Romania and Hong Kong were replaced by anomaly
data from Berkeley Earth (http://berkeleyearth.lbl.gov/country-list/, accessed Septem-
ber 2017).
Sensitivity of SVAR-Model
• Inflation rate (country-specific): As the preferred source we use the not seasonally
adjusted Consumer Price index (CPI), from the OECD Main Economic Indicators
database. This series is available for 45 countries for varying sample periods. For
the remaining countries we use the CPI series from the IMF International Statistics
Database. There are a few exceptions: for Argentina we use CPI from the MIT project
(http://www.inflacionverdadera.com/?page_id=362), for Bulgaria we obtain CPI from
Oxford Economics (via Datastream), for Belarus we obtain CPI from the from the Na-
tional Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus (via Datastream). For Colombia
we backcast the OECD CPI series with CPI from The National Administrative Depart-
ment of Statistics (DANE) (downloaded via Datastream). For Chile, China, Denmark,
Ireland, Mexico, Hong Kong we backcast the series using BIS data. If not already done
so by the source, all series are seasonally adjusted using Census X-13 (X-11 option). We
calculate the inflation rate by taking log differences.
• Real (bilateral) USD exchange rate (country-specific): Based on nominal exchange
rates (quarterly average) downloaded from the IFS database. For euro area countries,
the legacy currency is converted to euro based on fixed conversion rates. The nominal
exchange rates are converted to real exchange rates using U.S. and domestic CPI.
• Broader commodity price index: Food commodity index calculated by the IMF.
The index is a trade-weighted average of different benchmark food prices in US dollars
for cereals, vegetable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, bananas and oranges. These benchmark
prices are representative for the global market and determined by the largest exporter
of each commodity. Seasonally adjusted using Census X-13 (X-11 option). The nominal
price index has been deflated by U.S. CPI.
Cross-country heterogeneity
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• Income per capita (country-specific, annual frequency): Real GDP per capita, calcu-
lated by dividing output-side real GDP at current PPPs (in mil. 2011 U.S. dollar) by
population (both series obtained from Penn World Table, version 9.0).
• Net exports of primary food and beverages (country-specific, annual frequency):
Share in GDP of primary food and beverages net exports. Trade data in U.S. dollar
downloaded from the UN Comtrade database. Primary food and beverages corresponds
with Broad Economic Categories (BEC) Classification 11 and includes primary food
and beverages both for industry and household consumption. Nominal annual GDP in
U.S. dollar was downloaded from the World Bank (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD).
• Value added agriculture (country-specific, annual frequency): We use the value
added of agriculture (% of GDP) provided by theWorld Bank (code: NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS)
as the primary source. We backcast these series with data from various other sources.
For Austria, Australia, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Fin-
land, United Kingdom, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Portugal,
Slovenia, Slovakia and the U.S. we use data from AMECO (the annual macro-economic
database of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial
Affairs). For Canada, Spain, Hong Kong and Ireland we use data from the respective
national statistical offices. For Israel and Luxembourg we use OECD data. For Croatia,
Latvia and Poland we use data from Trading Economics.
• Trade openness (country-specific, annual frequency): Trade (% of GDP), provided by
the World Bank (code: NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS). Trade is the sum of exports and imports
of goods and services measured as a share of GDP.
• Trade tariffs for agricultural goods (country-specific, annual frequency): Effec-
tively Applied Rate for Agricultural Goods (HS classification), including ad-valorem-
equivalents (AVEs) calculated with UNCTAD method based on Trade Analysis Infor-
mation System (TRAINS) data. Downloaded using World Integrated Trade Solutions
(WITS).
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Figure 1 - Evolution of food commodity prices over time
Note: variables are measured as 100*log of index deflated by US CPI. Real food commodity prices is a trade-weighted average
          of benchmark food prices in US dollars for cereals, vegetable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, bananas and oranges.
          Cereal prices aggregates the prices of corn, wheat, rice and soybeans on a (trend) production-weighted basis. Source: IMF.
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Figure 2 - Effects of 1 percent increase in global real cereal prices: panel SVAR-IV estimations
Note: Mean Group impulse responses with one- and two-standard error bands; the confidence intervals are constructed using 
            a recursive-design wil bootstrap that accounts for correlation of the VAR residuals across countries; horizon is quarterly
Figure 3 - Assessing the role of the instruments for the output effects: comparison with a recursively identified VAR 
Note: Mean Group impulse responses with one- and two-standard error bands; the confidence intervals are constructed using 
            a recursive-design wil bootstrap that accounts for correlation of the VAR residuals across countries; horizon is quarterly
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Figure 4 - Effects on real GDP: alternative panel SVAR-IV estimations
Note: Mean Group impulse responses with one- and two-standard error bands; the confidence intervals are constructed using 
            a recursive-design wil bootstrap that accounts for correlation of the VAR residuals across countries; horizon is quarterly;
            red dashed lines are the responses of the benchmark panel SVAR-IV
Figure 5 - Effects of 1 percent increase in global real cereal prices: panel LP-IV estimations
Note: Impulse responses with one- and two-standard error bands; the confidence intervals are adjusted for correlations 
           between the residuals across countries, as well as serial correlation between the residuals over time; horizon is quarterly
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Figure 6 - Effects of 1 percent increase in global real cereal prices on high-income versus low-income countries
Note: Mean Group impulse responses for top and bottom tertiles of the countries with one- and two-standard error bands; the confidence intervals
            are constructed using a recursive-design wil bootstrap that accounts for correlation of the VAR residuals across countries; horizon is quarterly
            
Figure 7 - Difference between high-income and low-income countries: robustness checks
Note: Differences between impulse responses of high-income versus low-income countries with one- and two-standard error bands; the confidence intervals
            are constructed using a recursive-design wil bootstrap that accounts for correlation of the VAR residuals across countries; horizon is quarterly
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Figure 8 - Effects of 1 percent increase in global real cereal prices on country groups: alternative characteristics
Note: Mean Group impulse responses for top and bottom tertiles of the countries with one- and two-standard error bands; the confidence intervals
            are constructed using a recursive-design wil bootstrap that accounts for correlation of the VAR residuals across countries; horizon is quarterly
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Figure 9 - Simultaneous analysis of country characteristics
Note: Impulse responses with one- and two-standard error bands; the confidence intervals are adjusted for correlations 
           between the residuals across countries, as well as serial correlation between the residuals over time; horizon is quarterly
           (A) dummy variables if countries belong to top-tertile of characteristics; (B) based on average values of characteristics over period 2000-2015
(A) Panel LP-IV with dummy variables
Trade openness Agricultural trade tariffs Income per capita
(B) Panel LP-IV with continues variables
Constant Net export primary food Value added agricultural sector
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Figure A1 - Effects of 1 percent increase in global cereal prices on individual countries
Note: Impulse responses with one- and two-standard error bands; the confidence intervals are constructed using  a recursive-design wil bootstrap; horizon is quarterly
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Figure A1 (continued) - Effects of 1 percent increase in global cereal prices on individual countries
Note: Impulse responses with one- and two-standard error bands; the confidence intervals are constructed using  a recursive-design wil bootstrap; horizon is quarterly
Italy Jamaica Japan Korea
Hong Kong Hungary Iceland India
Indonesia Iran Ireland Israel
Egypt Estonia Finland France
Georgia Germany Greece Guatemala
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 4 8 12 16
Chapter 2 - 43 
Figure A1 (continued) - Effects of 1 percent increase in global cereal prices on individual countries
Note: Impulse responses with one- and two-standard error bands; the confidence intervals are constructed using  a recursive-design wil bootstrap; horizon is quarterly
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Figure A1 (continued) - Effects of 1 percent increase in global cereal prices on individual countries
Note: Impulse responses with one- and two-standard error bands; the confidence intervals are constructed using  a recursive-design wil bootstrap; horizon is quarterly
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Table 1 - Overview of narrative global agricultural commodity market shocks
Impact  After 1Q
1972Q3 Unfavorable 1.4% 18.3%
Russian Wheat Deal and failed monsoon in Southeast Asia
Wheat production in the USSR declined by 13% due to disastrous weather conditions. This resulted
in purchases on an unprecedented scale by the Soviet Union on the world market, leading to large
price increases from July and August 1972 onwards. The negative consequences of the bad weather
conditions in the USSR were only known very late, and were percieved as a considerable shock
worldwide since only a few months earlier there were reports of heavy surplus stocks building. The
sales involved a series of subsidized transactions following an agreement whereby the US made
available credit to the USSR for the purchases (Russian Wheat Deal). The rise in wheat prices was
further accelerated by a decision of the US to suspend the subsidies normally paid on exports.
At the same time, the global agricultural sector was severely affected by monsoon failure in most of
southeast Asia during summer, followed by extremely dry weather throughout autumn and early
winter. Rice production decreased in Cambodia, India, Malaysia and Thailand by respectively 29%,
9%, 13% and 10%.
In 1972Q3 and 1972Q4, real cereal prices rose by respectively 9.7% and 16.5%. Overall, annual
global cereal production declined by 1.6% in 1972, compared to a rise of respectively 9.2% and 7.4%
in 1971 and 1973. 
1975Q2 Favorable -10.9% -9.9%
Significant improved estimate of world grain production
In April 1975, the USDA predicted a significant increase in world grain production (the previous
forecast was in December 1974), indicating an easing of the tight supply-demand balance of the
previous two years. Furthermore, in May 1975, the USDA increased its US wheat production
estimate for 1975 because of favorable May field conditions. A record wheat harvest was expected.
In retrospect, annual global cereal production increased by 6.9% relative to the previous year.
1975Q4 Favorable -4.7% -10.7%
Optimistic rice forecast because of very favorable monsoon season
In September 1975, there were expectations of a record rice crop because of a favorable monsoon
season. As a consequence, rice prices started to decrease from October 1975 onwards, which is the
start of the harvesting season. Real cereal prices fell by 19% over two subsequent quarters. Ex post,
1975 proved indeed to be a very favorable rice year for India, Japan and Thailand, with an
acceleration of production yields relatively to 1974 by respectively 23%, 7% and 14%.
1977Q3 Favorable -20.9% -12.9%
Predictions of record US and Soviet harvests
Several favorable and/or increased food production forecasts were published throughout July and
August: predictions of record US corn crops (July 1977), increased forecasts of world wheat and feed
grains production (July 1977), news on record Soviet wheat harvest (August 1977), and predictions
of record US soybeans crops (August 1977).
1977Q4 Unfavorable 8.0% 15.6%
Record grain harvests did not materialize
Despite expectations of record harvests in the previous quarter, global grain production turned out
to be below trend in 1977 as a result of unfavorable weather conditions in the major producing
areas. In November 1977, the Financial Times announced that the Soviet crop would be roughly
10% below the latest estimate predicted by the USDA. In addition, the International Wheat Council
lowered its estimate of world wheat output by 2%-3%. In retrospect, Soviet wheat production
decreased by 5% compared to the previous year. Chinese wheat production declined by 18% and in
the US wheat production shrunk by 5%. It is clear that this came as an unexpected shock in 1977Q4,
given the extreme optimistic forecasts in 1977Q3.
1984Q3 Favorable -10.4% -14.1%
Favorable weather in North America and exceptionally good cereal harvest in Western Europe
In July 1984, the USDA improved its June estimate for US wheat production, and predicted record
grain production worldwide. Much of this increase was a consequence of the North American
recovery from the sharp decline of 1983 as a consequence of increased planting, as well as favorable 
weather. Western Europe also had exceptionally good harvests of cereals. In retrospect, US maize
production rose considerably, i.e. 84%. Furthermore, wheat production increased in China, India
and France by respectively 8%, 33% and 6%. Overall, global cereal production increased by 11.4% in
1984, which was the largest annual rise since the 1960s.
1988Q4 Favorable -4.5% -9.4%
Expectations of global surge in wheat production
In December 1988, it was announced by the International Wheat Council that worldwide wheat
production was expected to rise considerably in 1989, amongst others because of a reduction in the
requirement for US set-aside of arable land, from 27.5% to only 10% of the wheat acreage in the
next year, which was a farm policy response to the 1988 drought in the US (The Disaster Relief Act
of 1988). In response to drought-shortened crop inventories, the 1989 version of the farm bill was
expected to encourage larger crop planting. Wheat production in 1989 increased indeed in all large
wheat producing countries (China 6%; France 10%; India 17%; US 12%; USSR 11%). Ex post, annual
global cereal production increased by more than 10% in 1989.
Date Type
(Cumulative) change in
Food commodity market eventfood commodity prices
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1995Q3 Unfavorable 6.6% 7.8%
Significant downward revised world cereal estimates
In 1995Q3, there were large downward revisions of 1995 world cereal production. This was
especially the case for wheat and coarse grains production in the US (poor weather conditions,
predominantly hot and dry weather during early September) and the Commonwealth of
Independent States, and for wheat production in Argentina and China. In Central America, a below-
normal coarse grain crop was in prospect in Mexico due to a combination of reduced plantings and
dry weather in parts. In retrospect, wheat production declined in the US and Russia by 6%, and in
Argentina by 16%. Mexican maize production stagnated in 1995, but US maize production
decreased by 26%. Annual global production of the four major staples ultimately declined by 2.6% in 
1995.
1996Q3 Favorable -4.5% -12.5%
Expectations of excellent global cereal harvest
The FAO issued a first provisional favorable forecast for world 1996 cereal output (6.5% up from the
previous year) in June 1996. The largest increase was expected in coarse grains output, mostly in the 
developed countries. Additionally, wheat output was forecast to increase significantly, and rice
production to rise marginally. In September 1996, the International Grains Council increased its
forecast (compared to a month earlier) for 1996-97 global wheat production in response to a
confirmation of favorable harvests in the Northern Hemisphere and excellent prospects in the
Southern Hemisphere.
2002Q3 Unfavorable 9.4% 10.7%
Significant downward revised global cereal estimates
The FAO's July forecast pointed to a global cereal output which is considerably less than the
previous forecast in May. It would be the smallest wheat crop since 1995. The downward revision
was mostly a result of a deterioration of production prospects for several of the major wheat crops
around the globe because of adverse weather in the northern hemisphere or for planting in the
southern hemisphere. The forecast for global coarse grain output was also revised downwards since
the last report mainly because of dry weather conditions in the Russian Federation. In September,
the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics announced that drought will slash the
country's winter grain production. Australia is one of the big five wheat exporters. In retrospect, US
wheat production decreased by 18% in 2002 and Australian wheat production by 60%.
2004Q3 Favorable -6.9% -10.9%
Significant improved forecast of world cereal output 
Favorable weather conditions triggered expectations of significant higher cereal production in
Europe, China, Brazil and the US. In July 2004, the International Grains Council announced an
expected rise in the global volume of coarse grain. In september 2004, the FAO’s raised its forecast
for world cereal output since the previous report in June. Annual global cereal production increased
by more than 9% in 2004.
2010Q3 Unfavorable 8.6% 22.1%
Droughts in Russia and Eastern Europe
The 2010 cereal output in the Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Ukraine
was seriously affected by adverse weather conditions. Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Ukraine
(all three amongst the world's top-10 wheat exporters) suffered the worst heatwave and drought in
more than a century, while the Republic of Moldova was struck by floods and hail storms. In the
Russian Federation, the most severely affected by adverse conditions, the 2010 cereal crop was 33%
lower than the previous year. In Ukraine the wheat harvest decreased 19%. Accordingly, in July
2010, wheat prices have seen the biggest one-month jump in more than three decades, i.e. a rise of
nearly 50% since late June. In September, wheat prices were even 60% to 80% higher due to a
decision by the Russian Federation to ban exports.
2012Q3 Unfavorable 7.9% 6.9%
Droughts around the globe
Due to droughts in Russia, Eastern Europe, Asia and the US, there was a signifcant decline in global
cereal production. In retrospect, annual global cereal production contracted by 2.4%. In July, the
USDA decreased its previous (June) estimate for US corn by 12% because of the worst Midwest
drought in a quarter century. Heatwaves in southern Europe added serious concern about global
food supplies later that month, as well as below-average rainfall in Australia. In August, there was
news about a late monsoon affecting the rice harvest in Asia negatively. According to the
International Food Policy Institute, production of food grains in the South Asia region was expected
to decline by 12% compared to a year earlier. Also in August, the Russian grain harvest forecasts
were reduced because of drought. In October 2012, wheat output in the Russian Federation was
estimated some 30% down from 2011, in Ukraine, a decrease of about 33% was expected, while in
Kazakhstan, output was reported to be just half of last year’s good level. Wheat harvest indeed
declined in 2012, respectively by 33%, 29%, 57% in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 
Note: a detailed motivation and description of the episodes can be found in the online appendix of De Winne and Peersman (2016).
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Table 2 - Overlap of country groups and correlation of country characteristics
high low high low high low high low high low
high 5 12 0 20 7 8 7 4
low 14 4 19 1 5 10 9 12
high 12 2 6 10 8 13
low 4 15 12 5 7 8
high 6 9 10 11
low 11 5 5 5
high 6 10
low 9 8
high
low
Note: numbers above diagonal are number of countries that overlap across groups (maximum is 25), numbers below 
          diagonal are correlations of underlying variables, values are based on the period 2000-2015. See data appendix.
0.04 -0.160.10 -0.07
-0.250.35 -0.25
-0.32
-0.71 0.40
Trade openness Agricultural tariffsIncome per capita
Net export primary 
food & beverages
Share agriculture 
in GDP
Trade openness
Agricultural 
tariffs
Income per 
capita
Net export 
primary food & 
beverages
Share agriculture 
in GDP
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Table A1 - Country characteristics
Argentina 1968Q1-2014Q4 12.6 14.7 16031 (41) 2.16 (6) 8.0 (25) 34 (72) 5.1 (66)
Australia 1965Q1-2014Q4 15.9 21.1 41353 (9) 0.77 (18) 2.9 (48) 41 (70) 2.9 (72)
Austria 1965Q1-2014Q4 15.5 19.7 39429 (13) -0.28 (50) 1.6 (65) 96 (26) 10.3 (43)
Belarus 1992Q1-2014Q4 10.4 15.3 13327 (48) -0.73 (67) 10.1 (18) 131 (12) 6.4 (60)
Belgium 1965Q1-2014Q4 16.4 18.4 36218 (18) -0.58 (66) 0.9 (69) 149 (8) 10.3 (35)
Belize 1994Q1-2014Q4 8.4 12.6 6952 (64) 4.84 (3) 14.8 (5) 125 (16) 13.4 (18)
Bolivia 1990Q1-2014Q4 11.7 19.8 4182 (72) 0.72 (19) 13.9 (9) 69 (47) 5.6 (65)
Botswana 1994Q1-2014Q4 14.0 30.1 11940 (51) -1.27 (74) 2.7 (52) 97 (25) 0.6 (74)
Brazil 1980Q1-2014Q4 11.1 15.6 11018 (52) 0.84 (15) 5.5 (33) 26 (75) 6.9 (58)
Bulgaria 1980Q1-2014Q4 13.7 29.7 12983 (50) 1.43 (11) 7.5 (29) 106 (22) 14.1 (17)
Canada 1965Q1-2014Q4 10.9 16.9 40379 (10) 0.60 (22) 1.7 (61) 68 (49) 11.1 (25)
Chile 1965Q1-2014Q4 14.3 14.1 15523 (42) 2.07 (8) 4.2 (40) 68 (48) 3.6 (70)
China 1980Q1-2014Q4 18.5 31.1 7771 (61) -0.20 (48) 11.0 (16) 50 (64) 16.6 (12)
Colombia 1980Q1-2014Q4 10.7 14.3 9263 (58) 0.80 (16) 7.7 (27) 36 (71) 11.1 (26)
Costa Rica 1991Q1-2014Q4 2.7 8.4 10951 (53) 4.87 (2) 8.0 (24) 78 (38) 7.9 (54)
Croatia 1988Q3-2014Q4 10.3 18.6 17788 (35) -0.49 (63) 5.1 (35) 84 (35) 7.2 (56)
Cyprus 1988Q1-2014Q4 14.4 50.7 26383 (26) -0.32 (52) 2.9 (49) 116 (19) 15.6 (15)
Czech Republic 1988Q3-2014Q4 14.7 20.4 24538 (29) -0.07 (45) 2.5 (54) 125 (15) 9.4 (48)
Denmark 1965Q1-2014Q4 15.9 19.6 40161 (11) 0.00 (38) 1.6 (62) 93 (29) 10.3 (40)
Ecuador 1991Q1-2014Q4 6.8 41.0 8035 (59) 4.62 (4) 10.7 (17) 57 (55) 9.8 (45)
Egypt 2002Q1-2014Q4 4.4 33.5 7502 (63) -1.17 (73) 14.0 (8) 49 (65) 13.4 (19)
Estonia 1988Q3-2014Q4 12.3 16.0 18690 (34) -0.21 (49) 3.6 (43) 141 (10) 8.7 (51)
Finland 1965Q1-2014Q4 15.2 17.7 36705 (16) -0.41 (58) 2.8 (51) 76 (40) 10.3 (29)
France 1965Q1-2014Q4 15.2 18.8 34735 (19) 0.08 (34) 1.9 (60) 55 (58) 10.3 (36)
Georgia 1996Q1-2014Q4 8.2 19.5 6388 (66) -0.30 (51) 13.5 (10) 86 (31) 7.0 (57)
Germany 1965Q1-2014Q4 12.4 18.1 39353 (14) -0.44 (61) 0.9 (71) 75 (42) 10.3 (41)
Greece 1965Q1-2014Q4 15.4 17.9 25916 (27) 0.01 (37) 4.2 (39) 56 (56) 10.3 (32)
Guatemala 2001Q1-2014Q4 3.8 21.2 5887 (69) 3.27 (5) 12.6 (11) 62 (50) 6.4 (61)
Hong Kong 1966Q1-2014Q4 20.1 33.4 45664 (7) -1.67 (75) 0.1 (74) 381 (1) 0.0 (75)
Hungary 1979Q1-2014Q4 14.6 26.8 18842 (33) 0.78 (17) 4.5 (37) 148 (9) 12.9 (21)
Iceland 1965Q1-2014Q4 17.6 22.9 37044 (15) 1.86 (9) 7.1 (30) 85 (32) 19.2 (9)
India 1965Q1-2014Q4 17.5 25.4 3519 (73) 0.28 (28) 19.2 (4) 43 (69) 46.2 (2)
Indonesia 1970Q1-2014Q4 20.1 25.3 5891 (68) 0.18 (33) 14.2 (6) 55 (59) 4.4 (67)
Iran 1988Q1-2014Q4 15.6 24.3 13893 (45) 0.26 (30) 7.6 (28) 48 (66) 17.5 (10)
Ireland 1965Q1-2014Q4 12.9 12.3 48326 (6) -0.20 (47) 1.4 (66) 174 (6) 10.3 (42)
Israel 1965Q1-2014Q4 17.4 23.1 29501 (24) -0.16 (46) 1.9 (58) 71 (44) 11.9 (22)
Italy 1965Q1-2014Q4 11.7 16.1 34094 (21) -0.42 (59) 2.3 (56) 52 (61) 10.3 (34)
Sample period
F-statistics 
instruments
Robust F-
statistics 
instruments Income per capita
Country characteristics: average values 2000-2015 (ranking between brackets)
Agricultural tariffs 
(%)
Trade (%GDP)
Value added 
agriculture (%GDP)
Net export primary 
food & beverages 
(%GDP)
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Jamaica 1996Q1-2014Q4 4.9 13.7 6432 (65) -0.54 (65) 6.4 (32) 88 (30) 16.1 (13)
Japan 1965Q1-2014Q4 16.9 28.9 34659 (20) -0.33 (54) 1.2 (67) 28 (73) 22.8 (6)
Korea 1965Q1-2014Q4 11.3 26.8 29413 (25) -0.36 (55) 3.0 (46) 84 (34) 96.1 (1)
Kyrgyzstan 1986Q2-2014Q4 10.7 16.7 3093 (74) -0.04 (43) 27.1 (2) 115 (20) 4.0 (69)
Latvia 1988Q3-2014Q4 17.5 40.2 16240 (39) -0.03 (41) 4.1 (41) 102 (24) 9.6 (47)
Lithuania 1993Q1-2014Q4 16.1 31.2 17310 (37) 0.51 (25) 4.3 (38) 124 (17) 7.9 (53)
Luxembourg 1965Q1-2014Q4 17.7 49.4 57796 (2) -0.42 (60) 0.4 (73) 318 (3) 10.3 (37)
Macedonia 1993Q1-2014Q4 9.0 37.8 9966 (57) 0.02 (36) 11.7 (14) 95 (28) 10.9 (27)
Malaysia 1970Q1-2014Q4 17.1 20.5 16233 (40) -0.78 (68) 9.2 (21) 178 (5) 10.5 (28)
Malta 1996Q1-2014Q4 9.0 17.4 22973 (31) -0.95 (70) 1.9 (59) 265 (4) 8.1 (52)
Mauritius 2000Q1-2014Q4 5.4 9.6 14932 (43) -1.08 (71) 5.1 (34) 117 (18) 5.7 (64)
Mexico 1965Q1-2014Q4 15.3 25.7 13587 (46) 0.27 (29) 3.5 (44) 58 (53) 15.2 (16)
Morocco 1966Q2-2014Q4 11.9 12.4 5681 (70) 0.32 (26) 14.1 (7) 72 (43) 25.9 (5)
Netherlands 1965Q1-2014Q4 18.8 23.8 43794 (8) -0.02 (40) 2.0 (57) 133 (11) 10.3 (39)
New Zealand 1965Q1-2014Q4 18.5 22.5 29511 (23) 1.22 (12) 6.4 (31) 60 (51) 8.7 (50)
Norway 1965Q1-2014Q4 15.9 17.6 69450 (1) 0.61 (21) 1.6 (63) 70 (45) 40.4 (3)
Paraguay 1994Q1-2014Q4 8.9 18.8 5976 (67) 7.27 (1) 19.4 (3) 96 (27) 6.0 (63)
Peru 1979Q1-2014Q4 9.0 13.2 7645 (62) 0.93 (14) 7.8 (26) 47 (67) 6.5 (59)
Philippines 1981Q1-2014Q4 15.3 19.0 4919 (71) -0.04 (42) 12.5 (12) 83 (36) 11.3 (24)
Poland 1982Q1-2014Q4 15.3 36.1 17712 (36) -0.05 (44) 3.1 (45) 78 (37) 13.4 (20)
Portugal 1965Q1-2014Q4 14.3 15.6 23873 (30) -1.12 (72) 2.6 (53) 69 (46) 10.3 (31)
Romania 1980Q1-2014Q4 12.0 28.5 13484 (47) 0.22 (32) 8.6 (23) 75 (41) 15.9 (14)
Russian Federation 1990Q1-2014Q4 12.3 22.6 16493 (38) -0.32 (53) 4.9 (36) 54 (60) 11.6 (23)
Serbia 1995Q1-2014Q4 5.6 6.6 10478 (56) 0.57 (23) 12.0 (13) 76 (39) 10.3 (30)
Singapore 1975Q1-2014Q4 19.8 25.2 51756 (3) -0.78 (69) 0.1 (75) 380 (2) 1.5 (73)
Slovakia 1992Q1-2014Q4 13.0 30.6 19373 (32) -0.02 (39) 4.0 (42) 154 (7) 8.8 (49)
Slovenia 1992Q1-2014Q4 7.6 43.9 24864 (28) -0.49 (64) 2.4 (55) 125 (14) 9.6 (46)
South Africa 1965Q1-2014Q4 14.7 14.9 10674 (54) 0.52 (24) 2.9 (50) 59 (52) 6.1 (62)
Spain 1965Q1-2014Q4 14.0 13.2 30484 (22) 0.24 (31) 3.0 (47) 57 (54) 10.3 (33)
Sweden 1965Q1-2014Q4 18.2 19.7 39603 (12) -0.41 (57) 1.6 (64) 85 (33) 10.3 (38)
Switzerland 1965Q1-2014Q4 14.6 23.4 51248 (4) -0.47 (62) 0.9 (70) 109 (21) 31.4 (4)
Tanzania 2001Q1-2014Q4 5.4 7.5 1722 (75) 1.05 (13) 31.9 (1) 45 (68) 20.1 (8)
Thailand 1980Q1-2014Q4 17.5 20.1 10615 (55) 0.62 (20) 9.8 (19) 129 (13) 16.6 (11)
Turkey 1965Q1-2014Q4 20.0 33.0 14466 (44) 0.32 (27) 9.6 (20) 52 (63) 20.6 (7)
Ukraine 2001Q1-2014Q4 10.0 16.4 7963 (60) 1.45 (10) 11.1 (15) 103 (23) 7.5 (55)
United Kingdom 1965Q1-2014Q4 16.2 17.1 36294 (17) -0.37 (56) 0.7 (72) 55 (57) 10.3 (44)
Uruguay 1988Q1-2014Q4 5.6 13.7 13216 (49) 2.16 (7) 9.2 (22) 52 (62) 4.3 (68)
United States 1965Q1-2014Q4 12.8 24.5 49020 (5) 0.03 (35) 1.2 (68) 27 (74) 2.9 (71)
Note: rankings of country characteristics are based on the period 2000-2015. See data appendix for more details.
Sample period
F-statistics 
instruments
Robust F-
statistics 
instruments
Country characteristics: average values 2000-2015 (ranking between brackets)
Income (2011 USD 
per capita)
Net export primary 
food & beverages 
(%)
Share agriculture in 
GDP (%)
Trade openness (%)
Agriculture tariffs 
(%)
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1 Introduction
“Bread, freedom, social justice!”
(Slogan shouted in Cairo, 2011—Mittermaier, 2014)
Throughout history, various violent events occurred in times of high food prices. A surge
in food prices in 2008 and again in 2010–2011 spurred interest in the investigation of this
relationship: a large number of recent papers feature food commodities and conflict incidence.1
However, theory provides arguments for both a negative and a positive relationship, and also
the empirical evidence is mixed. For example, Brückner and Ciccone (2010), Berman and
Couttenier (2015) and Fjelde (2015) show that higher prices decrease the risk of violent
events. Bazzi and Blattman (2014) find no evidence of a robust, significant link, while Smith
(2014), Bellemare (2015), Hendrix and Haggard (2015) and Raleigh et al. (2015) show that
higher prices correspond with more conflict.
The existing food price-conflict literature has a few shortcomings. Notably because the
measurement of a causal effect of food prices on conflict is complicated by two important
issues. The first issue concerns the possible endogeneity of food prices. A potential source
of endogeneity is reverse causality. Most papers merely assume that conflict does not affect
global food prices, but Raleigh et al. (2015) find a positive feedback loop between food prices
and violence. Another – and probably more important – source of endogeneity arises if both
conflict incidence and food prices are determined by a third variable such as global economic
activity. A booming global economy can result in higher food prices, but it can also affect
conflict incidence through increased global trade, investment, remittances or aid flows. The
consequences of higher food prices because of strong economic growth might be very different
from the consequences of higher prices due to supply shocks such as failed harvests. Failing to
take into account this heterogeneity might lead to the inability to reject the null hypothesis.
A second issue arises because many papers focus exclusively on the relative effect for pro-
ducers or exporters by including time fixed effects in their analysis (see for example Brückner
and Ciccone, 2010, Bazzi and Blattman, 2014, Berman and Couttenier, 2015 and Fjelde,
2015). These time fixed effects are included to capture for example the global business cy-
cle. However, this results in the omission of any effect that is common for all areas. These
common effects, which we label baseline effects, could be non-negligible, for example, because
food prices likely affect consumers in all areas. These baseline effects could offset or even
1In this paper we consider a broad range of violent events, ranging from riots to civil wars, whereas many
existing papers have focused on more narrowly defined types of conflict. In section 5 we will pay particular
attention to different types of conflict.
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reverse the partial, differential effect for producers. In essence, these studies including time
fixed effects do not tell us anything about the total effect of food prices on conflict in a given
area.
In this paper we want to deal with these two shortcomings in the existing literature in
order to shed more light on the existence, direction and size of a causal effect of changes in food
commodity prices on conflict in Africa. To do so, we identify truly exogenous changes in food
prices by instrumenting international food commodity prices with two exogenous instruments
as proposed by De Winne and Peersman (2016).2 The first external instrument captures
unexpected changes in global food production outside Africa. Our method ensures that these
production shocks are only the result of changing supply conditions. As a second external
instrument we use a narrative dummy indicator of exogenous food supply shocks, constructed
based on FAO reports, newspaper articles, and several other sources. This identification
strategy deals with the issues in the literature as follows. First, we can easily ensure that the
shock did not occur in Africa, thereby avoiding any possibility of reverse causality. Second,
the source of the price change is unambiguously a supply shock. Since these shocks are not the
result of changing demand conditions, we do not need to include time fixed effects in order to
control for the global business cycle or other common shocks as in most papers. This allows
us to study both the baseline effects and the differential effect for producers of exogenous food
price changes.
We follow the existing literature as much as possible and in line with the most recent
advances in this literature we use geo-referenced, sub-national conflict data. Just as McGuirk
and Burke (2017) we study two different types of conflicts: factor conflict (large-scale battles
for territory) using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) database and output conflict
(smaller-scale conflict such as riots and protests) using the Armed Conflict Location and Event
Data Project (ACLED) dataset. These geo-coded violent events are converted to a panel of
10678 African equally sized cells (around 55×55 km at the equator) between 1997Q1 and
2014Q4. However, in contrast to the existing literature, we aggregate the data to a quarterly
frequency instead of an annual frequency.3 The existing food-conflict papers using grid-level
data only consider the annual frequency, which is surprising given the very detailed, almost
daily, information on conflict incidence. The higher frequency allows to pay more attention
2In the benchmark analysis we use a narrow production-weighted average of only four crop types as an
indicator of global food prices. These four crops account nevertheless for 75 percent of worldwide calorie
production (Roberts and Schlenker, 2013). In the robustness section we show that the results are robust to
using a broader index of food commodity prices.
3We could also aggregate the conflict data to a monthly frequency, but the external instruments used in
this paper are only available at the quarterly frequency.
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to the dynamics of the food-conflict nexus. In order to study the dynamic effect of food price
changes on conflict, we apply the local projections method proposed by Jordà (2005).
The main findings are the following. First, we show that an exogenous rise in international
food commodity prices increases both types of conflict. This contrasts with the results from
a “naive” regression of conflict on food prices showing an inverse relationship. Hence, it is
important to isolate exogenous changes in food prices. Second, for both conflict types the
bulk of the effect takes place beyond one year after the price increase, and the effect is larger
and more persistent for output conflict than for factor conflict. Third, we find that in areas
with more agriculture, an exogenous price increase will result in more output conflict. This
is in line with the deprivation hypothesis: in food-producing cells, higher food prices increase
the income gap between net consumers and producers and there is food production available
to prey upon. Again we show that when failing to account for an exogenous price change
the results exhibit a downward bias. Fourth, we show that the inclusion of time fixed effects,
as is commonly done in the literature to evaluate the effect on food producers, results in an
underestimation of the true effect for producers, because there are positive baseline effects for
all cells. For cells with an average amount of agriculture, the inclusion of time fixed effects
results in an underestimation of the effect of food prices on conflict by almost 50 percent.
In the next section we describe the main theories and findings put forward in the existing
literature, and we discuss the caveats in this literature. In section 3 we outline how we
provide a solution for these caveats by identifying exogenous food price changes. Section 4
gives an overview of the conflict data used in this study. In section 5 we estimate the effect
of exogenous food price changes on conflict and we compare these results with those from a
“naive” regression. In section 6 we focus on the baseline effects and the differential effect for
producers. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Existing Literature
In this section we first discuss the main theoretical reasons why higher food prices could
affect conflict, next we outline the existing empirical findings, and finally we highlight the
main caveats in the current literature. Note that we limit this literature review to the link
between food prices and conflict. This rather specific food price-conflict literature fits within a
broader literature focusing on the causes of civil war and other forms of conflict. Blattman and
Miguel (2010) survey the vast literature on civil war and conclude that there is a robust link
between civil war, low per capita income and slow economic growth, but that the direction of
4
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causality remains contested. Various empirical studies have continuously searched for better
identification strategies. The papers discussed in this section fit within this literature, because
they have (implicitly) used international food prices as an instrument for local economic
conditions, thereby aiming to achieve causal identification.4
2.1 Theories
According to theory, the impact of food prices on conflict is not unambiguously negative or
positive. There are two main reasons why higher food prices can reduce conflict. First, if
food prices increase, there is a higher opportunity cost of insurrection for farmers. A higher
wage makes it less appealing to abandon work (assuming higher food prices translate into
a net increase in real farm wages). This interpretation has been the most popular one in
the food-conflict literature, see e.g. Besley and Persson (2008), Dube and Vargas (2013),
Bazzi and Blattman (2014), Berman and Couttenier (2015) and Fjelde (2015), but it is also
a leading theory in a broader literature on the origins of civil war or conflict (e.g. Grossman,
1991, Collier and Hoeﬄer, 1998, 2004). Second, higher commodity prices can increase state
revenues and hence also the capacity of the state to prevent, curb or resolve conflict (Fearon
and Laitin, 2003, Besley and Persson, 2010). For food commodities this channel is probably
less important than for higher-valued and more easily taxable commodities such as mined
products, petroleum, rubber, coffee and cocoa (Bazzi and Blattman, 2014).5
Conversely, there are three reasons why higher food prices can result in more violent events.
To begin with, food is a basic necessity. If higher food prices make food unaffordable, and
if there is no legal way to obtain (money for) food, food price hikes will result into stealing
or other criminal activities. We label this the absolute deprivation hypothesis. Second,
even if there is legal way to purchase food (use up savings, borrow money, work more),
consumers can feel relatively deprived. Deprivation can arise from comparisons over time or
with other groups or individuals. According to the relative deprivation hypothesis, unfulfilled
material expectations cause anger, ultimately leading to public unrest (Hendrix and Haggard,
2015).6 Arezki and Brückner (2014), for example, find that higher food prices increase the
4Another group of studies has focused on weather variables as an instrument for economic conditions (e.g.
Miguel et al., 2004). This is in turn related to an emerging literature linking climate and conflict. For a survey,
see Burke et al. (2015).
5Nunn and Qian (2014) have shown that an increase in U.S. food aid due to changes in U.S. wheat production
increases the incidence and duration of civil conflict. Qualitative accounts point to aid stealing as one of the
key ways in which humanitarian aid fuels conflict. If this result can be extrapolated to global food aid, food aid
could constitute another channel through which higher food prices reduce conflict: i.e. lower food production
(corresponding with higher prices) entails less food aid and hence also less conflict.
6See Hendrix and Haggard (2015) for a discussion of the related psychological and behavioral economics
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income gap in low-income countries, thereby increasing relative deprivation for consumers.
This hypothesis is not often mentioned in the literature, but it is in line with a long list of
episodes of high food prices coinciding with public unrest, ranging from ancient Rome, when
“bread and circuses” were needed to appease the people (Juvenal, Satire 10.77–81), to the
French Revolution (Doyle, 1989), flour riots in the 19th century in the U.S. (McPherson, 1988,
Burrows and Wallace, 1999), and food riots in 2007–2008 in West and North Africa and in
the Middle East (Bush, 2010, Berazneva and Lee, 2013). See for example Bellemare (2015)
for an overview of food riots in modern and contemporary history. A third reason could be
that higher prices increase the value of the appropriable surplus, the “state prize” (Besley and
Persson, 2008, Dube and Vargas, 2013, McGuirk and Burke, 2017). However, this “rapacity
effect” is probably less applicable for food commodities and more relevant for commodities
that bring large rents, such as extractive commodities and tree crops (Bazzi and Blattman,
2014).7
To sum up, the most important channels through which food price shocks can affect violent
events are the opportunity cost channel for farmers (predicting higher food prices to cause less
conflict) and the absolute and relative deprivation channel for consumers (predicting higher
food prices to result in more violent events). Our analysis is limited to food commodities. This
will allow us to focus on a more limited number of theoretical mechanisms in the interpretation
of the results. Several papers have shown that the findings can be opposite for different types
of commodities. Dube and Vargas (2013) for example find opposite effects for agricultural
goods and natural resources.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
A first glance at the existing empirical literature gives the impression that no consensus at
all exists whether higher food prices result in conflict. Table 1 offers a schematic overview of
thirteen recent studies in which the relationship between food prices and conflict plays a major
literature. Note that this relative deprivation effect is not the same as an inverse opportunity cost effect
for consumers. Higher food prices will not decrease the opportunity cost of engaging in violent events for
consumers, as higher food prices will decrease both the real wage of workers and the real “wage” (or any source
of income that is used to buy groceries) for protesters/fighters. In fact, if protesting or engaging in violent
events does not yield an income, liquidity-constrained consumers will have to work more to buy the same
amount of food. On the other hand, there can be an inverse relative deprivation effect for farmers (i.e. they
feel less relatively deprived when food prices are high). It is hard to discern this effect from the opportunity
cost effect for farmers described earlier.
7A fourth reason is mentioned in the literature, namely that higher commodity prices can fund conflict, but
it is also less likely that this applies to food crops. For example, Klare (2001) discusses several examples of
natural resource extortion, such as diamonds in West Africa, timber in Cambodia, and cocaine in Colombia.
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role. Some of these papers also focus on other commodity types besides food commodities
or on other outcome variables besides conflict, but all of these papers estimate a variant of a
(panel) model with a measure of violent events as the dependent variable and (among others)
food prices as an explanatory variable. Four studies find that higher food prices lead to less
conflict, whereas six studies show that higher food prices cause more conflict. Two papers
find a mixed effect and one paper finds no significant link.
However, these seemingly opposing findings make more sense when grouped in a particular
way. On the one hand, the papers that do not distinguish between the effect on producers
and consumers, as well as the studies focusing on the effect for consumers find that higher
food prices result in more conflict (Smith, 2014, Bellemare, 2015, Hendrix and Haggard, 2015,
Janus and Riera-Crichton, 2015, Raleigh et al., 2015, McGuirk and Burke, 2017). On the other
hand, there are studies that consider only the effect for producers. These studies construct
an independent variable for which international food prices are multiplied with export or
production shares. Most of these papers conclude that higher food prices reduce conflict
(Brückner and Ciccone, 2010, Dube and Vargas, 2013, Berman and Couttenier, 2015, Fjelde,
2015, Janus and Riera-Crichton, 2015).8 However, this finding is not entirely robust: Besley
and Persson (2008) and Arezki and Brückner (2014) find that even when focusing on (net)
export-weighted prices, higher food prices cause more conflict. McGuirk and Burke (2017)
show that in food-producing cells higher prices result in more output conflict (e.g. riots and
protests), but less factor conflict (large-scale battles). Bazzi and Blattman (2014) find no
significant link between food prices and conflict incidence. To sum up, most studies find that
higher food prices lead to more conflict, except some — but not all — papers focusing on the
effect for producers find the opposite.
Some of the papers in table 1 have also investigated whether the link between food price
changes and conflict depends on other characteristics. Various sources of heterogeneity are
considered: the inclusiveness of the political institutions (Besley and Persson, 2008), the
remoteness of the area (Berman and Couttenier, 2015), regime type (Hendrix and Hag-
gard, 2015), ethnic composition (Janus and Riera-Crichton, 2015) and economic development
(McGuirk and Burke, 2017). We will analyze whether heterogeneity influences our results in
section 6.
8Janus and Riera-Crichton (2015) and McGuirk and Burke (2017) consider the effect for both consumers
and producers. Janus and Riera-Crichton (2015) also look at the joint estimate by analyzing terms of trade
changes.
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2.3 Caveats in Existing Studies
Despite the recent surge in empirical studies on food and conflict, there are two important
caveats in the existing literature: endogeneity and the omission of baseline effects when focus-
ing on the differential effect for producers. First, when studying the effect of food prices on
conflict, there are two sources of endogeneity. There could be reverse causality running from
conflict to food prices. For this reason, most papers study international food commodity prices
and they assume there is no causal effect of African conflict on global prices, because most
African countries are small food producers (for example Smith, 2014; Hendrix and Haggard,
2015; Raleigh et al., 2015 and McGuirk and Burke, 2017). Some papers perform a robustness
check where they exclude countries with levels of production above a certain threshold (Brück-
ner and Ciccone, 2010, Arezki and Brückner, 2014, Bazzi and Blattman, 2014, Berman and
Couttenier, 2015, Fjelde, 2015, Janus and Riera-Crichton, 2015). However, local conflict can
also have an impact on global food prices through changing demand conditions. Bellemare
(2015) addresses the issue of reverse causality by using data on natural disasters to identify
the causal effect of food prices on social unrest. However, the exclusion criterion might not be
met, as natural disasters could affect conflict incidence through other channels besides food
prices.9
A second endogeneity problem arises if both international food prices and conflict are de-
termined by a third variable such as global economic activity. To address this problem most
papers in table 1 include time fixed effects to control for changes in conflict incidence related
to the global business cycle or other common shocks.10 The inclusion of time fixed effects
wipes out any effect that is common for all countries. These studies resort to a difference-
in-differences strategy: they multiply international food prices with time-invariant local food
production, export or import shares. The estimated coefficient corresponds with the differen-
tial effect of higher food prices in cells with more production, exports or imports. However,
this differential effect does not tell us anything about the overall effect of food prices on
conflict. For example, if an increase in global commodity prices causes more conflict in all
African countries, but slightly less so in food-producing countries, the difference-in-difference
estimator will only provide us with the latter piece of information. These common effects,
9In another related paper Buhaug et al. (2015) estimate the effect on various conflict measures of local food
production shocks instrumented by weather and they find no consistent link. The same concern with regards
to the exclusion criterion applies. For the case of coffee Dube and Vargas (2013) address the reverse causality
issue by instrumenting coffee prices with export volumes of the three major coffee exporters.
10See for example Besley and Persson (2008), Brückner and Ciccone (2010), Dube and Vargas (2013), Arezki
and Brückner (2014), Bazzi and Blattman (2014), Smith (2014), Berman and Couttenier (2015), Fjelde (2015),
Janus and Riera-Crichton (2015) and McGuirk and Burke (2017).
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which we label baseline effects, can take place directly, via consumption, but also indirectly
via trade or aid if global food supply shocks affect the global economy. We will illustrate the
importance of these baseline effects explicitly in section 6.11
3 Exogenous Food Price Changes
In the previous section we have discussed the main problems that arise when estimating the
effects of food prices on conflict. In this section we explain how we can address those caveats
by identifying exogenous food price changes. To do so, we use two different shock variables
which will later on serve as external instruments for changes in international food commodity
prices: a series of unexpected food production shocks and a series of narrative shocks.
3.1 Food Production Shocks
The first external instrument is a quarterly series of unexpected changes in global food pro-
duction. The underlying idea is that unexpected variations in harvests that are sufficiently
large to affect global supply of cereals likely trigger significant shifts in international food
commodity prices (fulfilling the instrument relevance condition). On the other hand, harvest
volumes can in principle not (endogenously) respond to changes in the state of the economy
within one quarter (fulfilling the exogeneity condition). More specifically, for the staple food
commodities that we consider, there is a time lag of at least one quarter between the planting
and harvesting seasons (De Winne and Peersman, 2016). If farmers adjust their planting
volumes in response to changing economic conditions this could only have an impact on the
harvest volumes in subsequent quarters. In any case, the possible influence of food producers
on the volumes during the quarter of the harvest itself is probably meager relative to vari-
ation induced by other factors such as weather conditions, pests or diseases affecting crops.
For example, it is not realistic that farmers increase food production significantly by raising
fertilization activity during the harvesting quarter in response to an improvement of economic
conditions. In fact, several studies have shown that in-season fertilization strategies are inef-
ficient and often even counterproductive for the staples that we consider (see De Winne and
Peersman, 2016 for a more elaborate discussion).
11The time fixed effects do not only wipe out the effects of a common demand shock, but also of a common
supply shock. This channel is non-negligible: in De Winne and Peersman (2016) we have shown that global
food supply disruptions have a large effect on the global economy. Another solution could be to include global
economic activity as a control variable, but again, this would also eliminate the impact of a food supply shock
that affects both global economic activity and conflict simultaneously.
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To derive the instrument, in a first step, we construct a quarterly index of global food
production. To do so, we elaborate on De Winne and Peersman (2016). More precisely, the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations publishes annual harvest
data for each of the four major staples for 192 countries over the period 1961-2014.12 In De
Winne and Peersman (2016) we combined the annual harvest data of each individual country
with that country’s planting and harvesting calendars for each of the four crops, in order
to allocate the harvest volumes to a specific quarter. Harvests were only allocated if the
planting season was at least one quarter earlier. Since most countries have only one relatively
short harvest season for each crop, i.e. a few months, and the delay between planting and
harvesting varies between 3 and 10 months, we could assign two-thirds of world harvests to
a specific quarter. In line with Roberts and Schlenker (2013) we then aggregated all crops
and countries using calorie weights into one global quarterly index. In this paper we follow
the same approach, but we exclude African production from the production index to ensure
that the shock originates elsewhere. By doing so, we rule out changes in food production that
are the result of conflict, or changes in food production that are the result of local weather
conditions affecting both food production and conflict simultaneously.
In a next step, we use this index to obtain unexpected changes in global food production
(εt). In essence, the shocks are prediction errors of the harvest volumes conditional on past
harvests and a set of relevant information variables that may influence harvests. Specifically,
we estimate the following equation:
Fqt = β0 + β1(L)Xt−1 + εt (1)
Fqt is the seasonally adjusted quarterly index of global food commodity production excluding
Africa. Xt−1 is a vector of control variables that may affect global food commodity markets
and hence also harvest volumes with a lag of one or more quarters: an index of real food
commodity prices (based on the same four crops), real oil prices, world industrial production
and lagged values of the food production index. We include five lags of the control variables
(L = 5). These variables should adequately capture global demand. Oil prices are included
to make sure that we are not picking up a response to oil prices, because food commodities
12Note that the global food production index is based on only four crop types: wheat, maize, rice and
soybeans. Limiting our analysis to these four commodities facilitates the construction of the global food
production index needed for the identification of the quarterly shocks. These four crops account nevertheless
for 75 percent of worldwide calorie production (Roberts and Schlenker, 2013), so the identified shocks should
characterize developments in global food markets reasonably well. In De Winne and Peersman (2016) we have
shown that exogenous food supply shocks based on the quarterly index of food production have a large and
significant effect on global food commodity prices.
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can be considered as a substitute for crude oil to produce refined energy products, while oil is
used in the production, processing and distribution of food commodities. All variables enter
in log-levels. A detailed description of the data used can be found in appendix A. Equation
1 is estimated for the largest time sample as possible (1962Q2–2014Q4).13 If we assume that
the information sets of local farmers are no greater than equation 1, the residuals (εt) of this
equation can be considered as unanticipated harvest shocks. Figure 1 displays these residuals
(εt), which we will use as our first instrument, together with the index of real food commodity
prices.
To sum up, by excluding African production from the production index, the issue of
reverse causality is addressed: any shock to food production should by construction originate
elsewhere. As a consequence, we can make strong causal claims about the link between food
market events and conflict. The second endogeneity issue is also addressed, because any
unexpected change in the food production index that is not captured by the control variables
are food supply shocks. This is the case because food production cannot react to demand
conditions within a quarter, given the time lag between planting and harvesting of at least
one quarter. Thus, any demand-induced production change should be captured by the lags
of food prices or world industrial production.14 Typically the unexpected changes in food
production will be the result of harvest failure in the producing areas due to bad weather or
a pest.
A worry could be that these external production changes are systematically correlated
with global weather phenomena such as El Niño, and these weather phenomena might also
affect conflict directly (Burke et al., 2015). In that case we would be measuring the effect
of local weather on conflict instead of food price changes on conflict. Therefore we will
include different local weather variables as control variables in a robustness check (see section
5). An additional concern could be that conflict elsewhere in the world has an effect on
food production and at the same time influences conflict in Africa. If we include two different
measures of international conflict (excluding Africa) between 1960 and 2014 and their (annual)
lag in equation 1, the results remain unchanged (available on request).15
13If we instead restrict the sample for the estimation of equation 1 to 1997 Q1–2014 Q4, the results remain
largely unchanged (results available on request).
14Note that these residuals are also exogenous with respect to expected demand conditions, because expec-
tations of higher demand for food should be reflected in food prices, and food prices are included in equation
1.
15The first measure counts the number of events per year in the annual UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset (version 4-2016). The second measure counts the number of deaths per year in the Systemic Peace
Major Episodes of Political Violence Dataset.
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3.2 Narrative Shocks
Alongside the unexpected food production shocks, we consider a second external instrument.
This alternative instrument, which is borrowed from De Winne and Peersman (2016), is based
on a narrative approach in the spirit of Hamilton (1983), Romer and Romer (1989, 2010),
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Ramey (2011). Based on newspaper articles, FAO reports and
disaster databases, a number of historical episodes have been identified that can be considered
as major exogenous food commodity market disturbances. For each episode we made sure
that the change in food prices is unambiguously driven by an exogenous commodity market
shock, and not by another macroeconomic event, such as oil shocks.
A short motivation and description of these events — three unfavorable shocks in 2002,
2010 and 2012 and one favorable shock in 2004 — is listed in table 2. In the summer of
2002 droughts in major wheat and coarse grain producing countries, especially Russia and
Australia, led to large drops in production. In that period real food commodity prices rose by
9.4%. In the third quarter of 2004, favorable weather conditions led to better-than-expected
cereal harvests in Europe, China, Brazil and the U.S.. Real food prices declined by 6.9%.
In the summer of 2010, droughts in Russia and Eastern Europe led to a surge in real food
prices of 8.6% and 13.5% in the subsequent quarter. Two years later, in the third quarter of
2012, droughts in Russia, Eastern Europe, Asia and the U.S. caused a decline in global cereal
production of 2.4%. Real food commodity prices increased by 7.9% in that quarter. A more
detailed description, and excerpts from the newspaper articles and reports can be found in
the online appendix of De Winne and Peersman (2016).
The instrument we use is a dummy variable equal to one for unfavorable food market
disturbances and equal to minus one for the favorable event. The narrative shocks are also
displayed in figure 1. The correlation between the food production shocks and the narrative
shocks is 0.18. The advantage of the narrative method compared to the food production
shocks is that we can incorporate a large amount of information. We can ensure for example
that these shocks are not the result of conflict in Africa or anywhere else in the world. The
downside is that it requires judgment from the researcher. In the benchmark analysis we
will use both the food production shocks and the narrative shocks as external instruments
to identify exogenous changes in food prices. In the robustness section we will also study
the effect of using only one instrument. Section 5 outlines how we will use these external
instruments in a dynamic panel model.
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4 Conflict Data
In line with McGuirk and Burke (2017) we consider two different types of conflict: large-scale
factor conflict and smaller-scale output conflict. For both types of conflict we rely on two
highly disaggregated datasets, listing individual events that can (almost always) be allocated
to a specific day and a specific geographical location (down to the level of individual villages).
These two datasets have been often used in the literature. Both datasets are constructed
based on information from various sources: local and international media sources, reports
from NGOs and international organizations, research articles etc.
Factor conflict is defined as armed conflict over the control of land (McGuirk and Burke,
2017). As in McGuirk and Burke (2017) we use the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
Georeferenced Event Dataset version 4 (Sundberg and Melander, 2013, Croicu and Sundberg,
2015) to measure factor conflict. The scope of this dataset is rather narrow, because the events
are restricted to incidents of lethal violence committed by an organized actor.16 Additionally,
only those dyads (pair of conflicting parties) are included if during at least one year the conflict
resulted in at least 25 battle deaths. Given that this variable measures larger conflicts, it is
deemed appropriate to capture conflicts associated with the permanent control of land.17
The second conflict type, output conflict, is defined as conflict over the appropriation of
surplus. To measure output conflict we use the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
Project (ACLED) database version 6 (Raleigh and Dowd, 2016). The scope of the database
is wide, including various sub-types of conflict. In line with McGuirk and Burke (2017)
we retain only two event types: riots and protests, and violence against civilians.18 These
events are more transitory and more likely to capture appropriation of surplus. The UCDP
dataset covers the globe between 1989 and 2014 and the ACLED dataset covers only African
16An event is defined as: “An incident where armed force was used by an organized actor against another
organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least one direct death at a specific location and a specific
date”.
17Note that also the ACLED database contains data on battles, however the threshold for inclusion is much
lower in the ACLED database. By including these ACLED battle types we might run the risk of including
events that fall within the scope of smaller-scale output conflict.
18Riots and protests include demonstrations against a political entity (or against businesses or other private
institutions), and spontaneous acts of violence by disorganized groups, which may target property, businesses,
or other disorganized groups. Violence against civilians is defined as deliberate violent acts perpetrated by
an organized political group such as a rebel, militia or government force against unarmed non-combatants
(Raleigh and Dowd, 2016). For example, the database includes an event classified as violence against civilians
in October 2013, in Timiaouine (Algeria) with the following description: “A trader informed the gendarmerie
force in Timiaouine that his truck which was carrying food had been looted and carjacked at a point 10km
north of Timiaouine after having been attacked by an armed group consisting of four to five men.” Additionally,
note that the results are similar if we consider both types of smaller-scale conflict separately (results available
on request).
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countries between 1997 and 2015. In order to make useful comparisons between the two types
of conflict we look at the overlapping sample for our benchmark analysis: Africa between 1997
and 2014.19
As in Berman and Couttenier (2015), Fjelde (2015), McGuirk and Burke (2017) we con-
sider sub-national units of analysis, defined by a standardized grid structure covering all 54
African countries. The grid has a spatial resolution of 0.5 decimal degrees latitude/longitude
(approximately 55×55 km at the equator), dividing the continent into 10678 equally sized cells
(Tollefsen et al., 2012). Because of the large inter-annual variability in food prices and conflict
incidence, we consider the quarterly frequency, so the cell-quarter is our unit of analysis. We
recode the available conflict information into two different dependent variables. First, the
events are transformed into a set of dummy variables indicating whether or not an event took
place in a given cell-quarter. This approach is commonly used in the literature.20 As a second
dependent variable we consider conflict intensity. Smith (2014) argues that measuring the
intensity of unrest is subjective and counting events requires distinguishing between events
that may be related. On the other hand, the binary approach does discard a lot of potentially
valuable information concerning the intensity of the conflict. Besides, in the ACLED database
each event is recorded only once (in contrast, double-counting can occur when using a search
and count of news stories approach as in Bellemare, 2015). Therefore we use the number of
total events in a cell in a given quarter as a proxy for conflict intensity.21
Table 3 lists some descriptive statistics for each of these variables. ACLED output conflict
is twice as common as UCDP factor conflict. The unconditional probability of any event taking
place in a given quarter is 2.36 percent for ACLED output conflict versus 1.18 percent for
UCDP factor conflict. Figure 2 shows the evolution of events over time. The number of
ACLED events rises steeply as of 2010. This increase is driven by a large number of events
between 2010 and 2014 in Egypt (3846), South Africa (4025), Somalia (2990) and Nigeria
(2839). In contrast, the amount of UCDP events remains constant over time, with around
1000 to 2000 events per year.
19Most other papers in the food-conflict literature also focus on Africa (Brückner and Ciccone, 2010, Smith,
2014, Berman and Couttenier, 2015, Fjelde, 2015, Raleigh et al., 2015, McGuirk and Burke, 2017).
20See for example Besley and Persson, 2008, Smith, 2014, Berman and Couttenier, 2015, Fjelde, 2015,
McGuirk and Burke, 2017.
21Dube and Vargas (2013), Arezki and Brückner (2014), Bellemare (2015), Hendrix and Haggard (2015),
Raleigh et al. (2015) also include the total number of events in their analysis.
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5 The Impact of Food Prices on Conflict: Price Changes ver-
sus Exogenous Price Changes
5.1 Estimation Framework
Bazzi and Blattman (2014) have raised the issue that a binary indicator of conflict incidence
constrains shocks to have the same effect on conflict onset as on conflict continuation or
ending. Moreover, they state that there is a serious econometric concern, as conflict is a
persistent variable and ignoring dynamics biases the estimated effect of shocks on conflict.
They suggest two solutions. One is to use a dynamic model, another solution is to model onset
and ending separately. Whereas Bazzi and Blattman (2014) and also Berman and Couttenier
(2015) and McGuirk and Burke (2017) opt for the latter option, we choose the first option.22
We use the local projections method pioneered by Jordà (2005) to estimate impulse response
functions. The local projections method easily allows us to study the dynamic effects of
food price changes on conflict incidence in a panel set-up. This local projections method has
become an increasingly popular method to study the dynamic effects of shocks, especially in
a panel set-up.23 Essentially, a local projections estimate of the impulse response function of
the dependent variable y to a shock in an exogenous regressor x in period h after the shock,
corresponds with the coefficient on x in the regression of yt+hon the regressors measured at
time t (Teulings and Zubanov, 2014). The intermediate values realized between t and t + h
are not included.
In our case, this local projections method entails estimating the following panel model for
different horizons h:
cit+h = αih + βhfpt + λh(L) cit−1 + ψh(L) fpt−1 + δch × yct−1 + γih × trendt + µit+h (2)
where cit+h is either a dummy variable indicating whether conflict took place in cell i in a given
quarter (conflict incidence) or a variable counting the number of events (conflict intensity).
αih are cell fixed effects. In the benchmark analysis we use a (production-weighted) index
of international prices of only four crop types (fpt). These four crops (wheat, maize, rice
and soybeans) correspond with the instruments (see subsection 3.1). These crop prices, made
available by the IMF, are representative for the global market and determined by the largest
22Nickell (1981) has shown that the fixed effects panel estimation of dynamic models is biased when the time
dimension of the panel is small. We assume this bias is small in our set-up given that T = 72.
23The local projections method has been used to estimate, for example, government spending multipliers
(Owyang et al., 2013), the effect of a banking crisis on GDP (Teulings and Zubanov, 2014) and the effect of
household debt on the business cycle (Mian et al., 2017).
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exporter of each commodity. In the robustness section we show that the results are robust
to using a broader index of food commodity prices. Note that this variable is common for
all cells.24 As control variables we include five lags of the conflict variable and five lags of
the price variable (λh(L) and ψh(L) are polynomials in the lag operator, with L = 5). We
also include a country-specific coefficient for the natural logarithm of annual national GDP
(δch × yct) lagged by one year, in order to control for any local demand effects. Finally, we
include a cell-specific trend (γih × trendt) to capture any time-varying factor exhibiting an
analogous trend to conflict in cell i. The conflict variables were discussed in the previous
section, a description of the other data can be found in appendix A.
We estimate equation 2 in two ways. On the one hand we obtain “naive” results by
estimating equation 2 using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). On the other hand we deal with
the endogeneity issues raised in subsection 2.3 by using the food production shocks and the
narrative dummy variable as two external instruments for fpt.25 We assess the strength of the
instrument set by evaluating the cluster-robust Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic. The values of the
F-statistic range between 50 and 90 for the different horizons, which exceeds the relevant Stock
and Yogo (2005) critical value. The first-stage t-statistics vary between -2.22 and -3.31 for
the different horizons for the production shocks, and between 4.82 and 6.86 for the narrative
shocks. When the dependent variable is the binary indicator of conflict this corresponds with
estimating a linear probability model. This model is most commonly used in the literature
owing to the straightforward interpretation of the coefficients.26
Equation 2 is estimated for horizons h = 0, 1, ..., 12. The coefficient βh measures the effect
of a change in food prices on conflict at each horizon h, controlling for past incidences of
conflict and lagged values of food prices. By using a cell fixed effects model we study the
24Note that unlike some papers in table 1, we do not construct country or cell-specific food price indices by
multiplying international price series with local production, consumption or trade weights. First, the choice of
weights is not neutral: the resulting price index will lean closer to either consumers, producers or exporters.
We will explicitly zoom in on the differential effect for producers in section 6. Second, the prices of these
four crops (wheat, maize, rice, soybeans) are highly correlated anyway. For example, the correlation between
the monthly change in the price of maize and the monthly change in the price of soybeans is 0.65 (between
1997 and 2014). Third, the instrument capturing production shocks is only based on these four crops (the
construction of crop calendars is only feasible for a limited number of crops). By including more commodity
types in the price index the instruments become weaker.
25Specifically, we use the Stata command reghdfe (Correia, 2017) which easily accommodates the large
amount of fixed effects, the use of instrumental variables and clustered standard errors.
26An alternative approach is a model that explicitly takes into account the binary nature of the dependent
variable. Most papers present these limited dependent variable results as a robustness check (see for example
Besley and Persson, 2008; Brückner and Ciccone, 2010; Arezki and Brückner, 2014; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014;
Berman and Couttenier, 2015; Janus and Riera-Crichton, 2015; Hendrix and Haggard, 2015 and McGuirk and
Burke, 2017). We also find that when using an IV probit estimation with country fixed effects, the food supply
shock has a significant positive effect on conflict incidence (results available on request).
16
Chapter 3 - 16 
variation in conflict within cells. The cell fixed effects control for any time-invariant effect on
conflict incidence. For example, the fact that poor countries are more often involved in civil
war (Besley and Persson, 2008) should be captured, at least to the extent that this is time-
invariant. Notice that, since the international food commodity price index (fpt) does not vary
across cells, we cannot include time fixed effects. In contrast with the existing studies, we do
not have to include these time fixed effects to control for global demand shocks, given that our
identification strategy already ensures the exogeneity of food prices. Since we estimate the
effect of a common shock, the errors may exhibit time effects, meaning that the errors may
have arbitrary correlation across cells at a moment in time. We correct for this time effect by
calculating Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. These standard errors also correct for persistent
common shocks, with the degree of persistence increasing with horizon h (see Thompson,
2011, for an elaborate discussion).27
5.2 Results
It has been common practice in the conflict literature to show the estimation results in a table,
but because we study the dynamic effects on conflict over time, we think it is more useful
to show the results in the form of impulse response functions. This approach is common in
the macroeconomic literature and various other fields of economics (see for example Jordà,
2005; Beaudry and Portier, 2006; Romer and Romer, 2010 and Galí, 1999). Results in tabular
format are reported in the appendix table A1 (for space considerations we only include the
peak effect). The impulse responses are shown in figure 3. In particular we show the estimated
coefficient βh of equation 2 for horizons h = 0, 1, ..., 12, both for UCDP factor conflict and
ACLED output conflict. These impulse responses hence show the evolution over time – until
12 quarters after the initial shock – of the effect of a one percent increase in real food prices.
We show both the effect on conflict incidence (part A) and intensity (part B) together with one
and two standard error bands. The left column (red graphs) shows the results for the “naive”
OLS estimations and the right column (blue graphs) shows the results for the IV estimation
with the food production shocks and the narrative dummy as external instruments.
Figure 3 shows that for the OLS estimations an increase in food prices only has a significant
impact on conflict incidence and intensity at a few horizons. Moreover, if significant (at the 5
percent level), this effect is negative. In contrast, when looking at the IV results, an exogenous
increase in food prices has a significant positive effect on conflict. We can conclude that it
27By not including time fixed effects the estimates could be biased if there are omitted persistent common
factors. In the robustness section in appendix B we show that an IV estimator with demeaned variables in
order to capture these unobserved common factors yields very similar results.
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matters to study exogenous changes in food prices. A potential explanation could be that
a price increase can be the result of higher global economic activity. Higher global demand
might coincide with increased trade flows, aid flows, remittances etc., which can (more than)
offset the negative consequences of food price increases.
Our approach allows to study the dynamics of the effect of food shocks on conflict. On
impact and within the first year after the shock the effect on conflict is much smaller and
often not significantly different from zero. The effects peak around six quarters after the
price increase, and for ACLED output conflict there is even a significant, though diminishing,
effect in the third year after the shock. To get a better understanding of these dynamics we
re-estimate equation 2 with the food commodity price index as the dependent variable. This
allows us to assess the dynamic effects of a food production shock on food prices themselves.
The result is shown in figure 4. We can see that after a food production shock, food prices
keep on increasing for three quarters after the shock. Prices only return to baseline in the
second year after the shock. It seems reasonably that if food prices increase, people do not
immediately engage in conflict, since they probably have some reserves. However, if prices
remain elevated, as is apparently the case after food production shocks, the relative and
absolute deprivation become more pressing.
How large are the effects? A one percent exogenous increase in food prices augments UCDP
factor conflict incidence with 0.03 percentage points after six quarters. The unconditional
probability of such a large-scale event taking place in a given cell-quarter is 1.18 percent, so
a ten percent exogenous increase in food prices leads to a relative increase in factor conflict
probability of 25 percent.28 For ACLED output conflict, a one percent exogenous increase in
food prices increases conflict incidence with 0.092 percentage points after eight quarters. The
unconditional probability of such a smaller-scale event taking place in a given cell-quarter is
2.36 percent, so a ten percent exogenous increase in food prices leads to an increase in factor
conflict probability of 39 percent. This finding is in line with Arezki and Brückner (2014)
who also show that increases in international food prices have a stronger positive effect on the
incidence of demonstrations and riots than on civil conflict. The graphs for conflict intensity
show that an increase in production has a similar effect on the total number of events. A one
percent increase in real food prices leads to an increase in the absolute number of events at
horizon six by 0.001 and 0.003 for factor and output conflict respectively.
In appendix B we present and discuss various robustness checks. A major concern of
the approach proposed in subsection 5.1 is that we assume homogeneous slope coefficients
28This number is calculated as follows: 0.03 (increase in absolute probability for a 1 percent price increase)
is multiplied with 10 (size of the price increase) and divided by 1.18 (unconditional probability).
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for all cells. In the next section we investigate whether the coefficient βh is different for
cells with more agriculture. However, the literature has shown that various other sources of
heterogeneity can exist (see subsection 2.2 for some examples). Pesaran and Smith (1995)
propose a mean group panel estimator where separate regressions are estimated for each cross-
sectional unit and panel estimates are obtained by means of taking cross-sectional averages of
the estimation results. Appendix figure A1 shows that this mean group estimator yields very
similar results. Furthermore, we show that the results of figure 3 are quantitatively robust
to changing the set of external instruments, the inclusion of local weather variables, using a
broad index of food commodity prices instead of a narrow index and including only precisely
measured events.
6 Baseline Effects versus Relative Effects for Food-Producers
One of the caveats in the literature highlighted in subsection 2.3 is that most existing studies
include time fixed effects to control for changes in conflict incidence related to the global
business cycle. Therefore these studies have to resort to a difference-in-differences strategy:
they multiply international food prices with, for example, time-invariant food production
shares. The estimated coefficient corresponds with the differential effect of higher food prices
on conflict in cells with more production. Given our identification strategy, we do not have
to include these time fixed effects. This allows us to estimate both the baseline effect, which
is common for cells with and without agriculture, as well as the relative effect for producers.
6.1 Estimation Framework
To measure the relative or differential effect for producers we build our case step by step. We
run three types of estimations. As a starting point we follow the approach commonly used in
the literature. We multiply food prices with a measure of agricultural specialization (sit) to
create a “producer price index”. We estimate the following equation using OLS:
cit+h = αih + βphfpt × sit + λh(L) cit−1 + ψph(L) fpt−1 × sit−1 + γcth + µit+h (3)
In line with the literature we include time fixed effects (γcth).29 We allow the time fixed effects
to differ by country as is also done in McGuirk and Burke (2017). This strategy corresponds
29 See for example Besley and Persson (2008), Brückner and Ciccone (2010), Dube and Vargas (2013), Arezki
and Brückner (2014), Bazzi and Blattman (2014), Smith (2014), Berman and Couttenier (2015), Fjelde (2015),
Janus and Riera-Crichton (2015) and McGuirk and Burke (2017).
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with a difference-in-differences estimator: the coefficient βph measures the effect of an increase
in food prices on conflict for cells with an additional unit of agricultural specialization.
In a second step we can compare the OLS estimation of equation 3 with an IV approach
in order to assess again the importance of dealing with endogeneity. As external instruments
we now multiply the food production shocks and the narrative shocks with the measure
of agricultural specialization. This approach still has some drawbacks. The difference-in-
differences estimator only shows the differential effect for areas with more agriculture. Due to
the inclusion of time fixed effects, the coefficient βph does not tell us anything about the effect
that is common for all producing cells.30 For example, if higher food prices increase conflict in
all producing cells, but slightly less in areas with more production, the difference-in-difference
estimator would only give us the latter information, but it would not tell us anything about
the total or absolute effects. There could be common effects for all cells via consumption,
but also via spill-overs or via trade, investment, aid flows and remittances (if exogenous food
price changes affect the global business cycle).
Given this shortcoming, as a third strategy, we also estimate the following equation, where
we replace the time fixed effects by the food price index:
cit+h = αih + βCh fpt + β
p˜
hfpt × sit + λh(L) cit−1 + ψch(L) fpt−1+
ψp˜h(L) fpt−1 × sit−1 + τhsit + δch × yct−1 + γih × trendt + µit+h (4)
We estimate equation 4 using an IV approach. The coefficient βCh measures the baseline
effects of a food price increase for all cells (with and without agriculture) and the coeffi-
cient βp˜h measures how this effect is different for cells with an additional unit of agricultural
specialization.31
In line with McGuirk and Burke (2017) we use cell-specific land-use data to measure
agricultural specialization. More specifically, we use the share of the area of a cell dedicated
to agriculture provided by the PRIO-GRID.32 Data are available for 1990, 2000 and 2010.
We interpolate and extrapolate missing values.33 The agricultural land share ranges between
30A similar remark on the use of time fixed effects has been made by Dupor and Guerrero (2016) in the
context of estimating the effect of fiscal spending on U.S. states.
31Given the comment of Brambor et al. (2006) with regards to the omission of constitutive terms (i.e. the
elements that constitute the interaction term) potentially leading to an omitted variable bias, we also include
agricultural specialization (sit) by itself in equation 4. However, this does not affect the results.
32The underlying dataset is the ISAM-HYDE land-use dataset.
33Using constant values instead of interpolated values has little effect on the results. Results available on
request.
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0 and 99 percent, and is 7 percent on average.
6.2 Results
In figure 5 we compare three sets of results: (i) equation 3 estimated with OLS; (ii) equation
3 estimated with IV; (iii) equation 4 estimated with IV. We show the results for both UCDP
and ACLED conflict, and for conflict incidence (part A) and conflict intensity (part B). The
peak effects are also reported in appendix table A2.
First, when comparing column (i) and column (ii), notice that there is again a large dif-
ference between the OLS estimates and the IV estimates. The impulse responses show the
effect of an increase in food prices on conflict for cells with an additional unit of agricultural
specialization. This means that for the OLS estimates, the impulse responses show the differ-
ential effect on conflict of an increase in food prices due to any type of shock (e.g. a demand
shock) for cells with more agriculture. The IV estimates only show the differential effect on
conflict of an increase in food prices due to a supply shock. Overall, we can conclude that
including time fixed effects is not an adequate way to filter out demand effects.
Looking at the effects of the exogenous price changes, column (ii), we can see that for
UCDP factor conflict the sign of the effect changes over time. First there is a positive effect on
factor conflict, but in the third year after the shock there is a negative effect (only significant
for conflict incidence). This means that for factor conflict, which typically includes larger
conflicts, in the long-run the opportunity cost effect for farmers surpasses the absolute and
relative deprivation effect for consumers.34
For ACLED output conflict, an increase in real food prices has a significant positive
effect on conflict incidence and intensity in cells with one percentage point more agricultural
land. This means that higher food prices result in more output conflict in food producing
cells. From a theoretical point of view this means that the relative and absolute deprivation
effect for consumers more than offset the opportunity cost effect for producers. When food
prices rise, the income gap between net consumers and net producers will increase, which can
result into anger and protest according to the relative deprivation hypothesis. Additionally,
the presence of producers facilitates theft or looting. These results are consistent with the
34McGuirk and Burke (2017) also find a negative effect on UCDP factor conflict in food-producing cells.
According to their theoretical model, in food-producing cells, higher food prices will reduce factor conflict, as
rural groups choose to farm rather than to attack neighboring territory. Factor conflict is concerned with the
permanent control of the land, and an increase in prices will have a comparatively weaker effect on the present
value of victory than on the opportunity cost of fighting. However, this theoretical prediction rests on the
assumption of stationary prices.
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findings of McGuirk and Burke (2017): they also show that higher food prices cause more
ACLED output conflict in food-producing cells. Furthermore, in a robustness check with
Afrobarometer survey data, they show that higher food prices increase the probability that
commercial farmers report incidences of theft and violence in food-producing areas.
Next, we focus on column (iii) showing the IV estimations of equation 4. The blue impulse
responses (first row) show the additional effect for one percentage point more agricultural land
(coefficient βp˜h in equation 4). The additional effect for producers is more or less similar to the
IV results in column (ii), although the effect for UCDP factor conflict is less significant. The
green impulse responses (second row) correspond with the baseline effects (coefficient βCh in
equation 4), i.e. the effects that are common for all cells, regardless their level of agricultural
production. For both conflict types there are significant positive baseline effects of food price
changes on conflict. For example, for ACLED output conflict incidence, a one percent rise
in real food prices leads to a common increase in the absolute probability of conflict of 0.034
percentage points after two years. For a 10 percent food price increase, this corresponds with
a relative increase in the probability of 15 percent. Each additional percentage point of land
devoted to agriculture increases the absolute probability with 0.005 percentage points. For
cells with an average share of agricultural land of 7 percent, a 10 percent increase in prices will
increase the relative probability of output conflict additionally with 15 percent.35 In total,
the probability of conflict occurring in those cells will thus increase by 29 percent.36 Omitting
the baseline effects would lead us to understate the effect in those cells by 50 percent. Note
that the positive baseline effects also apply to cells with no food production at all. The effect
is consistent with the hypothesis of relative deprivation: even in cells with no production,
higher food prices make consumers poorer, which causes grievances and can lead to riots and
protests.
In appendix B we present various robustness checks. We perform the same robustness
35We assume a linear effect: each additional unit of agricultural specialization has the same effect. If we
instead estimate equation 4 with the interaction of food prices and a dummy variable indicating if agricultural
production is larger than a certain threshold, we observe again that more agriculture leads to more conflict,
but as the share of agricultural land increases the extra effect on conflict becomes smaller. For example, for
ACLED output conflict, a one percent increase in real food prices leads to a maximal increase in the absolute
probability of conflict incidence of 0.21 percentage points for cells with a share of agricultural land of more than
1.56 percent (the median). For cells with a share of agricultural land of more than 7.19 percent (75 percentile)
and 21.27 (90 percentile) there is an increase in conflict incidence of respectively 0.37 and 0.44 percentage
points.
36These numbers are calculated as follows: 0.0344 is multiplied with 10 (size of the price increase) and
divided by 2.36 (unconditional probability of conflict), which results in a relative increase in the probability
of 15 percent. 0.005 is also multiplied with 10 (size of the price increase) and divided by 2.36 (unconditional
probability of conflict), this number is then multiplied by 7 (average agricultural land share) which results in
15 percent.
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checks as in the previous section: controlling for local weather conditions, changing the set of
external instruments, using a broader index of food commodity prices, and including only pre-
cisely measured events. Additionally, we also alter the measure of agricultural specialization
by using the share of cereal net exports in GDP instead of the agricultural land share. This
variable is only available at the country-level and the additional effect for cereal net exporters
is never significant at the 5 percent confidence level. However, the large, positive baseline
effect remains significant. Next, agricultural specialization could be correlated with other
characteristics. For example, there is a positive correlation between the share of agricultural
land in a cell and the population of a cell. A higher population density could be a breeding
ground for certain types of conflict. Therefore, as a robustness check we include interaction
terms of food prices with other characteristics that could be correlated with agricultural spe-
cialization and/or that have been found to play an important role in the literature. We include
interactions with population, travel time, the polity2 index for democracy, and an ethnic di-
versity dummy. Overall, for both factor and output conflict incidence, the positive effect for
cells with more agriculture remains significantly positive when including these interactions.
We also find that more populous, and less distant cells experience more output conflict when
food prices increase.
6.3 Why Is There More (Output) Conflict in Cells With More Agriculture?
Our finding that in cells with more agriculture, higher food prices have a stronger positive
effect on (mainly) output conflict incidence might seem somewhat counter-intuitive. Figure
6 sheds more light on this matter. The left histogram in figure 6 shows how much of the
household budget is spent on food and beverages in Africa and the right histogram shows the
share of the budget spent on grains. These figures are based on household survey data from
2010 provided by the World Bank.
In the majority of the countries more than fifty percent of the household budget is spent
on food and beverages (left histogram). The total numbers (black bars) mask a divergence
between the urban population (gray bars) on the one hand, and the rural population (white
bars) and the population belonging to the lowest income group (blue bars) on the other hand.
In the majority of the countries, these latter two groups spend more than sixty percent on
food and beverages. It is remarkable that even in rural areas, where we expect households
to be more self-sufficient, more money is spent on food and beverages than in urban areas.
Grains take up a smaller part of the household budget, but they are again more important for
rural and low income households than for urban households (right histogram). Knowing that
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in rural areas more money is spent on food and grains than in urban areas, it is less surprising
that in cells with more agriculture a food price increase leads to more output conflict.
7 Conclusion
Since 1997 political violence in Africa has resulted in more than 600.000 deaths.37 A plethora
of studies has tried to analyze which factors cause such havoc. A large strand of this literature
has focused on the link between income shocks and conflict. A subset of this literature has
focused on changes in international food prices as the source of income shocks. We extend
this literature by estimating the dynamic effects of exogenous food supply shocks rather than
a potentially endogenous food price change.
Our findings are the following: 1) Exogenous food price increases raise conflict incidence
and intensity in Africa. “Naive” estimates find the opposite effect, so identifying exogenous
price changes is non-trivial. 2) The effect is more pronounced for output conflict types such as
riots and protests (39 percent higher probability after a 10 percent real food price increase),
than for battles over land control (25 percent higher probability). Because we estimate a
dynamic model, we can see that the bulk of the effect only takes place beyond one year after
the price increase. Especially for output conflict the effect is persistent: also in the third year
after the shock there is still a significant effect on output conflict. 3) The effect on output
conflict is more pronounced in areas with more agricultural land. 4) Additionally, we show
that the inclusion of time fixed effects as is commonly done in the literature to evaluate the
effect for food producers wipes out the positive baseline effects for areas with and without
agriculture. As a result, the total effect for food producers is in fact much larger.
Overall, our results confirm that income shocks are a likely source for violent events.
Although most violent events probably do not occur because of higher food prices, but due to
broader economic conditions or political grievances such as injustice, inequality and political
repression (Bush, 2010, Berazneva and Lee, 2013), these income shocks can be a trigger to
engage in violent events. It is unlikely that the implications of these results will become less
important in the future. The demand for cereals in sub-Saharan Africa will approximately
triple by 2050 and unless there is significant agricultural intensification and massive cropland
expansion sub-Saharan Africa will depend much more on imports of cereals than it already
does today (Ittersum et al., 2016).
37Based on ACLED dataset, sum of estimated fatalities for all conflict types between 1997 and 2015.
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Consequently, our results support the type of policy recommendations oriented at insuring
poor societies against negative income shocks in order to avoid violent events (Blattman and
Miguel, 2010). However, our results also suggest that these insurance schemes should not
only be targeted towards farmers, but also — and perhaps more importantly — towards
the consumers. Measures targeting only the poorest consumers are easier to maintain than
broader consumer subsidies (Egyptian government food and fuel subsidies increased from 1.4
percent in 2002 to 8 percent of GDP in 2011 according to Hendrix and Haggard, 2015) and
cause less international turmoil than export bans or restrictions (a strategy followed by China
and India in 2008).
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Appendix A: Data
• Food production index excluding Africa: The construction of this index is based on
annual food production data downloaded from the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO). Annual production data for wheat, rice, soybeans and maize are allocated to
a specific quarter using country-specific harvest calendars. The four crops are then
aggregated into a global index using calorie weights. For a more detailed description
of the construction of the index, see De Winne and Peersman (2016). The index is
seasonally adjusted using Census X-13 (X-11 option).
• Real food commodity price index: The real food commodity price index is a (trend)
production-weighted aggregate of the price series of corn, wheat, rice and soybeans made
available by the IMF. These benchmark prices are representative for the global market
and determined by the largest exporter of each commodity. Seasonally adjusted using
Census X-13 (X-11 option). The nominal price index has been deflated by U.S. CPI.
• World industrial production: World industrial production is the world industrial
production index from the Dutch Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis backcasted for
the period before 1991 using the growth rate of industrial production from the United
Nations.
• Oil price: The real oil price series is the refiner acquisition cost of imported crude
oil. Seasonally adjusted using Census X-13 (X-11 option). The nominal price index has
been deflated by U.S. CPI.
• Domestic GDP: National GDP in current U.S. dollars made available by the World
Bank at an annual frequency (code: NY.GDP.MKTP.CD).
• Share of agricultural land in total: We use the share of the area of a cell used as
agricultural land provided by the PRIO-GRID. The underlying dataset is the ISAM-
HYDE land-use dataset. Data are available for 1990, 2000 and 2010. We interpolate
and extrapolate missing values.
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Appendix B: Robustness
B.1 Robustness of Figure 3
We perform a number of checks to evaluate the robustness of the baseline results of section
5. The point estimates are shown in figures A1 and A2, together with the two standard
error confidence bands of the benchmark estimations of figure 3. A complete overview of the
robustness checks, including error bands, is available on request.
• Mean Group estimator: A major concern of the approach proposed in subsection 5.1
is that we assume homogeneous slope coefficients for all cells. In section 6 we investi-
gated explicitly whether the slope coefficient is different for cells with more agriculture.
However, the literature has shown that various other sources of heterogeneity can exist
(see subsection 2.2 for some examples). Pesaran and Smith (1995) have shown that if
slope heterogeneity is present, a fixed-effects model is fundamentally misspecified and
will yield biased results. Pesaran and Smith (1995) propose a mean group panel esti-
mator where separate regressions are estimated for each cross-sectional unit and panel
estimates are obtained by means of taking cross-sectional averages of the estimation
results. Appendix figure A1 (dotted black line) shows that this mean group estimator
yields very similar results.
• Addressing potential omitted common factors problem: Everaert and De Groote
(2016) have shown that omitting common factors in a dynamic panel model implies
inconsistent estimators when the omitted common factor shows persistence. The incon-
sistency spills over even to the exogenous variables (in our case the instrumented fpt) if
these are correlated with the lagged dependent variable (in our case cit−1). In order to
deal with this potential bias we use an IV approach in order to eliminate any time fixed
effect, except for the effect of an exogenous food shock. Specifically, we instrument all
variables in equation 2 that could be correlated with the omitted common factors: we
instrument fpt (and its lags) with the two external instruments (and their lags) and we
instrument cit−1 (and its lags) with the demeaned variable (across cross-sections). Ap-
pendix figure A1 (dashed-dotted green line) shows that following this approach yields
very similar results, indicating that the bias due to persistent omitted common fac-
tors is small. However, instrumenting 11 variables with 17 instruments renders the
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic very small and it becomes hard to assess the strength of the
instruments. Therefore we do not follow this approach as our benchmark approach.38
38Note that the natural logarithm of annual national GDP (δch × yct) could also be correlated with the
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• Different external instruments: For the baseline results we included two external
instruments. As a robustness check we include only one external instrument. The
size of the effect is very similar when including only the food production shocks as
external instrument (figure A1, full blue line), but the results are less significant. The
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics (tables available on request) are now much lower: between
6.7 and 16.7, so our instrument is a borderline weak instrument. The dummy variable
on the other hand is a much stronger instrument and the results are also significantly
positive when using only this variable as external instrument (figure A1, red dashed
line).
• Including weather variables: As mentioned above, if the changes in the food pro-
duction index are the result of weather phenomena that also affect Africa, and weather
has a direct effect on conflict, the results in figure 3 might be showing the effect of
global weather patterns on conflict. For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (2001) lists the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and the the North
Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) as key factors influencing African inter-annual variability
of climate. Burke et al. (2015) survey an emerging literature linking climate and con-
flict. In order to control for local weather conditions we include three different local
weather variables as a robustness check. These weather variables are made available at
the cell-year level by the PRIO-GRID project.39 We include the average temperature
in a cell, the total precipitation in a cell and the proportion of the year that experi-
enced drought. We include both the contemporaneous values and the one year lag of
the weather variables. The underlying sources for these variables are respectively: the
GHCN_CAMS dataset for temperature, the GPCP Version 2.3 Combined Precipitation
Data Set (both provided by the NOAA/OAR/ESRL PSD, Boulder, Colorado, U.S.) and
the SPEI Global drought monitor. This latter variable captures deviations from normal
conditions and it takes into account both temperature and precipitation. Figure A2
(black dotted line) shows that the results are very similar when including these weather
variables.
• Broader index of food commodity prices: The size of the effect is slightly larger
when using the food commodity price index from the International Monetary Fund
(figure A2, full blue line). This index is a trade-weighted average of different benchmark
food prices in U.S. dollars for cereals, vegetable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, bananas,
omitted common factors. However, these country-specific coefficients are absorbed as fixed effects when using
the function reghdfe. Using the demeaned variable (across countries) also does not alter the results.
39These datasets can be downloaded at http://grid.prio.org/#/download.
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and oranges. These benchmark prices are representative of the global market and are
determined by the largest exporter of each commodity. A one percent increase in real
food commodity prices increases the probability of ACLED output after two years with
0.16 percentage points, compared to 0.097 for a one percent increase in the narrow index
of food commodity prices. However, the two external instruments are less strong when
using this broad index.
• Only precise events: Both the UCDP and the ACLED dataset include information
on the spatial and temporal precision level of the event. Events are attributed the
highest level of precision if the actual date is provided by the source and if a particular
town and coordinates for that town are provided. Lower levels of precision are assigned
if only the week or month, or (a part of) the region of the event are provided. We
re-run the estimations, but we include only events when the exact month of the event
is know (temporal precision level lower than 5 for UCDP factor conflict and all ACLED
events - ACLED does not include events with less temporal information) and the exact
location or 25 km radius is known (spatial precision level lower than or equal to 2 for
UCDP events and equal to 1 for ACLED events). The results (figure A2, red dotted
line) remain largely unchanged.
The results are also qualitatively robust to changing the time period (using the full sample
for both conflict types — 1989Q1 until 2014Q4 for UCDP factor conflict and 1997Q1 until
2015Q4 for ACLED output conflict — or restricting the sample period to the pre-crisis period
1997Q1 until 2006Q4. These results are available on request.
B.2 Robustness of Figure 5
First of all, we perform the same robustness checks as for figure 3. These results are available
on request. Again, the results are quantitatively robust to including weather variables, chang-
ing the external instruments, using a broader index of food commodity prices, and including
only precise events.
Second, we perform a number of additional robustness checks. Here we focus on the
robustness of the results in column (iii), the IV estimations of equation 4.
• Cereal Net Exports: Instead of the land share devoted to agriculture we can also use
the share of cereal net exports in GDP as a measure of agricultural specialization. The
use of the share of cereal net exports in GDP is more in line with the country-year panel
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papers that have constructed country-specific food price indices by multiplying interna-
tional commodity prices with (net) export shares (see for example (Besley and Persson,
2008, Brückner and Ciccone, 2010, Arezki and Brückner, 2014, Bazzi and Blattman,
2014) and Janus and Riera-Crichton, 2015). However, the share of cereal net exports in
GDP is only available at the country level.40 Figure A3 shows that countries with (one
standard deviation) more cereal net exports experience more factor and output con-
flict after an increase in food prices, but the effect is not very significant. Importantly,
the green impulse responses show that there is a significant baseline effect on conflict
incidence and intensity for both types of conflict.
• Controlling for other interactions: Agricultural specialization might be correlated
with other characteristics. For example, there is a positive correlation between the share
of agricultural land in a cell and the population of a cell. A higher population density
could increase certain types of conflict. Therefore, as a robustness check we include
interaction terms of food prices with other characteristics that could be correlated with
agricultural specialization and/or that have been found to play an important role in the
literature. We include interactions with population, travel time, the polity2 index for
democracy and an ethnic diversity dummy. Population at the cell level is made available
by the PRIO-GRID at five-year intervals.41 Berman and Couttenier (2015) find that the
relationship between income shocks and conflict is significantly weaker for more remote
cells, because these cells are less likely to be affected by international shocks. Therefore
we also include the interaction with a variable measuring the travel time to the nearest
urban center. This time-invariant variable is also provided by the PRIO-GRID.42 Next,
Hendrix and Haggard (2015) find a positive relationship between food prices on urban
unrest, but only for democracies. Therefore we also include the interaction with the
annual Polity2 index, which scores countries between -10 (strongly autocratic) and +10
(strongly democratic).43 Finally, Janus and Riera-Crichton (2015) find that commod-
ity terms of trade declines cause civil war only in countries with intermediate ethnic
diversity. In line with their approach we construct a dummy variable equal to one for
countries with intermediate ethnic diversity: this corresponds with a population share
40Cereal export and import data is downloaded from the UN Comtrade Database (SITC Rev. 2, Cereals
and cereals preparations). GDP is made available by the World Bank.
41The underlying source is the Gridded Population of the World dataset, made available by the Socioeconomic
Data and Applications Center.
42The underlying global map of accessibility was developed by the European Commission and the World
Bank.
43This index is part of the Polity IV project, and it is produced by the Center for Systemic Peace.
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of the largest ethnic group between 50% and 85%, based on data from Fearon (2003).
Figures A4 and A5 show the results for the interaction with these characteristics. The
full set of results, including the baseline effect and additional effect for cells with more
agriculture, are available on request. The estimates are scaled so that they show the
effect of an additional standard deviation of the characteristic. Overall, for both fac-
tor and output conflict incidence, the effect for cells with more agriculture remains
significantly positive. For conflict intensity the positive effect largely disappears when
including the interaction with population. Additionally, we can see that more populous
cells experience less factor conflict and more output conflict after a food price increase.
More remote cells experience less output conflict. There is no significant impact of the
interaction with regime type. Finally, cells with intermediate ethnic diversity will expe-
rience more factor conflict (in the short term), which is in line with finding by Janus and
Riera-Crichton (2015). The long term effect (mainly for output conflict) is opposite.
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Table 1: Literature on Food Prices and Conflict
Paper Set-up & Sample Independent Dependent Distinction Controls Finding i 
McGuirk and 
Burke (2017)
Grid cell - Year 
Africa '89-'13
Producer prices: ∑(World Pricest*Trade 
Sharecountry*Crop Land Sharecell) 
Consumer prices: ∑(World Pricest*Trade 
Sharecountry*Crop Calorie Sharecountry) 
Conflict (UCDP GED, ACLED & 
Afrobarometer Survey) (dummy for 
incidence, onset, offset)
Type of conflict
Food vs. cash crops, 
Interaction with luminosity, 
urbanization.
Control for weather, for interaction 
with population, distance to lights 
and capital, mountain terrain, 
precolonial hierarchy.
Mixed: - (P) & + (C) for 
factor conflictii
+ (P&C) for output conflict 
Raleigh et al. (2015) Regional - Month 
Africa '97-'10
Local Commodity Pricesrt (IV: International Pricest) Violent Conflict (ACLED) (count) Interaction with climate, 
feedback from conflict to 
prices
Democracy, economic growth (t) +
Janus and Riera-
Crichton (2015)
Country - Year 
Global '70-'09
Commodity Terms of Trade:
∆ln(∏(Pt^Export Sharec)/∏(Pt^Import Sharec))
Civil war  onset (UCDP, COW) 
(dummy for onset)
Interaction with ethnic 
diversity
Income, population, trade openness, 
government expenditure, foreign aid, 
democracy (t-5)
Mixed: - (P) & + (C)
Hendrix and 
Haggard
(2015)
City - Year 
Asia & Africa '61-'10
International Food Pricest Urban protests and riots (PRIO Urban 
Social Disturbance database) (count)
Interaction with regime type GDP per capita, GDP growth, trade 
openness (t-1)
+
Fjelde (2015) Grid cell - Year 
Africa '90-'10
∆(∑Export Pricest-1 * Productionc) Conflict (UCDP GED) (dummy for 
incidence)
Asymmetries Local income, population, excluded 
ethnic group, time since conflict, 
spatial dependence, drought, oil or 
diamond extraction. (t-1)
- (P)
Berman and 
Couttenier (2015)
Grid cell - Year 
sub-Saharan Africa '80-'06
World Import Valuecountry,t*Productionregion Conflict (UCDP GED, ACLED) 
(dummy for incidence, intensity, onset 
and ending)
Interaction with remoteness 
(distance to seaport)
Interaction with distance to capital, 
distance to natural resources, distance 
to border, population, GDP (time-
invariant)
- (P) iii
Bellemare (2015) Month 
Global '90-'11
Food Pricest (IV: Natural Disasterst) Social Unrest (search of news stories 
and SCAD) (count)
+
Smith (2014) Country - Month 
Africa '90-'12
Domestic Food Pricesct 
(IV: International Pricesct & Rainfallct)
Urban unrest (SCAD) (dummy for 
incidence)
Type of unrest Election time, democracy, civil 
conflict, size of youth population, 
urban population, income, life 
expectancy, mortality
+ (C)
Bazzi and Blattman 
(2014)
Country - Year 
Developing countries '57-'07
(∆ln(∏Commodity Export Pricest^Export Sharec,t-
2))*Commodity Exports/GDPc
Civil wars, battle deaths, coups (UCDP, 
COW and others) (dummy for onset and 
ending, count of deaths)
Various crop types Consumption shock (t, t-1, t-2) No link
Arezki and 
Brückner (2014)
Country - Year 
Low-income countries '70-'07
∆ln(∏International Food Pricest ^ Food Net Export 
Sharec)
Demonstrations, Riots, Civil Conflict 
(UCDP and others) (count)
Weather conditions (t) + (P-C)
Dube and Vargas 
(2013)
Municipality - Year 
Columbia '88-'05
∑ln(International Commodity Pricest)* Productionm Armed Conflict (count) Various types of attacks, 
Various types of 
commodities
Coca production, population (t) - (P) for agricultural 
commodities, which are 
labour intensive
Brückner and 
Ciccone (2010)
Country - Year 
sub-Saharan Africa '80-'06
∆(∑International Commodity Pricest * Export Sharec) Civil War (UCDP) (dummy for onset) Rainfall (t, t-1, t-2) - (P)
Besley and Persson 
(2008)
Country - Year 
Global '60-'05
∑International Commodity Pricest * Export Sharec
∑International Commodity Pricest * Import Sharec
Civil War (COW, UCDP) (dummy for 
occurence)
Interaction with political 
institutions
Controls: Income, Democracy, 
Natural Disasters (t)
+ (P&C)
Notes: (i) “-” means higher food prices lead to less conflict. “+” means higher food prices lead to more conflict. “P” and “C” stand for focus on the effect for respectively producers and consumers. “P-C” means that the paper looks at a net effect, 
producers minus consumers, e.g. terms of trade. (ii) The authors define factor conflict as conflict over the permanent control of land and output conflict as as conflict over the appropriation of surplus. (iii) The authors shows that when using country 
level data no significant effect is found.
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Figure 1: Real Food Price Index, Unexpected Food Production Shocks and Narrative Shocks
Notes: The real food commodity price index is a (trend) production-weighted aggregate of the price series of corn, wheat, 
rice and soybeans made available by the IMF, deflated with U.S. consumer prices. The construction of the unexpected 
food production shocks and the narrative shocks is explained in section 3.
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
19
97
19
97
.
5
19
98
19
98
.
5
19
99
19
99
.
5
20
00
20
00
.
5
20
01
20
01
.
5
20
02
20
02
.
5
20
03
20
03
.
5
20
04
20
04
.
5
20
05
20
05
.
5
20
06
20
06
.
5
20
07
20
07
.
5
20
08
20
08
.
5
20
09
20
09
.
5
20
10
20
10
.
5
20
11
20
11
.
5
20
12
20
12
.
5
20
13
20
13
.
5
20
14
20
14
.
5
In
de
x
 
(10
0 
tim
es
 
n
at
u
ra
l l
o
g)
Unfavorable Narrative Shock Favorable Narrative Shock
Change in Real Food Commodity Price Index Unexpected Food Production Shocks
Chapter 3 - 38 
Table 2: Overview of Narrative Food Shocks
Impact  After 1Q
2002Q3 Unfavorable 9.4% 10.7%
Significant downward revised global cereal estimates
The FAO's July 2002 forecast pointed to a global cereal output which was considerably less than the previous forecast in May; it would be
the smallest wheat crop since 1995. The downward revision was mostly a result of a deterioration of production prospects for several of the
major wheat crops around the globe because of adverse weather in the Northern Hemisphere or for planting in the Southern Hemisphere.
The forecast for global coarse grain output was also revised downwards since the last report mainly because of dry weather conditions in
Russia. In September, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences announced that drought would slash the
country's winter grain production. Australia is one of the top five wheat exporters. In retrospect, U.S. wheat production decreased by 18
percent in 2002, and Australian wheat production decreased by 60 percent.
2004Q3 Favorable -6.9% -10.9%
Significantly improved forecast of world cereal output
Favorable weather conditions triggered expectations of significantly higher cereal production in Europe, China, Brazil, and the United
States. In July 2004, the International Grains Council announced an expected rise in the global volume of coarse grain. In September 2004,
the FAO raised its forecast for world cereal output after the previous report in June. Annual global cereal production increased by more
than 9 percent in 2004.
2010Q3 Unfavorable 8.6% 22.1%
Droughts in Russia and Eastern Europe
The 2010 cereal output in Moldova, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine was seriously affected by adverse weather conditions. Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (all three among the world's top 10 wheat exporters) suffered the worst heat wave and drought in more than a
century, and Moldova was struck by floods and hail storms. In Russia, the country that was most severely affected by adverse conditions,
the 2010 cereal crop was 33 percent lower than the previous year. In Ukraine, the wheat harvest decreased by 19 percent. Accordingly, in
July 2010, wheat prices saw the biggest one-month jump in more than three decades, a rise of nearly 50 percent. since late June. In
September, wheat prices were even 60 to 80 percent higher due to a decision by Russia to ban exports.
2012Q3 Unfavorable 7.9% 6.9%
Droughts around the globe
Due to droughts in Russia, eastern Europe, Asia, and the United States, there was a signifcant decline in global cereal production. In
retrospect, annual global cereal production contracted by 2.4 percent. In July 2012, the USDA decreased its June estimate for U.S. corn by
12 percent because of the worst midwestern drought in a quarter century. Heat waves in southern Europe added serious concern about
global food supplies later that month, as well as below-average rainfall in Australia. In August, there was news about a late monsoon
negatively affecting the rice harvest in Asia. According to the International Food Policy Research Institute, production of food grains in
southern Asia was expected to decline by 12 percent compared with a year earlier. Also in August, the Russian grain harvest forecasts
were reduced because of a drought. In October 2012, wheat output in Russia was estimated to be about 30 percent down from 2011; in
Ukraine, a decrease of about 33 percent was expected; and in Kazakhstan, output was reported to be just half of the previous year’s good
level. The wheat harvest indeed declined in 2012, by 33 percent, 29 percent, and 57 percent in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan,
respectively.
Note: Table based on De Winne and Peersman (2016) - Online Appendix.
Period Type
(Cumulative) change in
Food commodity market eventfood commodity prices
Chapter 3 - 39 
Figure 2: Conflict Events in Africa
Table 3: Descriptives
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Sample Observations
UCDP Factor Conflict Dummy (%) 1.18 10.82 1997Q1-2014Q4 768816
UCDP Factor Conflict Total Events 0.03 0.56 1997Q1-2014Q4 768816
ACLED Output Conflict Dummy (%) 2.36 15.18 1997Q1-2014Q4 768816
ACLED Output Conflict Total Events 0.07 1.06 1997Q1-2014Q4 768816
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Figure 3: Effects of a 1 Percent Increase in Food Prices on Conflict
(A) Conflict Incidence
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict
Percentage Points Price Change (OLS) Percentage Points Exogenous Price Change (IV)
Quarters Quarters
(2) ACLED Output Conflict
Percentage Points Price Change (OLS) Percentage Points Exogenous Price Change (IV)
Quarters Quarters
(B) Conflict Intensity
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict
Nr. of Events Price Change (OLS) Nr. of Events Exogenous Price Change (IV)
Quarters Quarters
(2) ACLED Output Conflict
Nr. of Events Price Change (OLS) Nr. of Events Exogenous Price Change (IV)
Quarters Quarters
Note: Cell fixed effects, cell-specific time trends, 5 lags of the conflict variable, 5 lags of food prices, and country-specific annual 
lags of national GDP are always included. External instrumental variables: residual from production function and narrative dummy. 
One and two standard error confidence bands based on Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
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Figure 4: Effects of an Exogenous Food Production Shock on Food Prices
Percentage Points
Quarters
Note: Cell fixed effects, cell-specific time trends, 5 lags of food prices, and country-specific 
annual lags of national GDP are included. External instrumental variables: residual from 
production function and narrative dummy. One and two standard error confidence bands based on 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Chapter 3 - 42 
Figure 5A: Effects of a 1 Percent Increase in Food Prices and Food "Producer" Prices on Conflict Incidence
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict
Percentage Points Percentage Points Percentage Points
Quarters Quarters Quarters
Percentage Points
(2) ACLED Output Conflict Quarters
Percentage Points Percentage Points Percentage Points
Quarters Quarters Quarters
Percentage Points
Quarters
Baseline Effects (IV)
Note: Cell fixed effects, 5 lags of the conflict variable and 5 lags of food "producer" prices are always included. Estimations of equation 3 include country-specific time fixed 
effects (TFE). Estimations of equation 4 also include 5 lags of food prices and the measure of agricultural specialization, and the country-specific annual lag of national GDP. 
External instrumental variables: residual from production function and narrative dummy. One and two standard error confidence bands based on Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
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Figure 5B: Effects of a 1 Percent Increase in Food Prices and Food "Producer" Prices on Conflict Intensity
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict
Nr. of Events Nr. of Events Nr. of Events
Quarters Quarters Quarters
Nr. of Events
(2) ACLED Output Conflict Quarters
Nr. of Events Nr. of Events Nr. of Events
Quarters Quarters Quarters
Nr. of Events
Quarters
Baseline Effects (IV)
Note: Cell fixed effects, 5 lags of the conflict variable and 5 lags of food "producer" prices are always included. Estimations of equation 3 include country-specific time fixed 
effects (TFE). Estimations of equation 4 also include 5 lags of food prices and the measure of agricultural specialization, and the country-specific annual lag of national GDP. 
External instrumental variables: residual from production function and narrative dummy. One and two standard error confidence bands based on Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
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Figure 6: Histogram of Food and Grains Shares in Household Expenditures
Source: World Bank Global Consumption Database (based on survey data, 2010 values) for consumption data. The 
lowest income group corresponds with an income below $2.97 per capita a day.
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Appendix Table A1: Maximal Effect of a 1 Percent Increase in Food Prices on Conflict
VARIABLES
(1) OLS (2) IV (3) OLS (4) IV (5) OLS (6) IV (7) OLS (8) IV
Horizon 6 6 8 8 6 6 6 6
Food Prices 0.004 0.030*** 0.015 0.092*** 0.0002 0.001*** 0.0001 0.003***
     S.E. (-0.003) (-0.007) (-0.015) (-0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.001) (-0.001)
     P-value 0.158 0.000 0.322 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.896 0.004
L1.Conflict Variable -0.021 -0.021 -0.023** -0.022** 0.026 0.026 -0.012 -0.012
     S.E. (-0.013) (-0.013) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.040) (-0.040) (-0.064) (-0.064)
     P-value 0.113 0.113 0.014 0.015 0.516 0.517 0.851 0.853
L2.Conflict Variable -0.008 -0.008 -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 0.063** 0.063**
     S.E. (-0.011) (-0.011) (-0.009) (-0.009) (-0.016) (-0.016) (-0.031) (-0.031)
     P-value 0.453 0.454 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.047 0.047
L3.Conflict Variable -0.016 -0.016 -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 0.027 0.027
     S.E. (-0.010) (-0.010) (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.011) (-0.011) (-0.020) (-0.020)
     P-value 0.127 0.128 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.193 0.190
L4.Conflict Variable -0.015* -0.015* -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.016 -0.016 0.072 0.072
     S.E. (-0.008) (-0.008) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.017) (-0.017) (-0.094) (-0.094)
     P-value 0.058 0.057 0.001 0.001 0.348 0.349 0.446 0.446
L5.Conflict Variable -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.054*** -0.054*** 0.063 0.063
     S.E. (-0.007) (-0.007) (-0.005) (-0.005) (-0.015) (-0.015) (-0.039) (-0.039)
     P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.113 0.113
L1.Food Prices -0.006 -0.040*** -0.008 -0.109*** -0.000** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.004***
     S.E. (-0.004) (-0.008) (-0.013) (-0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.001) (-0.001)
     P-value 0.168 0.000 0.545 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.790 0.007
L2.Food Prices 0.003 0.025*** -0.010 0.054** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.003**
     S.E. (-0.005) (-0.006) (-0.012) (-0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.001) (-0.001)
     P-value 0.522 0.000 0.394 0.029 0.175 0.000 0.545 0.016
L3.Food Prices 0.003 -0.011 0.007 -0.034 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.002
     S.E. (-0.005) (-0.008) (-0.013) (-0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.001) (-0.001)
     P-value 0.619 0.187 0.614 0.145 0.393 0.028 0.552 0.123
L4.Food Prices -0.011** -0.002 0.013 0.042* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
     S.E. (-0.005) (-0.007) (-0.017) (-0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.001) (-0.001)
     P-value 0.024 0.775 0.450 0.057 0.304 0.429 0.447 0.426
L5.Food Prices 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.008 -0.007 0.000*** 0.000* 0.001 0.000
     S.E. (-0.003) (-0.004) (-0.018) (-0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.001) (-0.001)
     P-value 0.000 0.002 0.671 0.704 0.001 0.094 0.125 0.432
Observations 636,098 636,098 615,738 615,738 636,098 636,098 636,098 636,098
Adjusted R-squared 0.254 0.254 0.333 0.332 0.278 0.278 0.489 0.488
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 60.82 51.43 60.81 60.76
Hansen J-statistic 0.353 1.41 0.149 0.873
p-value 0.552 0.235 0.7 0.35
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Cell fixed effects, cell-specific time trends, and country-specific annual lags of national GDP are always 
included. External instrumental variables: residual from production function and narrative dummy. Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors in parentheses.
(A) Conflict Incidence (B) Conflict Intensity
UCDP Factor ACLED Output UCDP Factor ACLED Output
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Appendix Table A2: Maximal Effects of a 1 Percent Increase in Food Prices and Food "Producer" Prices on Conflict
VARIABLES
(1) OLS (2) IV (3) IV (4) OLS (5) IV (6) IV (1) OLS (2) IV (3) IV (4) OLS (5) IV (6) IV
Horizon 6 6 6 8 8 8 6 6 6 8 8 8
Producer Prices -0.0001 0.001* 0.001* 0.002 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.00002** 0.0001** 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0001
(= Food Prices * Agricultural Specialization)
     S.E. (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
     P-value 0.770 0.068 0.078 0.146 0.001 0.001 0.029 0.015 0.063 0.250 0.004 0.184
Baseline Effect 0.017*** 0.034*** 0.001* 0.001***
(=Food Prices)
     S.E. (0.006) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
     P-value 0.006 0.000 0.058 0.005
L1.Conflict Variable 0.039*** 0.039*** -0.021 0.030** 0.030** -0.024*** 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.028 0.182** 0.181** 0.017
     S.E. (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.077) (0.077) (0.016)
     P-value 0.001 0.000 0.113 0.038 0.038 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.507 0.022 0.022 0.299
L2.Conflict Variable 0.039*** 0.039*** -0.009 0.019 0.019 -0.025*** 0.035 0.035 -0.049*** 0.174 0.174 0.066
     S.E. (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.027) (0.027) (0.017) (0.144) (0.144) (0.099)
     P-value 0.005 0.004 0.417 0.195 0.191 0.008 0.197 0.197 0.005 0.232 0.232 0.509
L3.Conflict Variable 0.023** 0.023** -0.016 0.017 0.017 -0.024*** 0.047* 0.047* -0.036*** 0.125* 0.125* 0.042
     S.E. (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.027) (0.027) (0.011) (0.073) (0.073) (0.036)
     P-value 0.043 0.042 0.130 0.152 0.149 0.000 0.087 0.087 0.002 0.091 0.090 0.242
L4.Conflict Variable 0.017** 0.017** -0.016** 0.018 0.018 -0.019*** 0.062*** 0.062*** -0.016 0.126** 0.126** 0.027
     S.E. (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.055) (0.055) (0.027)
     P-value 0.030 0.030 0.037 0.172 0.173 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.358 0.026 0.026 0.322
L5.Conflict Variable 0.008 0.008 -0.026*** 0.008 0.008 -0.031*** 0.044 0.044 -0.057*** 0.075** 0.075** -0.014
     S.E. (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005) (0.033) (0.033) (0.015) (0.030) (0.030) (0.037)
     P-value 0.353 0.350 0.000 0.563 0.556 0.000 0.194 0.193 0.000 0.016 0.016 0.702
L1.Producer Prices -0.000 -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001 -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 -0.001** -0.000
     S.E. (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
     P-value 0.411 0.008 0.018 0.405 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.013 0.325 0.024 0.240
L2.Producer Prices 0.001 0.002*** 0.001* 0.000 0.006** 0.002* 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000
     S.E. (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
     P-value 0.174 0.004 0.061 0.916 0.047 0.077 0.014 0.000 0.004 0.561 0.044 0.307
L3.Producer Prices -0.001* -0.002** -0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.000
     S.E. (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
     P-value 0.060 0.015 0.383 0.715 0.166 0.438 0.137 0.025 0.030 0.663 0.250 0.911
L4.Producer Prices -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
     S.E. (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
     P-value 0.764 0.640 0.371 0.744 0.167 0.291 0.481 0.767 0.619 0.794 0.202 0.607
L5.Producer Prices 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
     S.E. (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
     P-value 0.011 0.057 0.021 0.846 0.313 0.804 0.031 0.186 0.021 0.616 0.274 0.814
L1.Food Prices -0.021*** -0.043*** -0.001** -0.001**
     S.E. (0.007) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001)
     P-value 0.004 0.000 0.038 0.017
L2.Food Prices 0.014*** 0.023** 0.000** 0.001*
     S.E. (0.004) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
     P-value 0.001 0.012 0.018 0.072
L3.Food Prices -0.006 -0.017** -0.000 -0.001**
     S.E. (0.004) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000)
     P-value 0.205 0.028 0.135 0.049
L4.Food Prices 0.002 0.022*** 0.000 0.001**
     S.E. (0.004) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000)
     P-value 0.592 0.002 0.459 0.017
L5.Food Prices 0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.000
     S.E. (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
     P-value 0.199 0.526 0.781 0.852
Agricultural Specialization -1.835*** -8.375*** -0.069*** -0.226***
     S.E. (0.438) (0.969) (0.015) (0.016)
     P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TFE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Observations 628,117 628,117 614,504 607,523 607,523 594,838 628,117 628,117 614,504 607,523 607,523 594,838
Adjusted R-squared 0.220 0.220 0.256 0.297 0.296 0.325 0.354 0.354 0.279 0.332 0.332 0.507
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 57.37 30.63 55.56 25.87 57.34 30.63 55.49 25.87
Hansen J-statistic 2.331 0.340 0.770 2.644 4.149 0.0282 0.659 2.933
p-value 0.127 0.843 0.380 0.267 0.0417 0.986 0.417 0.231
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(A) Conflict Incidence (B) Conflict Intensity
Note: Cell fixed effects are always included. Estimations of equation 3 include country-specific time fixed effects (TFE). Estimations of equation 4 also 
include the country-specific annual lag of national GDP. External instrumental variables: residual from production function and narrative dummy. 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses.
UCDP Factor ACLED Output UCDP Factor ACLED Output
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Appendix Figure A1: Robustness of Figure 3
(A) Conflict Incidence
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict (2) ACLED Output Conflict
Percentage Points Percentage Points
Quarters Quarters
(B) Conflict Intensity
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict (2) ACLED Output Conflict
Nr. of Events Nr. of Events
Quarters Quarters
Two standard error confidence bands of benchmark estimations (Figure 3)
Mean Group estimator
Residual as Only External Instrument
Dummy as Only External Instrument
Addressing potential omitted common factors problem
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Appendix Figure A2: Robustness of Figure 3 (continued)
(A) Conflict Incidence
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict (2) ACLED Output Conflict
Percentage Points Percentage Points
Quarters Quarters
(B) Conflict Intensity
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict (2) ACLED Output Conflict
Nr. of Events Nr. of Events
Quarters Quarters
Two standard error confidence bands of benchmark estimations (Figure 3)
Including Weather Variables
Broad Index of Food Commodity Prices
Including Only Precisely Measured Events
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Appendix Figure A3: Robustness of Figure 4 -  Using Cereal Net Exports
(A) Conflict Incidence
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict
Percentage Points Baseline Effect Additional Effect for Cereal Net Exporters
Quarters Quarters
(2) ACLED Output Conflict
Percentage Points Baseline Effect Additional Effect for Cereal Net Exporters
Quarters Quarters
(B) Conflict Intensity
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict
Nr. of Events Baseline Effect Additional Effect for Cereal Net Exporters
Quarters Quarters
(2) ACLED Output Conflict
Nr. of Events Baseline Effect Additional Effect for Cereal Net Exporters
Quarters Quarters
Note: Cell fixed effect, cell-specific time trend, 5 lags of the conflict variable, 5 lags of food prices, 5 lags of the interaction, the 
measure of agricultural specialization, and the country-specific annual lag of national GDP are always included. External 
instrumental variables: residual from production function and narrative dummy. One and two standard error confidence bands based 
on Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
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Appendix Figure A4: Robustness of Figure 4 - Controlling for Interaction with Extra Characteristic
(A) Conflict Incidence
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict
Percentage Points Population Travel Time
Quarters Quarters
(2) ACLED Output Conflict
Percentage Points Population Travel Time
Quarters Quarters
(B) Conflict Intensity
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict
Nr. of Events Population Travel Time
Quarters Quarters
(2) ACLED Output Conflict
Nr. of Events Population Travel Time
Quarters Quarters
Note: Cell fixed effect, cell-specific time trend, 5 lags of the conflict variable, 5 lags of food prices, 5 lags of food "producer" prices,  
the measure of agricultural specialization, and the country-specific annual lag of national GDP are always included. External 
instrumental variables: residual from production function and narrative dummy. One and two standard error confidence bands based 
on Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
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Appendix Figure A5: Robustness of Figure 4 - Controlling for Interaction with Extra Characteristic (continued)
(A) Conflict Incidence
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict
Percentage Points Regime Type Dummy for Intermediate Ethnic Diversity
Quarters Quarters
(2) ACLED Output Conflict
Percentage Points Regime Type Dummy for Intermediate Ethnic Diversity
Quarters Quarters
(B) Conflict Intensity
(1) UCDP Factor Conflict
Nr. of Events Regime Type Dummy for Intermediate Ethnic Diversity
Quarters Quarters
(2) ACLED Output Conflict
Nr. of Events Regime Type Dummy for Intermediate Ethnic Diversity
Quarters Quarters
Note: Cell fixed effect, cell-specific time trend, 5 lags of the conflict variable, 5 lags of food prices, 5 lags of food "producer" prices,  
the measure of agricultural specialization, and the country-specific annual lag of national GDP are always included. External 
instrumental variables: residual from production function and narrative dummy. One and two standard error confidence bands based 
on Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
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